as in a vacuum. Even so, there is no promise to continue negotiating. Al the testimony of all witnesses is that no representative of the employers eve asserted that they would continue to negotiate after the termination of th 1935-1936 agreement. Such at least is my recollection of the testimony, althoug lacking a record it is possible I may be mistaken on this point. In any even I cannot believe that the Board intends to sponsor the doctrine that, pendin the consummation of a collective agreement, an employer is free to impose in dividual unilateral agreements upon his workers. The effect on future nege tiations would be positively disastrous if one of the parties holds a war club i the shape of 3,000 individual contracts which, according to their terms, ar "binding on the said worker and the undersigned for said period" of one year The fact that legally such contracts may be invalid is of no particular signit cance. Workers are not lawyers. Bargaining under such circumstances could not possibly be genuine collective bargaining. An agreement arrived at under such circumstances would be the product of compulsion and duress. I shall close my discussion of the draft decision's treatment of the 8 (5) violation by pointing to one further instance which, in my opinion, is determinative of the issue. I refer to the employers' final proposal on September 3, 1936, in which they unequivocally withdrew their previous recognition of the Union as the collective bargaining agency of all shed workers and concede such recognition only on behalf of Union members. Previous to this time, the fact that the Union was entitled to speak for all the shed workers in the vicinity had never been questioned. It was, in fact, stipulated in the record that prior to the strike the Union represented a majority of the workers in each shed. The testimony is uncontradicted that there were two reasons why the Union went on strike on September 4, 1936: first, the September 1 ultimatum, which substituted individual for collective bargaining; second, the withdrawal by the employers of recognition of the Union as the collective bargaining agency of all shed workers, limiting such recognition to members only. Both these acts are unfair labor practices and violations of Section 8 (5). These practices caused the strike. The record is without contradiction to this effect. The fact is of the highest importance on account of the possibility it offers the Board of ordering reinstatement or preference of employment to the workers who went on strike. I cannot understand why the draft decision chooses to pass over the plain meaning of the employers' action and find that it does not constitute a violation of 8 (5), although "under other circumstances" it might. Moreover, does not the employers' action speak eloquently on the issue of good faith? (5) The next portion of the draft decision deals with various alleged unfair labor practices under Section 8 (1). The decision finds "inexcusable police brutality" to exist, but fails to find the respondents in the slightest degree responsible for this and other tactics of the law enforcement agencies. Such a view, I submit, constitutes an unsound reading of the record. The Board has in various cases taken the police and other official agencies to task for biased action in a labor dispute. I know of no case in which the record of collaboration between law enforcement agencies and employers is more open and explicit than this one. The record provides a basis for an inference that the police, the sheriff's department, and the state highway patrol acted in this dispute as the agents of the employers. We should not overlook the implications of the following actions (to select at random on the basis of recollection of the record): (a) The conferences between employers and law officers at which plans were made for the opening of the sheds and the importation of the notorious Colonel Sanborn to act as coordinator of all law enforcement agencies. (b) The transfer of police and sheriff's headquarters to the Hotel Jeffery. (e) Coordination of civilian and official strike breaking efforts at the Jeffery under the guidance of Colonel Sanborn. (d) Payment by the Grower-Shipper Association of the expenses of maintaining the establishment at the Hotel Jeffery. The draft decision assigns no particular significance to the fact that the employers paid the board and room bills of the police and other agencies during the strike. (e) Maintaining of the closest liaison between employers and law enforcement officials, even going so far as to include employer representatives on the law enforcement agencies central strategy committee (Hank Strobel) (Harry Noland). The refusal of access to the fortress at the Hotel Jeffery to workers representatives and the granting of such access to employers is also significant. In short, the law enforcement agencies acted as the executive arm of the GrowerShippers Association for the purpose of reopening the lettuce sheds under nonunion conditions and breaking the strike and the Union. Their activities went far beyond maintaining “law and order". The type of employer-police-sheriff-highway patrol coordination initiated at Salinas has served as a model for similar attacks in other California agricultural communities. The draft decision, by misinterpreting the meaning of these actions, loses an opportunity to deliver an effective blow at this type of incipient California fascism. Criticism must likewise be made of the decision's treatment of the Watkins defective agency. True, the death of Watkins and the evasiveness of Brooks in testifying on this point rendered the record somewhat incomplete. But there is ample material to support a