Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995Michael Bruno, Boris Pleskovic World Bank Publications, 1996 - 383 pages This review examines the relevance and efficacy of the World Bank's overall country assistance strategy for Ghana and the effectiveness of the various instruments of Bank assistance. The review finds that Bank loans of more than US$2 billion since 1984, including more than US$1 billion for adjustment operations, contributed to Ghana's progress. It cautions, however, that progress will be unsustainable unless the country proceeds with a large unfinished agenda of reforms designed to stimulate private sector development and enhance the prospects for sustainable agricultural growth. |
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... Incentives , Rules of the Game , and Development Is Growth in Developing Countries Beneficial to Industrial Countries ? Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization : Dani Rodrik Elinor Ostrom Richard N. Cooper A Review of Some Efficiency and ...
... Incentives , Rules of the Game , and Development Is Growth in Developing Countries Beneficial to Industrial Countries ? Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization : Dani Rodrik Elinor Ostrom Richard N. Cooper A Review of Some Efficiency and ...
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... Incentives , Rules of the Game , and Development Elinor Ostrom COMMENTS Robert Klitgaard 235 Margaret Levi 241 Floor Discussion 247 Is Growth in Developing Countries Beneficial to Industrial Countries ? Richard N. Cooper COMMENTS Willem ...
... Incentives , Rules of the Game , and Development Elinor Ostrom COMMENTS Robert Klitgaard 235 Margaret Levi 241 Floor Discussion 247 Is Growth in Developing Countries Beneficial to Industrial Countries ? Richard N. Cooper COMMENTS Willem ...
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... incentives of participants . When farmers select their own officials to govern and manage an irrigation system , the officials ' incentives are closely aligned with those of the farmers and with the system's per- formance . Many ...
... incentives of participants . When farmers select their own officials to govern and manage an irrigation system , the officials ' incentives are closely aligned with those of the farmers and with the system's per- formance . Many ...
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... incentives , and rules of the game necessary to make them players in the new global econ- omy . - And how we can be more agile in recognizing and dealing with the rapid changes in the countries where we work — monitoring developments ...
... incentives , and rules of the game necessary to make them players in the new global econ- omy . - And how we can be more agile in recognizing and dealing with the rapid changes in the countries where we work — monitoring developments ...
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... incentives ( affecting relative prices ) to certain types of capital accumulation , or through unstable macroeconomic policies , the rate at which factors are accumulated and the incentives to introduce technological innovations are ...
... incentives ( affecting relative prices ) to certain types of capital accumulation , or through unstable macroeconomic policies , the rate at which factors are accumulated and the incentives to introduce technological innovations are ...
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Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995 Michael Bruno,Boris Pleskovic No preview available - 1996 |
Common terms and phrases
1996 The International adjustment allocation Annual World Bank Argentina assets capital central government Chile conditionality Conference on Development corruption costs country growth Dani Rodrik decentralization defined benefit system developing countries Development Economics 1995 discussion effects efficiency employment example exports factors farmers finance fiscal fiscal federalism Folbre funds gender Gini coefficient groups household important improve incentives income distribution increase industrial countries inequality institutions investment irrigation systems issues jurisdictions labor land reform Latin America macroeconomic ment Michael Bruno multilateral lending Nepal OECD Ostrom output participant pension percent political poor poverty poverty line private flows problems production programs rates Redistribution with Growth reduce regional rent-seeking Research result revenue risk Rodrik role Rudolf Hommes rules sector share social stabilization subnational governments tion trade transfers transition economies United University Press variables wages women workers World Bank World Bank Conference