INSOLVENT DEBTORS' LAWS.

INSOLVENCY LAWS OF ANOTHER STATE. Continued.

4. Under a domestic attachment in a court in the State of Pennsyl-
vania, trustees of the estate of the debtor were appointed by such court
in accordance with a statute of that State, which statute vested them with
all the estate of the debtor, including all debts and things in action from
the date of such attachment. Creditors of such debtor, residents of the
State of Pennsylvania, brought an action by attachment against him in
this State, and garnisheed persons residents of this State, who were in-
debted to such non-resident debtor; and thereupon the trustees appointed
in the State of Pennsylvania sought to defeat the attachment here by
interpleading and claiming the debts garnisheed, by virtue of their ap-
pointment and the laws of that State: Held, that such trustees took
subject to the remedies provided by the laws of this State, where the
fund had its existence, and that the creditors suing here obtained the
right to have such fund applied on their judgment. Rhawn et al. v.
Pearce et al. 350.

INSTRUCTIONS.

OF THEIR QUALITIES.

1. Accuracy required on issues when the evidence is conflicting.
On an issue whether a bell on an engine of a passenger train was rung
eighty rods before the train reached a public road crossing, and kept
ringing until the crossing was reached, witnesses for the plaintiff testi-
fied, in substance, that they did not hear the bell or whistle, although
near enough to have heard it had one been rung or the other blown,
while on the other hand it was proved by the fireman and engineer the
size of the bell, its character and condition, and that the bell was rung
and the whistle sounded as required by the statute: Held, that it was a
matter of grave importance that the law should be accurately given to the
jury. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Dougherty,
521.

2. Calling attention to an issue not in the case. In ejectment to
recover a strip of land which had been occupied by the defendant for
twenty years, under a claim that it was within the boundaries of his
quarter section, in which the twenty years' Limitation law was set up as
a defence, the court instructed the jury, for the plaintiff, that if the de-
fendant, by his declarations and acts, admitted that his fence was not a
fixed and settled boundary line between the lands in dispute, they should
find the Statute of Limitations was no bar. There was no pretence that
the defendant ever claimed the fence as the boundary line, but he did
claim that the centre of the road along and twenty feet south of his fence
was the line between the two tracts: Held, that the instruction was
erroneous and misleading, as calling the attention of the jury from the
real to a fictitious issue. Grim et al. v. Murphy, 271.

INSTRUCTIONS. OF THEIR QUALITIES.

Continued.

3. Misleading, as not directing inquiry to matters in issue. On
the assessment of damages for lots sought to be condemned, there being
no pretence that they had no market value, the court instructed the jury,
that if they found, from the evidence, that there was no market value for
such property in such condition, they should determine the actual value
of the property from the evidence in the case: Held, that the instruction
was calculated to mislead, and was erroneous. The jury should have
been so instructed as to direct their inquiry as to the market value of the
property. Chicago and Evanston Railroad Co. v. Jacobs, 414.

4. When good as to one defendant, and vicious as to another. On
the assessment of damages for lots sought to be condemned for right of
way, an instruction given for A, one of the defendants, which is errone-
ous as to petitioner, is not relieved of its error because it may be proper
as to other land owners, when it appears on its face the same was given
on behalf of A. Ibid. 414.

5. Assuming facts to be true which are controverted. An instruction
which assumes as true certain statements and admissions of the opposite
party which are controverted facts for the jury, and that they were abso-
lute and unconditional, while the evidence clearly tends to prove that if
made they were conditional, is highly calculated to mislead the jury, and
is erroneous. Grim et al. v. Murphy, 271.

6. Correcting an error in one by stating the true rule in another.
The practice of giving an instruction which, standing alone, does not
correctly state the law of the case upon the facts, and then giving a sepa-
rate instruction which, if read with the other, would announce the true
rule, is not to be commended, if it is not an error. It is better that each
instruction should be as nearly accurate as it can be made, in itself.
City of Peoria et al. v. Simpson, 294.

