tempt to bring him to the United States. That an American citizen having a child born abroad may be precluded from bringing him into this country seems so abhorrent to our natural instincts that an intention to accomplish such a harsh result should not be imputed to Congress unless it is expressed in clear and unmistakable language. If barred from entry into the United States, such a child may never be in a position to comply with the requirements of the Act and thereby attain the very privilege of citizenship which the law would confer upon him. In many states such a child, as an alien, would not be in a position to take title to real estate and would, therefore, be prevented from inheriting real property even from his own father or mother. If admitted to this country, he would be subject to all of the disabilities of an alien until he reached his majority.

In Church of the Holy Trinity v. The United States, 143 U.S. 457, the Supreme Court went as far as to depart from the literal construction of an unambiguous statutory provision in order to avoid a harsh and absurd result. The same thing was recently done in Helvering v. New York Trust Company, supra. In the present instance it is not necessary to resort to such an extreme measure in order to reach a reasonable construction of the act consonant with the purpose and intent of the Congress.

A study of the legislative history of the statute convincingly supports the view that the purpose of Congress was to equalize the rights of men and women in respect of transmitting citizenship to their children born abroad, by conferring upon women the same rights that had been theretofore lodged in men-not by depriving men of the rights which they had theretofore possessed. The hearing before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the House of Representatives (73d Congress, 1st Session; Hearing No. 73.1.1, Mar. 28, 1933) on H.R. 3673—the bill which matured into the Act of May 24, 1934-record the appearance of a number of representatives of various organizations of women urging that the provisions of Section 1993 of the Revised Statutes be extended so as to apply to the children of American mothers. The report of the House Committee (73d Congress, 1st Session, House Report No. 131)

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stated that "the purpose of the bill is to complete the provisions of the Cable Act of 1922 so as to establish complete equality between American men and women in the matter of citizenship for themselves and for their children."

When the bill was debated on the floor of the House of Representatives, Congressman Dirksen, a member of the committee in charge of the bill, who opened the discussion, stated that the object of the measure was to give the mother of a child that is born outside of the United States the same right to transmit citizenship to that child that is possessed by the father (Congressional Record, Vol. 78, p. 20771). While Congressman Dickstein, the Chairman of the Committee, stated in answer to a question directed to him on the floor that a child born abroad of one American parent and one alien parent is born an alien and may acquire citizenship cnly in compliance with the conditions proposed in the bill (Congressional Record, Vol. 78, p. 73421), it is quite apparent that that view was not shared by other members of the committee. Thus it was remarked by Congressman Taylor that "if it has been deemed wise that the protection and privileges of our Government should be extended to the children of American fathers, it would seem to be extraordinary that the same principle should not apply to the children of American mothers." (Id. p. 7332).

When the bill came before the Senate, Senator Thomas of Utah stated that (Congressional Record, Vol. 78, p. 8470): "As the bill is drafted, it is rather impossible to tell with certainty whether the child during his first 21 years is an alien or a citizen; this applies to a case of a foreign-born child, only one of whose parents is a citizen."

Accordingly, he proposed a substitute explicitly providing that a child born outside of the United States whose father and mother were citizens should be a citizen from birth; and that any such child, one of whose parents was a citizen and the other an alien, might become a citizen upon complying with the conditions prescribed in the Act. The Senator stated that under his substitute such a child would clearly be born an alien.

Speaking in opposition to the substitute, Senator O'Mahoney stated that under the pending bill," the child becomes

a citizen at birth but such citizenship is subject to defeasance by the omission of the child to reside in the United States or to take the oath." (Congressional Record, vol. 78, p. 8471.)

Senator Thomas' substitute was defeated. It is quite apparent, therefore, that the Senate did not intend to adopt a provision which would have the effect of preventing such a child from being born a citizen but that it evidently adopted the view of Senator O'Mahoney that under the bill the child becomes a citizen at birth and that such citizenship might be divested if the child failed to fulfill the prescribed conditions.

