of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death, in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." Section 424, of part 4, reads in pertinent part as follows: "Sec. 424 (a). All provisions of law authorizing any Federal agency to consider, ascertain, adjust, or determine claims on account of damage to or loss of property, or on account of personal injury or death, caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, are hereby repealed in respect to claims cognizable under part 2 of this title and accruing on and after January 1, 1945, including, but without limitation, the provisions granting such authorization now contained in the following laws: [enumerating several prior statutes relating to the administrative adjustment of tort claims in amounts of $1,000 or less]. * "(b). Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to repeal any provision of law authorizing any Federal agency to consider, ascertain, adjust, settle, determine, or pay any claim on account of personal injury or death, in cases in which such damage, loss, injury, or death was not caused by any negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, or any other claim not cognizable under part 2 of this title." [Italics supplied.] Section 421 provides that Title IV shall not apply to "any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority" or to eleven other designated classes of claims, some of which might conceivably affect the Inland Waterways Corporation as well as the executive departments and other agencies. However, the section is without bearing on the specific question which has been presented for my consideration, that is, whether the statute repeals the authority heretofore vested in the Inland Waterways Corporation to adjust tort claims exceeding $1,000 in amount. That question depends on section 424. Section 424 specifically repeals certain enumerated statutes which authorized the settlement of claims by various agencies in stipulated maximum amounts of $1,000 or less. It also repeals "all provisions of law in respect of claims cognizable under part 2 of this title." A claim for more than $1,000 is not "cognizable under part 2" and, therefore, a provision of law in respect of such a claim is not repealed. This conclusion finds further support in the subsequent provision (subsection b) to the effect that nothing contained therein shall be deemed to repeal any provision of law authorizing any Federal agency to adjust claims in cases where the damage, etc., was not caused by any negligence or wrongful act or omission of an employee, "or any other claim not cognizable under part 2 of this title." [Italics supplied.] It has been suggested that the draftsmen of the act may have intended the word "cognizable" to refer to "the character of the claims mentioned in part 2, rather than the amount, in other words to 'any claims against the United States for money only, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, on account of damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or death caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government,' etc." The suggested interpretation, however, would not accord with the ordinary usage of that word, and the legislative history of the statute does not warrant it. If it was intended to repeal all statutes relating to such claims without regard to the amount and thereafter to permit no one but the Attorney General to settle claims over $1,000, and then only after suit had been brought, the provisions in section 424 (a) and (b) should have read, respectively, "claims cognizable under this title" and "any other claim not cognizable under this title." This would have been clear. However, the additional words, "part 2 of," were used in each instance. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that, in interpreting a statute, effect must be given if possible to all of the words used. Under this rule it is not permissible to assume that the words "part 2 of" were used without purpose, or to adopt a strained construction which renders those words meaningless. Furthermore, the statute uses "cognizable" in several instances with apparent careful choice of accompanying words each time to denote precisely a meaning that is clear if the words are given their ordinary significance. Thus, section 420, under part 4 ("Provisions Common to Part 2 and Part 3"), imposing a statute of limitations, refers to claims "cognizable under this title." On the other hand, section 413, of part 3 ("Suits On Tort Claims Against the United States"), authorizes the Attorney General to compromise or settle claims "cognizable under this part." [Italics supplied.] Moreover, the authority given the Attorney General by this statute to compromise or settle claims is limited to those in which suit has already been brought and is subject to the approval of the court. It seems unlikely that the Congress intended this general provision, relating only to claims in litigation, to replace the specific statutory authority previously given to various departments and agencies to settle claims involving more than $1,000 without litigation. It should be noted that statutes other than the act creating the Inland Waterways Corporation authorized administrative settlement of tort claims in amounts of more than $1,000. Thus, 34 U. S. C. 599 authorized the Secretary of the Navy to determine the amounts due on claims (not exceeding $3,000 in amount) for damages for which Navy vessels were found to be responsible. That statute was not included among those expressly repealed in section 424 (a). However, 