(c. 90, 47 Stat. 70), such contracts are made unenforceable in the Federal courts. Quite clearly in so far as concerns clause (C), and apparently no less so with reference to clauses (A) and (B), the Congress merely has taken cognizance of factual situations which exist or may exist in the States and has provided against denying compensation for refusing to accept work under the specified "conditions," but has not attempted in the Social Security Act either to preserve or to eliminate the existence of such conditions.

It also appears to have been urged upon the Board that the rights to organize and to strike are conferred by other Federal legislation, such as the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the National Labor Relations Act (c. 372, 49 Stat. 449), and that the Social Security Act was designed to conform to the same legislative policy. The Congress has recognized the right of labor to organize for its protection, etc., within specified spheres of Federal power; likewise it has provided for the safeguarding of such rights, but only within the scope of that power. For example, the National Labor Relations Act provides that "employees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations," etc., in the field of interstate and foreign commerce; the Norris-LaGuardia Act declares and protects certain rights of labor within the scope of the Federal judicial power-and the Social Security Act provides for such protection within the domain of its operation. None of these acts attempts to confer or protect such rights within a State generally and without regard to the constitutional division of powers between the Federal and State Governments.

Nothing in the reports of the congressional committees. which considered the bill or in the debates in the Congress, indicates that any one regarded the provisions of the section under consideration as doing more than insuring that State laws shall be "genuine unemployment compensation laws" (H. Rept. 615, pp. 8-9, S. Rept. 628, p. 13, 74th Cong. 1st Sess.). That this is the purpose and effect of section 903 (a), moreover, was urged upon the Supreme Court by Government counsel, and apparently was accepted by the Court, in

Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 590-591, 593594, which upheld the constitutionality of the Social Security Act.

For the foregoing reasons I agree with the conclusion of the General Counsel of the Social Security Board that the provisions of section 903 (a) (5) of the Social Security Act require only that a State Unemployment Compensation Law shall provide against denial of compensation for refusing to accept new work under the conditions stated in clauses (A), (B), and (C) thereof, and that they do not mean that a State, in order to obtain certification of its unemployment compensation law, must protect the maintenance of these conditions or the right of employees and employers to bring about or participate in strikes, lockouts, etc.

Respectfully,

FRANK MURPHY.

COMPROMISE OF LOANS TO RAILROADS

The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to accept a cash offer in compromise on account of a loan to a railroad company under the Transportation Act, 1920.

Opinion of Feb. 25, 1924, distinguished.

The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

FEBRUARY 7, 1939.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In your letter of February 1 you state that the *** railway owes the United States $44,304.67 principal and approximately $17,000 accrued interest on account of a loan made under section 210 of the Transportation Act, 1920 (41 Stat. 468, 946), and that the carrier offers by way of compromise to pay the principal without interest. You ask my opinion concerning your authority to accept this offer "in view of the language in the opinions of the Attorney General" of January 18, 1923, February 25, 1924, and April 14, 1922 (33 Op. 423; 34 Op. 108, 151).

The Transportation Act authorized the making of loans to carriers by railroad, within 2 years after the termination

of Federal control, upon applications approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and provided that "the time, not exceeding 15 years from the making thereof, within which such loan is to be repaid * shall be in ac

* *

cordance with the findings and the certificate of the Commission." The Attorney General interpreted the statute as permitting extensions of the time for repayment, within the 15-year period, upon proper findings and certification. by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and concluded that the Secretary of the Treasury could not accomplish this result through exercise of the power to compromise. I quote from the opinion of February 25, 1924:

"If the Secretary of the Treasury accepted in compromise of a claim arising from such a loan, a new obligation or obligations of a later maturity, it would only be the indirect changing of the time of a loan made under section 210 of the Transportation Act, 1920, as amended.

"It is my opinion that under the general authority and power given to you by section 3469 of the Revised Statutes you cannot indirectly exercise the powers which were specially conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission by paragraph (c) of section 210 of the Transportation Act, 1920, as amended."

A proposal to compromise by present payment in cash of a part of the amount due, involving no such extension of time for payment with consequent exercise of a power specially conferred upon another agency, is a wholly different question and affected by nothing contained in the Transportation Act or in the language of the opinions cited.

It is therefore my opinion that you have the authority under section 3469 R. S. (U. S. C., title 31, sec. 194) to accept the offer in compromise hereinbefore mentioned and that no action by the Interstate Commerce Commission in connection therewith is required-understanding, of course, that the facts are such as to warrant a compromise under the principles commonly applied and having due regard to the question of collectibility.

Respectfully,

FRANK MURPHY.

DISPOSITION OF USELESS PAPERS IN THE TREASURY

DEPARTMENT

The National Archives Act repeals only that part of the act of February 16, 1889, as amended, which required heads of departments to report accumulations of useless papers to the Congress. The National Archives Act does not contemplate formal legislative approval by the Congress of recommendations of the Joint Committee on the Disposition of Executive Papers for the destruction of useless papers reported to the Congress by the Archivist.

The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

FEBRUARY 13, 1939.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In your letter of February 4, 1939, you outline the practice presently followed by your Department in disposing of its useless papers, and “in view of the doubt cast upon" its legality by the letter of the Acting Comptroller General of July 5, 1938, copy of which was enclosed, you request my opinion.

The act of February 16, 1889, 25 Stat. 672, entitled "An Act to authorize and provide for the disposition of useless papers in the Executive Departments," reads:

"That whenever there shall be in any one of the Executive Departments of the Government an accumulation of files of papers, which are not needed or useful in the transaction of the current business of such Department and have no permanent value or historical interest, it shall be the duty of the head of such Department to submit to Congress a report of that fact, accompanied by a concise statement of the condition and character of such papers. And upon the submission of such report, it shall be the duty of the presiding officer of the Senate to appoint two Senators, and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives to appoint two Representatives, and the Senators and Representatives so appointed shall constitute a joint committee, to which shall be referred such report, with the accompanying statement of the condition and character of such papers, and such joint committee shall meet and examine such report and statement and the papers therein described, and submit to the Senate and House, respectively, a report of such examination and their recommendation. And if they report that

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such files of papers, or any part thereof, are not needed or useful in the transtction of the current business of such Department, and have no permanent value or historical interest, then it shall be the duty of such head of the Department to sell as waste paper, or otherwise dispose of such files of papers upon the best obtainable terms after due publication of notice inviting proposals therefor, and receive and pay the proceeds thereof into the Treasury of the United States, and make report thereof to Congress."

The act of March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 910, provides in part (p. 933):

"That the Act entitled 'An Act to authorize and provide for the disposition of useless papers in the Executive Department,' approved February sixteenth, eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, be, and the same is hereby, amended so as to include in its provisions any accumulation of files of papers of a like character therein described now or hereafter in the various public buildings under the control of the several Executive Departments of the Government."

The National Archives Act, approved June 19, 1934, (48 Stat. 1122), reads in pertinent part:

"SEC. 3. All archives or records belonging to the Government of the United States (legislative, executive, judicial, and other) shall be under the charge and superintendence of the Archivist to this extent: He shall have full power to inspect personally or by deputy the records of any agency of the United States Government whatsoever and wheresoever located, and shall have the full cooperation of any and all persons in charge of such records in such inspections, and to requisition for transfer to the National Archives Establishment such archives, or records as the National Archives Council, hereafter provided shall approve for such transfer,

* * *99

"SEC. 9. That the Archivist * * * shall * transmit to Congress * * * on January 1 of each year, with the approval of the Council, a list or description of the papers, documents, and so forth (among the archives and records of the Government), which appear to have no permanent value or historical interest, and which, with the