The phraseology of the Act, though perhaps not as clear as might be desirable, leads to the same conclusion. The first sentence in clear and unmistakeable language provides that any child hereafter born outside of the United States, whose father or mother or both at the time of the birth of such child is a citizen of the United States, is declared to be a citizen of the United States. This is a sweeping, unequivocal pronouncement apparently subject to no limitation or qualification. To construe the second sentence of the section. as meaning that a child, only one of whose parents is a citizen, does not acquire citizenship at birth is at least partially to negative and destroy the grant of citizenship contained in the first sentence. On the other hand, if the second sentence be interpreted as containing conditions subsequent upon which the citizenship may become divested, full effect would be given to the entire section. In Petri v. Commercial Bank, 142 U.S. 644, 650, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller stated that "the rule that every clause in a statute should have effect, and one portion should not be placed in antagonism to another, is well settled ". Chief Justice Marshall in Postmaster General v. Early, 12 Wheat. 136, 152 stated that "the whole law is to be taken together, and one part expounded by any other, which may indicate the meaning annexed by the legislature itself to ambiguous phrases". Similarly, it has been stated that it is a settled rule of construction that one part of a statute must be so construed by another that the whole may, if possible, stand. United States v. Landram, 118 U.S. 81, 85.

It is, therefore, my opinion that a child born abroad subsequently to May 24, 1934, one of whose parents is a citizen of

the United States and the other an alien, acquires American citizenship at birth. Such citizenship is subject to being divested if such child thereafter fails to comply with the two conditions described in the Act, which must be regarded as conditions subsequent and not as conditions precedent.

Respectfully submitted.

To the SECRETARY OF STATE.

HOMER CUMMINGS.

COTTON AC

REFINANCING AN INDEBTEDNESS AGAINST QUIRED UNDER THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT Relative to the proposed plan of the Secretary of Agriculture, herein described, for refinancing an indebtedness of $100,000,000 outstanding against approximately 2,000,000 bales of cotton acquired under the provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, held that the Secretary is authorized to make the proposed loan and that he may re-pledge the cotton to secure the loan thus obtained.

The proposed form of the note to be used by the Secretary of Agriculture in connection with said refinancing plan is without legal objection.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 28, 1934.

SIR: I have your letter of July 25, 1934, and enclosures, setting forth the facts relative to the proposed plan for refinancing an indebtedness of $100,000,000 outstanding against approximately 2,000,000 bales of cotton acquired by the Secretary of Agriculture under the provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12, 1933 (48 Stat. 31).

Under the authority of section 4 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Secretary of Agriculture borrowed approximately $60,000,000 from commercial banks at the rate of 6¢ per pound on approximately 2,000,000 bales of cotton, giving notes for the amount borrowed and pledging the cotton as security by depositing warehouse receipts covering the cotton with the Federal Reserve Bank at Atlanta, New Orleans branch, as custodian. The notes mature July 31, 1934.

On January 8, 1934, for the purposes outlined in your letter, the Secretary of Agriculture with the consent of the producers, who, by reason of participation in the acreage reduction program, held options upon the cotton, established a cotton pool under the management of a pool manager,

who, pursuant to the authority given him under the pool agreement borrowed $40,000,000 from the Commodity Credit Corporation at the rate of 4¢ per pound on the said cotton. The obligation was evidenced by notes of the pool manager drawn in favor of the Commodity Credit Corporation and secured by a pledge of the cotton subject to the prior pledge made by the Secretary of Agriculture. The notes also mature July 31, 1934.

In order to protect the title to and the right of possession of this cotton and to effect a reduction in interest charges, the Secretary of Agriculture now proposes to borrow from commercial banks, under an existing arrangement, $100,000,000 at an interest rate of one-half of one per cent per annum, in order to refinance the loan of $60,000,000 and to advance to the Pool Manager $40,000,000 for payment of the notes held by the Commodity Credit Corporation.

You request my opinion upon the following questions:

1. Are the provisions of Section 4 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, sufficient to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to carry out the program above outlined?

2. Is the form of the note which the Secretary of Agriculture proposes to give to the commercial banks in proper authorized form?

It is indicated that there is doubt as to the Secretary's authority to make the proposed advance to the Pool Manager under the provisions of Section 4 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended by the Act of June 19, 1934 (Public No. 412, 73d Congress). That section is in part as follows:

"SEC. 4. (a) The Secretary of Agriculture shall have authority to borrow money upon all cotton in his possession or control and may, at his discretion, deposit as collateral for such loans the warehouse receipts for such cotton.

"(b) The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to advance, in his discretion, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of $100,000,000 to be available, until March 1, 1936, to the Secretary of Agriculture, for paying off any debt or debts which may have been or may be incurred by the Secretary of Agriculture and discharging any lien or liens which may have arisen or may