contest the attempted imposition of any such taxes, the question of liability being ultimately for the courts to determine.

"2. If your answer to question 1, is such that property is exempt from local taxation, will Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation be able validly to contract with states, counties, cities and other local authorities to pay, in lieu of taxes, such reasonable sums as may be agreed upon as compensation for the use of such services and facilities as are customarily financed by such bodies from ad valorem taxes? We refer to such services as supplying roads, school facilities, police protection, fire protection and the like.

"3. Will the members of the homesteading families living in such subsistence homestead communities, during the time that they are making payments under their contracts and title is held by Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation, be entitled to vote in state, county, city, and other local elections?

"4. Will the members of such homesteading families be subject to arrest by local authorities?

“5. Will the members of such homesteading families be generally entitled to the rights and privileges and subject to the duties and obligations of citizens of the city, county and state in which they reside, or will they be 'wards' of the Federal Government?

I quote for ready reference the following paragraph contained in my opinion of October 4, 1933, supra;

There

"While there may be some proper degree of federal 'supervision,' this cannot amount to a superseding of the authority of the State. The Constitution provides for the exercise of exclusive federal jurisdiction 'over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.' is no reason for believing that Congress contemplated any such assumption of jurisdiction over lands purchased for sites of subsistence homesteads, even assuming that the state legislatures would give the required consent. It is stated in Ft. Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 527, that when the United States acquires land without such consent the State may continue to exercise with respect

to such land the same authority and jurisdiction which she could have exercised over similar property held by private parties;' and this must be borne in mind when determining the proper function and authority of the Federal Government in connection with land purchased as sites of subsistence homesteads."

In my opinion, the occupants of the homesteads will not be "wards of the Federal Government," in the sense that they are removed from the political status of residents of the State and of the subdivision thereof in which they live, but will be entitled to the rights and privileges, and subject to the duties and obligations, of citizens and will be subject to arrest by local authorities. Their right to vote will depend upon state law.

As citizens and as potential taxpayers (even assuming that there may be at first an absence of privately owned and taxable property), the occupants of the homesteads will be entitled to such police and fire protection as may ordinarily be provided by the state, county or municipality for communities similarly situated; will be entitled to use the public schools and the public roads; and will be entitled to have their needs for such facilities considered by the local authorities in like manner as other citizens.

To the extent that the Corporation must supply a facility it may contract therefor, and there is no disability to contract with a state or other political subdivision for the supplying of a facility which the state or other political subdivision is not otherwise legally obligated to furnish. A precedent for the making of such contracts under somewhat similar circumstances is found in the report of the United States Housing Corporation (1920), v. 1, pp. 349, 358.

"6. Is Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation under the necessity of qualifying and registering as a foreign corporation in states other than Delaware when it seeks to enter into a state for the purpose of purchasing land, and entering into contracts with homesteaders as above set forth?"

The Supreme Court, in Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U.S. 305, 314, announced two exceptions to the rule that a corporation of one state, doing business in another state, is dependent upon the consent of the latter:

"One of these qualifications is that the State cannot exclude from its limits a corporation engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, established by the decision in Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. 1, 12. The other limitation on the power of the State is, where the corporation is in the employ of the general government, an obvious exception, first stated, we think, by the late Mr. Justice Bradley in Stockton v. Baltimore & New York Railroad, 32 Fed. Rep. 9, 14. As that learned justice said: 'If Congress should employ a corporation of ship-builders to construct a man-of-war, they would have the right to purchase the necessary timber and iron in any State of the Union.' And this court, in citing this passage, added, 'without the permission and against the prohibition of the State.' Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 186."

The last cited case had declared that " undoubtedly a corporation of one State, employed in the business of the general government, may do such business in other States without obtaining a license from them."

Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 156 Fed. 1, 16, citing the foregoing cases, stated that "Every corporation of any State in the employ of the United States has the right to exercise the necessary corporate powers and to transact the business requisite to discharge the duties of that employment in every other state in the Union without permission granted, or conditions imposed by the latter."

I accept the foregoing as applicable here. A fortiori consent of the state is not required when the corporation is owned and controlled, as well as employed, by the United States. The United States Housing Corporation was confronted with the same problem, and, as stated in the report (v. 1, p. 348): "It was finally decided that, being a purely Federal agency, the corporation is not amenable to State regulations applying to ordinary business corporations, and this view has been acquiesced in by the authorities of practically all the States where the question has come up."

I therefore conclude that it is unnecessary for the Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation to qualify and register in states other than Delaware.

“7. Is Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation subject to license, franchise, occupation, income and excise taxes?

(a) Levied by the State of Delaware?

(b) Levied by any other State in which it purchases land, builds homestead communities and enters into contracts with homesteading families?"

Preliminary fees or costs assessed by the State of Delaware which are in the nature of charges for services rendered are properly taxable against the Corporation. 18 Op. 491; 23 id. 299. Whether there may be other occasions hereafter when Delaware may levy valid charges of such nature is not before me at this time.

Beyond this, upon the authority of Williams v. Talladega, 226 U.S. 404, 419; Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269, U.S. 514; Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218; and De La Vergne Machine Co. v. State Tax Commission, 207 N.Y. S. 680, 684, I advise you, as I have with respect to your first question, supra, to contest the attempted imposition of any such taxes, the question of liability being ultimately for the courts to determine.

"8. May Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation pay cash to secure binding options on land?"

In my opinion to you of February 7, 1934, I concluded that the Public Works Emergency Housing Corporation might lawfully acquire options as an incident of the purchase of land. The powers of the Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation are no less broad in this particular.

"9. May Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation retain local attorneys and title companies to prepare abstracts of title, certificates of title, letters of opinion of title, letters of opinion of title and forms of warranty deed, and pay reasonable fees for such services, when such title papers, after they are completed, are to be transmitted to the Office of the Attorney General as the basis for the opinion of title of the Attorney General?"

The Comptroller General, in an opinion of May 3, 1924, (v. 3, p. 569, 571) concluded that appropriations chargeable with the purchase price of land are also available for the payment of a reasonable charge for such evidences of title as may be required by the Attorney General. I approve, as

applicable to the purchase of land by the Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation, the principle thus announced, and inclose, for your ready reference, a copy of a circular issued by this Department under date of April 16, 1934; setting forth the general requirements and recommended procedure in land title matters.

10. May Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation carry fire, tornado and other insurance on homestead properties during the time that title remains in the Corporation? May the Corporation carry public liability insurance?"

It is not the policy of the United States Government to carry insurance on its property, which is so extensive and so widely distributed as to render ordinary insurance of doubtful practicability and economy. As to public liability insurance, it is to be remembered that the Government's liability differs materially from that of an individual or a private corporation. However, the occupants of the homesteads will have, or will in time acquire, insurable interests, and such interests may properly be insured either by the individuals themselves or by the Corporation acting in their behalf and at their expense.

"11. Are employees of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads in Washington, and employees of Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation on the various projects in the various states entitled to the benefits of the United States Employees' Compensation Act?"

It appears that this question is more properly for consideration by the United States Employees' Compensation Commission. 31 Op. 252; 34 id. 120; 34 id. 363. In the first mentioned opinion the Attorney General concluded that it was within the province of the Commission " to decide whether employees of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, or other persons, are entitled to the benefits of the provisions of the act"; and in the two later opinions he interpreted the Act, upon request of the Commission through the President, as applied to particular employees of the Fleet Corporation.

I therefore respectfully suggest that you handle the matter with the United States Employees' Compensation Commission.