7. Whether series sufficient as a whole. It being impracticable to
require absolute, literal accuracy in instructions, it is therefore sufficient
if the instructions, considered as a whole, substantially present the law
of the case fairly to the jury. Ritzman v. The People, 362.
GIVEN BY THE COURT.

8. Instead of those asked by the parties. Where the court refuses
all the instructions asked on both sides, and on its own motion gives
others, containing all the law involved in the case, there will be no error
in refusing the instructions asked, even though they contained correct
propositions of law, as no injury could result in such case. Hill et al.
v. Parsons et al. 107.

INSTRUCTION CONSTRUED.

9. As being contradictory. In a contest over a strip of land, between
adjoining owners, growing out of a dispute as to the true line dividing
the two tracts, in which the defendant relied upon the Statute of Limita-
tions, the court, at the instance of the plaintiff, instructed the jury that

INSTRUCTIONS.

INSTRUCTION CONSTRUED. Continued.

if the defendant occupied the land up to his fence because he believed
it to be the true line, without intending to claim to the fence if it should
not be the line, then an element of adverse possession was wanting:
Held, that the instruction was not accurate, and should not have been
given, its language being self-contradictory. Grim et al. v. Murphy, 271.

10. As suggesting what influences ought not to control as to extent
of damages. In an action on the case against a city and another party,
the court, in an instruction, told the jury that in forming an estimate of
the damages sustained by the plaintiff, they had no right and should not
permit themselves to be influenced by any consideration of what effect
their verdict might have upon taxation in the case of the city, or upon
his financial condition in the case of the other defendant: Held, that
this was in no sense submitting a proposition of law to the jury, appli-
cable to the facts, but a mere suggestion to them, which the court had
no right to make. City of Peoria et al. v. Simpson, 294.

11. Whether directing the jury as to extent of finding of damages.
In an action to recover damages for a personal injury alleged to have
been occasioned by the negligence of the defendant, the court instructed
the jury, for the plaintiff, that if they found, from the evidence, the
plaintiff had established his case, and was entitled to a verdict for dam-
ages, then it became their "duty to fix such damages at the full sum that
upon the whole evidence" should "prove to be just and reasonable:"
Held, that the instruction was calculated to create in the minds of the
jury the belief that it was their duty, in case they found for the plaintiff,
to fix his damages at the highest possible amount the evidence would
justify, and that it was error to tell the jury, as a matter of law, that such
was their duty. Ibid. 294.

INSURANCE.

LIFE INSURANCE.

1. Payment of premium after death of the assured. A person whose
life was insured, on demand refused to pay the second annual premium,
and died in about ten days after default in payment. Two days after the
death, a subordinate agent of the company, and friend of the assured,
being ignorant of his death, paid the premium, taking the insurance
company's receipt renewing the policy. On learning of the death of the
assured, the friend returned the receipt to the company, and it returned
the money paid by him: Held, that the payment by such friend, which
was made, and received by the company, in ignorance of the fact of the
death of the assured, could then amount to nothing, and that the party
to whom the policy was payable acquired no rights thereby. Miller v.
Union Central Life Ins. Co. 102.

2. To whom payment shall be made. An insurance policy taken by
the assured provided for the payment of a certain sum within thirty days
after due notice and satisfactory evidence of his death, to his wife, or

the legal representatives of the assured: Held, that the intention of the
assured was, that his wife should have the proceeds in case she survived
him, but in case she did not, such proceeds were to go to his executor
or administrator, to be distributed in the due course of administration.
Johnson et al. v. Van Epps, 551.

3. Meaning of the words “legal representatives." The words "legal
representatives," in a policy of insurance, as designating the beneficia-
ries, when there is nothing in the context or surrounding circumstances
to indicate a contrary intention, mean "executors or administrators." A
policy of insurance payable to the legal representatives of the assured,
is the same as if made payable to himself. Ibid. 551.

