History.

WAS THE CRIMEAN WAR JUSTIFIABLE IN ITS ORIGIN, AND SATISFACTORY IN ITS RESULTS?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.-II.

Ir is not our intention in this debate, or at least in the commencing portion of it, to notice any circumstances which occurred after the actual outbreak of the Crimean war; but we shall endeavour to show that the acquisition of territory, and oppression, with a view to the ultimate destruction of those powers which the policy of Europe rendered it impracticable to overcome by a sudden blow, have been the constant aims of Russia, as an empire, since the reign of its great founder.

Peter the Great ascended the throne in the year 1689, and, assuming the title of "Emperor of all the Russias," commenced his reign with a remarkably clear intention, not only of deserving this haughty designation, but also, practically, that of all the Turkeys."

The conquest of the surrounding states, and their annexation to his empire, by this Great Conqueror, are events_well known in history. Still a notice of them may illustrate the Russo-European policy. He died in the year 1725, and was succeeded by his widow, Catherine I. This princess, however, died, after a short reign of two years, being succeeded by Catherine II., who reigned thirty-four years, leaving behind her, at her decease, marks of oppression and cruelty; having added to her dominions, without really increasing the power, or improving, in even the slightest degree, the social condition of her country. She gained, by intervention between Persia and Turkey, the territory of Georgia; and in 1769 obtained from Turkey, by the aid of England, various concessions contained in the treaty of Kainardje. By other treaties more territory was obtained, and, in point of fact, the Russians gained some advantage in every treaty they entered into, with the exception, perhaps, of that of Pruth, from which, we believe, they derived no particular advan tage; but, strange as it may appear, the shackles pertaining to almost every treaty were thrown off, either when the chance of benefiting by them occurred, or as soon thereafter as circumstances showed the advantage of such a step.

Having thus very briefly endeavoured to point out the invariable practice of Russian potentates in straining every nerve to one great end-viz., new acquisitions, we will proceed at once to the reign of Nicholas, who was the actual aggressor in the late Crimean campaign.

Russia was, at this time, as may be easily imagined from the preceding circumstances, almost without a pretext for aggression. At length, however, a dispute arose concerning the Holy Places, and it was at this time that Prince Menschikoff, a man of low origin, came forward, possessing the full authority of the Czar to act in the matter as should seem to him expedient. This unlimited power was actually exercised without the smallest restraint, and, strange as it may appear, the only censure passed upon him was on account of laxity. Harsh and insulting as was his conduct towards the Turkish Minister, of whose immediate resignation he was the sole cause, and unrelenting as his extortions in treaty, as to the original demand-the Holy Places, the guarded policy of the Sultan completely nonplussed him. He, knowing the inferiority of his own forces, and not being able to reckon, with any degree of certainty, on the assistance of the other European Powers, chose rather to assent to the arbitrary conditions of peace offered by the Russians, than to adopt the precarious alternative of war entirely on his own responsibility.

Unfortunately, however, the Russian Emperor wanted neither the Holy Places nor an amicable arrangement. The former were useless to him; and the latter, as he well knew, was calculated to blast his ambitious desires. He accordingly despatched orders to Menschikoff-than whom he could not have selected a fitter instrument-instantly to make a demand, to which the Turkish Government could not, with any possible consistency, accede. This was his undoubted object, and the Minister accordingly despatched a note to Rifast Pacha, the foreign secretary, demanding the protectorate over the Sultan's Greek subjects, amounting to 11,000,000. He also endeavoured to procure a secret treaty with Turkey, stipulating that its terms should not be revealed to the ambassadors of the Western Powers; promising, in case of a rupture with those powers, to assist the Turks with an army of 400,000 men. This, as may be concluded, was prudently refused by the Sultan.

The Turkish Government now saw clearly that an attempt at reconciliation was worse than useless, as only bringing insult to and dishonour upon themselves.

This mockery of European power was, however, rapidly drawing to a close. On the 5th October, 1853, the Turkish Government published a declaration of war against Russia, enumerating its chief causes, and concluding by stating, that Turkey would repel the aggression by force of arms. The campaign now commenced without further delay; and before the end of October in the same year, the Russian and Turkish armies found themselves vis-à-vis on the opposite shores of that river-the Danube,-the interruption of the traffic on which so greatly influenced England and France in their effort to arrest the course of the Czar's ambitious projects. We trust this brief review will not be considered superfluous; it has appeared to us necessary to render our case complete, showing, as it clearly does, the aggressive policy of Russia, inherited pure

and unadulterated from her greatest emperor. This, we submit, taken in connection with the surrounding circumstances merely affecting Turkey, forms an ample justification of the Western Powers in the part they subsequently took in the war. But we will take leave of this for the present, while noticing the specified motives under which our Government acted: and first, with regard to the passage at the mouth of the Danube.

By the treaty of Adrianople, Russia had secured to herself the possession of both sides of the river Danube from its mouth to a long distance upwards, and commercial traffic was thereby seriously affected. Now, a conquest of that division of Turkey would most assuredly have placed sufficient power in the hands of the Russians to materially damage, if not literally extinguish, the right of way then existing up that river.

This is most undoubtedly a strong political reason; but we will notice another more general in its nature, and recognized, with the exception of Russia, throughout the Continent of Europe; it is the necessity felt for maintaining the balance of power therein,-its well-known object being to preserve peace and safety, and thereby to promote the interests of commerce in those countries.

These are the grounds on which we take our stand, and do not consider ourselves guilty of presumption when we submit that our case, as far as its first branch at least is concerned, is clearly proved. Surely, our opponents will concede that it is impossible to maintain the balance of power if the stronger is allowed to oppress the weaker with impunity, to undermine the very foundations of those natural laws which exist for the benefit of all; or, lastly and specially, to destroy those ancient usages so essential to the freedom, safety, and encouragement of commercial enterprise throughout the world.