34 U. S. C. 600, which authorized the Secretary of the Navy to adjust tort claims (not exceeding $500 in amount) "other than such as are occasioned by vessels of the Navy," is included among those set forth as repealed. Both of the foregoing provisions related to Navy claims; one followed immediately after the other in the United States Code; and the language of the repealed statute, "other than such as are occasioned by vessels of the Navy," contained a clew, if one were needed, to the existence of the other. Furthermore, the first mentioned provision (34 U. S. C. 599) appears in the Statutes at Large immediately preceding an 1 Section 7 of the act of July 3, 1944, c. 399, 58 Stat. 723, 726 (46 U. S. C. 797) authorized the Secretary of the Navy to adjust claims for damages caused by vessels of the Navy, etc., not exceeding one million dollars in amount, but the section provided that the authority thereof "shall be supplementary to, and not in lieu of all other provisions of law authorizing consideration, adjustment, determination, settlement, and payment of claims." It may be noted that this statute, too, was omitted from those expressly repealed in Section 424 (a). other statute of the same date, appearing on the same page (42 Stat. 1066), relating to administrative settlement of tort claims not exceeding $1,000, and the latter statute is set forth in section 424 (a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act as repealed. (The repeal provisions refer to all the enumerated statutes by their public numbers and include citations to both the Statutes at Large and the United States Code.) If it was intended that the act providing for administrative adjustment of Navy claims up to $3,000 should be wholly superseded, there was no apparent reason for not including it among those enumerated in section 424 (a). The failure to include it, under the circumstances, can hardly be dismissed as an oversight. It must, I think, be regarded as deliberate, and consistent with an understandable purpose, evidenced by the other provisions previously considered to repeal in toto only those laws authorizing administrative settlement of claims in amounts of $1,000 or less. Statutes less clear upon the point than this, providing for administrative settlement of claims, have heretofore been construed as repealing prior laws only to the extent necessary to avoid duplication of remedies. 39 Op. A. G. 102 and other precedents therein cited. The Congress was no doubt aware of this practice and anticipated the fact that this statute, too, would probably be interpreted in the light of the past practice unless very clear language should be used to indicate a contrary intention. Viewed in this light, the language of the statute clearly indicates that the Congress attempted here by precise words to make manifest that which has heretofore been spelled out by resort to a principle laid down by the Supreme Court in cases cited in 39 Op. A. G. 102. For the foregoing reasons it is my opinion that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not repeal or otherwise affect the authority of the Inland Waterways Corporation to adjust administratively tort claims in amounts exceeding $1,000. Sincerely yours, DOUGLAS W. MCGREGOR, PROSECUTION OF CLAIMS BY RETIRED ARMY OFFICERS Retired officers of the Regular Army are prohibited by section 109 of the Criminal Code (18 U. S. C. 198) from appearing as counsel before Army retiring boards, the Secretary of War's Disability Review Board, and the Secretary of War's Discharge Review Board. Assuming arguendo that the Congress, in enacting section 109, was primarily concerned with protecting the United States against the exercise of improper influence in the prosecution of claims for money, the Attorney General would be extremely reluctant to concede that the Congress had no other type of claim in mind. A decision on the point is unnecessary in this opinion. The SECRETARY OF WAR. as, JUNE 10, 1947. MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This is in response to your letter of October 3, 1946, in which you request my opinion as to the applicability of section 109 of the Criminal Code (18 U.S. C. 198) to the appearance, as legal counsel, of retired officers before Army retiring boards and other Army boards, for example, those created pursuant to sections 301 and 302 of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (act of June 22, 1944, 58 Stat. 286–287), as amended (38 U. S. C. Supp. V, 693h, 6931). Enclosed with your letter is an opinion of the Judge Advocate General upon the question, and a brief prepared by a retired officer who is now engaged in the private practice of law. The brief supports the view that the statute does not apply to the appearance of retired officers before such boards, and the opinion of the Judge Advocate General concurs in this view. The question presented is important to the proper internal administration of the War Department since it involves the eligibility of members of the military establishment, i. e., retired officers, to appear before Army boards. Section 109 of the Criminal Code provides: "Whoever, being an officer of the United States, or a person holding any place of trust or profit, or discharging any official function under, or in connection with, any executive department of the Government of the United States, or under the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States, shall act as an agent or attorney for prosecuting any claim against the United States, or in any manner, or by any means, otherwise than in discharge of his proper |