4. Of the right of assured to change same. Where a policy of in-
surance is made payable to the wife of the party procuring the same, or
his legal representatives, whatever may be the right of the assured during
the lifetime of his wife, after her death he will have the same power
over it as if it had been originally payable to himself, his executors and
administrators, and with the consent of the insurer he may surrender the
same, and take out a new one payable to another person. Ibid. 551.

5. Payable to a stranger. The insurance of one's own life by a
party, for the benefit of one not a relative, is not void on grounds of
public policy, as tending to encourage the commission of crime. But if
it were, no one but the insurer can raise the question. That can not be
urged by the heirs of the person insured. Ibid. 551.

6. Certificate construed, as to beneficiaries. A certificate of mem-
bership in a benevolent association, in the nature of a policy of life
insurance, provided, if certain conditions were observed and performed,
for the payment of the sum of $5000 on the death of the holder, “to be
paid as a benefit to his wife, L. H., and children, equally." The holder,
at his death, left his wife and five children, one of whom died after suit
brought upon the policy in the name of all, leaving his mother and four
brothers and sisters as his only heirs, and the cause proceeded to judg-
ment in the names of the widow and remaining children, who recovered
judgment for the full $5000: Held, that the widow and remaining four
children were entitled to the same sum as though she and all the children
were suing, and that the judgment was not for too much. Covenant
Mutual Benefit Association v. Hoffman et al. 603.

7. Where a certificate in the nature of a life policy of insurance is
made payable to the wife of the holder, by name, and his children,
equally, upon evidence of his death, "or in the event of their prior
death, to the legal heirs or devisees of the holder," the word “children”
will designate a class of persons, and those living at the time of the trial
of an action on the certificate, together with the wife, will be entitled to
recover the whole amount; and a correct construction of the latter clause
is, in case of the prior death of any one of the class designated to take

the benefit, the heirs of the holder or the assured, who, in this case,
were the surviving brothers and sisters and the mother, shall take the
share of the deceased party. Covenant Mutual Benefit Association v.
Hoffman et al. 603.

8. Proof of death of the assured, as evidence of what disease he
died.
A benefit certificate issued to a member of an association had a
number of conditions annexed from which the benefit was non-payable.--
such as, if the member's death was by reason of self-destruction, or other
acts named. The proofs of his death stated that he died from pneumo-
nia. On the trial of an action brought by the beneficiaries, this proof
was introduced in evidence, and the defendant asked the court to instruct
the jury that the proofs of death offered were not evidence of what dis-
ease the member may have died, which the court refused to do: Held,
that the proofs of death were proper evidence, although containing proof
of the disease of which he died, and that it was not error to refuse the
instruction in the form asked; and that had the court been asked to
instruct the jury that the proofs of death were no evidence on the ques-
tion whether the deceased had disease of the lungs or other diseases at
the time he made the application, it would no doubt have so instructed.
Ibid. 603.

DELIVERY OF POLICY.

9. And payment of premium-evidence. In a suit upon a policy of
insurance against loss by fire, the insurance company attempted to prove
that the policy was canceled before the loss, and that no payment had
been made for the policy. The plaintiffs called as a witness one of a
firm of insurance brokers, who testified that he delivered the policy to
the plaintiffs, and that they paid him the premium. There was evidence
tending to show that the broker firm had authority to receive the premium,
from the agents of the company: Held, that proof of the delivery of
the policy, and of all the facts and circumstances in connection with the
payment, was proper for the jury. Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. Summons
et al. 166.

CANCELLATION OF POLICY.

10. What will amount to a cancellation. A mere notice of an inten-
tion to cancel a policy of insurance is not a cancellation. The mere
intention of an insurer to cancel such policy can have no effect upon the
contract of insurance until carried into execution. Ibid. 166.

11. As to want of notice of cancellation. On a question of notice
of the cancellation of a policy of insurance prior to a loss, the insurance
company claiming notice to have been given to the agents of the assured,
there is no error in allowing the assured to prove that he had received no
notice of such cancellation. In such case it is proper to show that the
assured had received no such notice, as well as to prove that the agents
had no notice. Ibid. 166.