man, uses for the purpose of his present existence. The air is universally diffused for him who is able to respire, and so for him who is willing to partake of it the intelligent power, which holds within it all things, is diffused as wide and free as the air. (VIII. 54.) It is by living a divine life that man approaches to a knowledge of the divinity." It is by following the divinity within, δαίμων or θεός as Antoninus calls it, that man comes nearest to the deity, the supreme good, for man can never attain to perfect agreement with his internal guide (rò nyeμovikóv). "Live with the gods. And he does (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν). live with the gods who constantly shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and that it does all the daemon (Saíuwv) wishes, which Zeus hath

manner we must think also about the deity, who in power is most mighty, in beauty most comely, in life immortal, and in virtue supreme: wherefore though he is invisible to human nature, he is seen by his very works." Other passages to the same purpose are quoted by Gataker (p. 382). Bishop Butler has the same as to the soul: "Upon the whole then our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly instruments, which the living persons, ourselves, make use of to perceive and move with." If this is not plain enough, he also says: "It follows that our organized bodies are no more ourselves, or part of ourselves than any other matter around us." (Compare Anton. x. 38.)

14 The reader may consult Discourse V. "Of the existence and nature of God," in John Smith's "Select Discourses." He has prefixed as a text to this Discourse, the striking passage of Agapetus, Paraenes. § 3:

He who knows himself will know God; and he who knows God will be made like to God; and he will be made like to God, who has become worthy of God; and he becomes worthy of God, who does nothing unworthy of God, but thinks the things that are his, and speaks what he thinks, and does what he speaks." I suppose that the old saying, "Know thyself," which is attributed to Socrates and others, had a larger meaning than the narrow sense which is generally given to it. (Agapetus, ed. Stephan. Schoning, Franeker, 1608. This volume con tains also the Paraeneses of Nilus.)

given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this daemon is every man's understanding and reason." (v. 27.)

There is in man, that is in the reason, the intelligence, a superior faculty which if it is exercised rules all the rest. This is the ruling faculty (rò yeμovikóv), which Cicero (De Natura Deorum, II. 11) renders by the Latin word Principatus, "to which nothing can or ought to be superior." Antoninus often uses this term, and others which are equivalent. He names it (VII. 64) "the governing intelligence." The governing faculty is the master of the soul. (v. 26.) A man must reverence only his ruling faculty and the divinity within him. As we must reverence that which is supreme in the universe, so we must reverence that which is supreme in ourselves, and this is that which is of like kind with that which is supreme in the universe. (v. 21.) So, as Plotinus says, the soul of man can only know the divine, so far as it knows itself. In one passage (xI. 19) Antoninus speaks of a man's condemnation of himself, when the diviner part within him has been overpowered and yields to the less honourable and to the perishable part, the body, and its gross pleasures. In a word, the views of Antoninus on this matter, however his expressions may vary, are exactly what Bishop Butler expresses, when he speaks of " the natural supremacy of reflection or conscience," of the faculty "which surveys, approves or disapproves the several affections of our mind and actions of our lives."

Much matter might be collected from Antoninus on the notion of the Universe being one animated Being. But all that he says amounts to no more, as Schultz remarks, than this: the soul of man is most intimately unitol to his body

E

one.

and together they make one animal, which we call man; the Deity is most intimately united to the world or the material universo, and together they form one whole. But Antoninus did not view God and the material universe as the same, any more than he viewed the body and soul of man as Antoninus has no speculations on the absolute nature of the deity. It was not his fashion to waste his time on what man cannot understand.15 He was satisfied that God exists, that he governs all things, that man can only have an imperfect knowledge of his nature, and he must attain this imperfect knowledge by reverencing the divinity which is within him, and keeping it pure.

From all that has been said it follows that the universe is administered by the Providence of God (póvolα), and that all things are wisely ordered. There are passages in

which Antoninus expresses doubts, or states different possible theories of the constitution and government of the Universe, but he always recurs to his fundamental principle, that if we admit the existence of a deity, we must also admit that he orders all things wisely and well. (ïv. 27; vi. 1; ix. 28; XII. 5, and many other passages.) Epictetus says (1.6) that we can discern the providence which rules the world, if we possess two things, the power of sceing all that happens with respect to each thing, and a grateful disposition.

But if all things are wisely ordered, how is the world so full of what we call evil, physical and moral? If instead of saying that there is evil in the world, we use the expression which I have used, “what we call evil," we have partly anti

" "God who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities. Looke, Essay concerning the Human Understanding, II. chap. 17.

cipated the Emperor's answer. We see and feel and know imperfectly very few things in the few years that we live, and all the knowledge and all the experience of all the human race is positive ignorance of the whole, which is infinite. Now as our reason teaches us that everything is in some way related to and connected with every other thing, all notion of evil as being in the universe of things is a contradiction, for if the whole comes from and is governed by an intelligent being, it is impossible to conceive anything in it which tends to the evil or destruction of the whole. (v. 55; x. 6.) Everything is in constant mutation, and yet the whole subsists. We might imagine the solar system resolved into its elemental parts, and yet the whole would still subsist “ever young and perfect."

All things, all forms, are dissolved and new forms appear. All living things undergo the change which we call death. If we call death an evil, then all change is an evil. Living beings also suffer pain, and man suffers most of all, for he suffers both in and by his body and by his intelligent part. Men suffer also from one another, and perhaps the largest part of human suffering comes to man from those whom ho calls his brothers. Antoninus says (vIII. 55), "Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe; and par ticularly, the wickedness [of one man] does no harm to another. It is only harmful to him who has it in his power to be released from it as soon as he shall choose." The first part of this is perfectly consistent with the doctrine that the whole can sustain no evil or harm. The second part must be explained by the Stoic principle that there is no evil in anything which is not in our power. from another is his evil, not ours.

What wrong we suffer But this is an admission

that there is evil in a sort, for he who does wrong does evil, and if others can endure the wrong, still there is evil in the wrong doer. Antoninus (xI. 18) gives many excellent precepts with respect to wrongs and injuries, and his precepts are practical. He teaches us to bear what we cannot avoid, and his lessons may be just as useful to him who denies the being and the government of God as to him who believes in both. There is no direct answer in Antoninus to the objections which may be made to the existence and providence of God because of the moral disorder and suffering which are in the world, except this answer which he makes in reply to the supposition that even the best men may be extinguished by death. He says if it is so, we may be sure that if it ought to have been otherwise, the gods would have ordered it otherwise. (XII. 5.) His conviction of the wisdom which we may observe in the government of the world is too strong to be disturbed by any apparent irregularities in the order of things. That these disorders exist is a fact, and those who would conclude from them against the being and government of God conclude too hastily. We all admit that there is an order in the material world, a Nature, in the sense in which that word has been explained, a constitution (Karaoke), what we call a system, a relation of parts to one another and a fitness of the whole for something. So in the constitution of plants and of animals there is an order, a fitness for some end. Sometimes the order, as we conceive it, is interrupted and the end, as we conceive it, is not attained. The seed, the plant or the animal sometimes perishes before it has passed through all its changes and done all its uses. It is according to Nature, that is a fixed order, for some to perish early and for others to do all their uses and leave successors to take