finding that the employment of this agency constituted an unfair labor practice. I cite the fact that the Watkins agency was admittedly hired to obtain and render information on union affairs and activities; (Record, page 684) that daily reports were rendered, all of them dealing with labor or labor trouble (Record, page 693); that no limitation was placed on methods to be used by the agency to obtain this data (Record, page 692). An inference as to how the Watkins agency operated in obtaining its data is to be found in items such as "cash reward” (p. 701) ; money paid out for "cultivating expenses", (p. 702), etc. Note that Watkins expenses were docketed under Ledger Account No. 304, the general anti-labor fund. Thousands of dollars were paid this agency for its services. With even less basis in the record, the Board condemned such activities in the Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company case. It is a mistake to whitewash the agency as does the draft decision. I wish to mention briefly one or two more items. On page 20 of the draft decision, we find Colonel Sanborn praised for his advice to "display no force in resuming operations until the strikers commenced violence." The draft decision draws the wrong inference from this advice. The action of the employers, following Sanborn's advice, in sending the first lettuce trucks through the picket lines unconroyed, although ample facilities were available, was clearly a tactic intended to provoke violence and justify retaliation. The temper of the strikers was known. They were bitter over the building of the barricades around the sheds and the recruiting of seab labor. The holding back of guards was an invitation to the stoning of the trucks and a justification for the sadistic wholesale gas attack which followed immediately-for the photographers' benefit. On page 21 the gas attacks on the morning of September 16 are well described. But the decision insufficiently stresses the point that the slaughter at the corner of Main Street and Gabilan was seemingly deliberately prepared for, by herding pickets and onlookers to this point, then routing the trucks down the crowded street, then loosing a ferocious attack upon the helpless crowd. The criticisms set forth above are broad in scope. I admit this, and submit that Something more than mere revision of the draft decision is necessary if these critieisms are accepted as substantially meritorious. Nevertheless I have not hesitated to speak bluntly, for the reason that the California labor movement and all progressive forces in that state were shocked by what occurred in the Salinas Valley in 1936 and have placed high hopes on the effect of the Board's decision, not only in rectifying to some extent the Salinas situation, but in preventing similar behavior in other agricultural regions of the state. It is my belief that there need be no cause for disappointment on their part if the record in this case is resurveyed with greater insight and realism. I shall be in New York for several days. If you wish to get in touch with me, you can reach me c/o D. McKay, 9 Christopher St., New York City. The telephone is CHelsea 2-8832. National Labor Relations Board, San Francisco, California. DEAR MR. SMITH: I sincerely regret that I shall not be here when you arrive. After many postponements, Mrs. Edises and I managed to break away for a vacation. We are planning to visit the East Coast, including Washington, D. C. Mrs. Rosseter was good enough to suggest a procedure which may enable me to combine business with pleasure to a certain extent. She mentioned the possibility of a regional conference being held at Washington during the coming month and pointed out that if a conference is held and I were called to Washington, I would be furnished with transportation. On the other hand. if I go back there now and advance my own fare, there is no possibility of being reimbursed. Therefore, she suggested that I travel on a Government transportation request, with the understanding that I will reimburse the Board for the value thereof in the event that the conference is not held as scheduled. I trust there will be no obstacle to my using this procedure. Best wishes and I hope that your stay on the Coast will be pleasant. Sincerely yours, BERTRAM EDISES. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Attention: Mr. Smith. From: BMS. Date 9/8. I know of no such arrangement. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Attention: Mr. Fahy. From: J. L. Date: 9/9. Mr. Smith wants to discuss this with you. C. F. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Attention: Mr. Smith. From: Fahy. Date: 9/13. * J. W. M.: What do you think I should say on this? E. S. S. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Mr. Madden. To: E. S. Smith. Date: 9/14. I don't think there is anything to say except that no plans have been made for a Regional Conference. BERTRAM EDISES, Esq., National Labor Relations Board, 20th Region, J. W. M. SEPTEMBER 16, 1937. 