Having thus shown an absolute necessity for war under the then existing circumstances, we must next consider how far its objects were attained, and whether any real good actually resulted from it beyond that which could have been achieved by any measures short of actual war.

If we were entirely without information as to the past history of Russia, we should feel that we have before us a real difficulty to contend with, and our first thought would be of a treaty. But while remembering the previous effects of such measures, we cannot be ignorant of their utter uselessness. Russia is glad to accept a treaty when it is her only resource,-when she fears invasion by a stronger power, and has not the means of repelling it; but she will not hesitate to employ it, although perhaps silently as does electricity the copper rod, as the means of passing over a dangerous period in security, and escaping, unscathed, those ruptures which might cripple its power by their violence. Knowing this so well as we do, can we wonder at the remark of Lord Lyndhurst during the discus sion of this question in the House of Lords," I have no faith in a treaty of that kind with Russia; it would not be worth the paper on which it might be written"? Was it possible, then, that any

treaty, however stringent in its provisions, could have the effect desired, viz., to set bounds to the encroachments of Russia? It might, it is true, have lasted a short time,-no doubt it would; but we did not want a mere temporary understanding, but rather one obtained by some means which should disperse the cloud then lowering over Turkey, so that it might never re-unite. Clearly but one course remained, and that course was war,-" War even to the knife." We do not for one moment deny the efficacy of a treaty merely to describe the bounds within which Russia must thereafter remain, entered into at the conclusion of more substantial measures, and after the requisite lesson had been inculcated by force of arms; indeed, it is very necessary, as calculated to preserve peace, and show to what another breach of the same description must inevitably lead.

Having thus noticed the impracticability of merely adding to the extensive list of treaties in this extremity, we will proceed at once, very briefly, to the plain question, Was the Crimean war satisfactory in its results? We have seen its objects, viz., to restrain the power of Russia, and to prevent the oppression of the Turks by that country. Have these objects been accomplished? We have no hesitation in giving an affirmative answer. The allied armies obtained possession of, at all events, the southern end of Sebastopol, from which position great advantage accrued, and there is no question but their success in this respect was the key to ultimate victory. Several great battles were fought and won by the allied armies during this campaign, which of course tended effectually to weaken and discourage their opponents; so much so indeed, as to render them utterly incapable of committing any dangerous breach of treaty for some time; and we think it highly probable that they may pause longer on another occasion, before they decide on giving such free and unlimited scope to their ambition, as may expose them to the alternative, either of a hopeless war, or humiliating con

cessions.

These are the reasons which have induced us to take an affirmative view of this subject; and in conclusion, we will ask our opponents one or two questions which we venture to submit will require a satisfactory elucidation before our opinions can possibly admit of dispute. Do they assert that Turkey is not necessary to the balance of power in Europe? Do they contend that its occupation by Russia would not threaten the peace of the continent, by the opportunities it would afford for further aggression? In answer to this, we may refer to the difficulties experienced by the Russians in their previous invasions of Turkey, and will leave our readers to imagine the increased difficulty when defended by Russians instead of the far less warlike Turks. We have it indeed on competent authority, that earth could not afford a mightier stronghold than Constantinople in the hands of such a nation." And again, do our opponents consider that England should have remained inactive and careless, while the important passes of the Dardanelles

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and Bosphorus were being closed, step by step, from European traffic, and entirely monopolized by an Eastern despot, and the Russian throne was being reared on the ruins of Turkey?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.-II.

W. H.S.

WELL indeed is it to ask this question, now that we are enabled to stand at a distance from the theatre of the sanguinary contest, and are no longer moved by exhibitions of pseudo-glory, the interested and rampant mouthings of military men and speculators, who, any end up, find war a glorious game. Hallo! here is a peace man! Yes, sir, simply because he desires to be esteemed a sensible man; and, according to his opportunity, to be a follower of that meek and lowly Jesus, who went about doing good. That authority is sufficient for him ;-what is your authority, my friend? Have you, like the opener of this debate, discovered, sapiently enough, that "the peace party, with Lord Aberdeen at their head, were the chief cause of the war"? Because the "peace party," acting upon Christ's teaching, counselled peace; and you, professing to believe in Christ's teaching, counselled war; and because war followed, not as a result or consequence, but because the hearts of men were set in them to do evil, then you declare that the war must be laid at the doors of those men who would cheerfully have laid down their lives to stay the war. That, my friend, is about as illogical a statement as you could well make, utterly subversive of the teachings of our common Christianity, and, further, is opposed to the facts. The men who can thus write and think must have counted the Czar a very nincompoop, ignorant alike of history and a knowledge of the tendencies of these war-like (or like-war) nations; and "the candid reader of history" knows he was neither one nor the other. The story runs, according to R. S., that "had the Czar counted on the determination of England for war, or foreseen the French alliance, it is almost certain he would never have entered upon war, but withdrawn his aggressive measures, immediately and entirely." But what are the facts to support this "almost certain" opinion? Does not the "careful reader" know that the English and French fleets were sent into the Black Sea and the Baltic before the declaration of war? And that, therefore, before the commencement of hostilities the Czar knew, if he did not know previously, the proclivities of the English and French nations in regard to war. If up to this time he had been under a delusion, his eyes were now opened, and all in good time to have amended his error. And yet he did no such thing, but, on the contrary, sent an angry manifesto to the Russian nation, declaring that "the English and French Governments had sided with Turkey, and, without previously declaring war, had sent their fleets into the Black Sea to impede the free navigation of their vessels of war." With that fact before you, you, "the careful and candid reader," will know how to estimate the deductions of R. S. and like-minded declaimers of the "peace party." Not only does