Games Real Actors Play: Actor-centered Institutionalism In Policy ResearchAvalon Publishing, 1997 M09 5 - 318 pages Games Real Actors Play provides a persuasive argument for the use of basic concepts of game theory in understanding public policy conflicts. Fritz Scharpf criticizes public choice theory as too narrow in its examination of actor motives and discursive democracy as too blind to the institutional incentives of political parties. With the nonspecialist in mind, the author presents a coherent actor-centered model of institutional rational choice that integrates a wide variety of theoretical contributions, such as game theory, negotiation theory, transaction cost economics, international relations, and democratic theory.Games Real Actors Play offers a framework for linking positive theory to the normative issues that necessarily arise in policy research and employs many cross-national examples, including a comparative use of game theory to understand the differing reactions of Great Britain, Sweden, Austria, and the Federal Republic of Germany to the economic stagflation of the 1970s. |
Contents
Policy Research in the Face of Complexity | 19 |
ActorCentered Institutionalism | 36 |
Actors | 51 |
Copyright | |
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Games Real Actors Play: Actor-centered Institutionalism In Policy Research Fritz W Scharpf No preview available - 1997 |
Common terms and phrases
able achieved actor constellations aggregate analytical assumed assumptions bargaining capacity cell Chapter Chicken game Coase Theorem collective competition composite actors concept conflict cooperative coordination game corporate actors decisions defined democracy democratic depend discussed distributive justice economic effective electoral empirical European European Union explanations fact Figure gains game theory game-theoretic hierarchical coordination implies individual inflation institutional institutionalism interac interest involved issues Keynesian labor leading coalition legitimacy macroeconomic majority ment mode of interaction monetarism monetarist move Mutual Adjustment Nash equilibrium Negative Coordination neoclassical economics networks noncooperative games normative options orientations Parametric Adjustment parties players policy choices policy processes policy research political Positive Coordination possible potential preferences Prisoner's Dilemma Problem Solving produce real-world rules Scharpf self-interest sequential game social solution specific stagflation status quo strategies theoretical theory tional tions tive transaction costs unemployment unilateral action unions veto vote voters wage welfare welfare-theoretic