1095 Market Street, San Francisco, California. DEAR MR. EDISES: I hope you will excuse me for not replying earlier to your letter of August 24. The only reply which it seems favorable to make under the circumstances is that there are no plans as yet for a regional conference. I hope you enjoyed your vacation, and I am sorry I missed you when I was in San Francisco. Sincerely yours, ess/vl EDWIN S. SMITH. EXHIBIT No. 1613-S [Western Union] HA82 17 Govt Collect Via Ha=NJA New York NY 20 1248P NATHAN WITT, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C.: Arriving Washington Tuesday morning Stop Respectfully request you read my Grower Shipper report prior my arrival. CHARLES FAHY, Esq. EXHIBIT No. 1613-T NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD TWENTIETH REGION 1095 Market Street San Francisco, California [BERTRAM] C. EDISES. MARCH 1, 1938. General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C. DEAR MR. FAHY: I have written a letter to Mr. Edwin S. Smith in which I make a proposal regarding the Salinas cases. I am sure that he will communicate with you on the subject if he considers the proposal worth while. Sincerely. DEAR MR. SMITH: This letter contains a proposal re the Salinas Cases (Case No. C-178). I am writing directly to you because the matter is in a sense personal, and because of your familiarity with the background of the cases. I have written to Mr. Fahy informing him that I am communicating directly with you. The Salinas cases are regarded as highly significant by important sections of California labor. Among agricultural laborers in the Imperial Valley and Salinas-Watsonville districts the prestige of the Board is bound up with the disposition of these cases. Moreover, they mean a good deal to me personally. Honsty compels me to record my belief that the Salinas cases have not received adequate treatment at the hands of the attorney assigned to review them. I am convinced that in a number of ways the record in this case presents the Board with an opportunity to render a monumental decision. For example, I know of no case in which there is a more thorough documentation of the operation of a comprehensive blacklist of union members. Yet the draft decision which I saw was completely silent on this point. There are other instances of omissions, such as various elements bearing on the refusal to hargain collectively. The background showing the Grower-Shipper Association long established hostility to union organization and its extensive preparatioLS for a union-smashing drive is poorly treated. The meaning of the formation of the Citizens Association and the Associated Farmers is not brought out. I shall not attempt to cite further instances, although they exist. At the discussion of the case in Washington last September it was evident that the review attorney was in flat disagreement with much of my analysis and evaluation. After the discussion with the Board (which, as I recall. was characterized by Mr. Madden as "throwing a new light on the case") I sensed a reluctance, perhaps quite involuntary, on the part of the review attorney f... revise his version of the case in accordance with the opinions expressed by the Board. Such a reluctance is understandable on psychological grounds. Under all the circumstances, and after much consideration, I have decided to make a request which at first blush may seem somewhat extraordinary. It is that I be permitted to draft for the confidential use of the Board a proposed decision in the Grower-Shipper case. It would be, in a sense, merely a brief in opinion form containing explicit references to the record in support of its contents. I am confident that if I am granted this permission I can convince the Board that the case is far stronger than they have been given reason to believe. I recognize that the granting of my request may involve the possibility of further delay in the handing down of a decision. But so much time has already elapsed since the completion of the hearing that a few more weeks would not make any material difference. And the possibility that an end of great value may be achieved seems to me to justify the additional delay. I ask you in all sincerity to give sympathetic consideration to this request. It is not made lightly or in a spirit of pique, but is based on the firm conviction that I can thereby render a valuable service to the Board and to the purposes which the Act seeks to accomplish. Should you decide to act favorably on this application, I ask either that the record and all exhibits be forwarded to San Francisco or that I be summoned to Washington to work on the case there. I believe I could do the job in about three weeks. I am authorized by Mrs. Rosseter to state that, while she does not feel herself in a position to comment on the propriety of the proposal set forth herein, she is strongly of the opinion that early favorable action on the case is imperative for the welfare of the agricultural workers concerned. Sincerely, BERTRAM EDISES, Esq., EXHIBIT NO. 1613-V BERT EDISES. MARCH 12, 1938. National Labor Relations Board, 20th Region, 1095 Market Street, San Francisco, California. DEAR MR. EDISES: I apologize for having delayed so long in answering your letter of March 1. I have discussed your suggestion with the Board and with Mr. Fahy and all of us feel that it would be inadvisable to have you prepare the draft decision in the Salinas case. I think after the talk which the Board and you had with Mr. Hawes that he entirely understands how the Board wishes the case to be written. The most unfortunate thing is the long delay. This has resulted because Mr. Hawes has been Mr. Emerson's most active assistant in building up the review staff and trying to break some of the log jam on back cases. His concentration on this has prevented his doing the final work on Salinas. However, arrangements have been made for him to take adequate time away from the office, beginning, we expect, the middle of next week, in order to finish up this task. I hope that within two or three weeks the Salinas matter will have been finally disposed of. This time schedule, of course, is entirely confidential, particularly as we may not be able to live up to it. Sincerely yours, EDWIN S. SMITH, P. S.-You understand, of course, that the Board would have every confidence in your capacity to handle the Salinas draft. It is purely a question of the proprieties. |