(N. L. R. B. Order In the Matter of Bercut-Richards Packing Co., et al, Ca Nos. C-883 to C-893 inclusive, was received in evidence, marked "N. L. R. I Exhibit No. 439-C", and is on file with the committee.) (N. L. R. B. Order Approving Stipulations In the Matter of Berest-Richard Packing Co., et al, C-883 to C-893, was received in evidence, marked "N. L. R B Exhibit No. 439-D", and is on file with the committee.) (Amended Complaint In the Matter of Bercut-Richards Packing Co., et a C-883 to C-893, was received in evidence, marked "N. L. R. B. Exhibit No 439-E", and is on file with the committee.) (Decree of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit u the case of National Labor Relations Board v. Bercut-Richards Packing Co., et al. was received in evidence, marked "N. L. R. B. Exhibit No. 439-F," and is Ľ. file with the committee.) (Decision And Order In the Matter of Bercut-Richards Packing Co., et al, Ca...“ Nos. C-883 to C-886, C-888 to C-890, and C-892 to C-898, was received s evidence, marked "N. L. R. B. Exhibit No. 439-G", and is on file with the committee.) N. L. R. B. EXHIBIT No. 440 [N. L. R. B. Supplement to Exhibit No. 1629, introduced into evidence in Volume 24, Part I, August 1, 1940] WATERFRONT CASE (Ruling of the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia in the case of A. F. of L., et al, v. J. Warren Madden, Chairman, National Labor Relations Board, et al, was received in evidence, marked "N. L. R. B. Exhibit No. 440-A", and is on file with the committee.) DEAR MR. MADDEN: Under authority granted by Congress, my Committee is proceeding to inquire into certain merchant marine matters. In the course of my study so far, I find that at one time the National Labor Relations Board gave Harry Bridges or some of his organizations a "geographical certification" whereby the Č. I. O. was designated as the sole bargaining agency for the longshoremen on the Pacific coast. I am informed that this is the only time in history that such a certification has been handed down, and that it was without a National Labor Relations Board vote being held. I wish full information on this subject, and I shall be pleased to be advised 1 upon what basis such action was taken, (2) what procedure preceded the certification, and (3) what other instances exist of such "geographical certification". I am writing you because I desire all the information I can get. It the grant of this certification was attacked, please advise what action was taken. Yours very sincerely, JWG. Hon. S. O. BLAND, (a) S. O. BLAND, Chairman. SEPTEMBER 27, 1910. Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. DEAR MR. BLAND: I have your letter of September 24 addressed to Mr. Madden. I hope to be able to forward a comprehensive answer to you within the next few days. In the meantime, may I refer you to your letter of September 12 and Mrs. Stern's reply of September 16. Sincerely yours, EDWIN S. SMITH. N. L. R. B. EXHIBIT No. 440-C e Honorable SCHUYLER OTIS BLAND, Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. OCTOBER 10, 1940. MY DEAR MR. BLAND: In further reply to your letter of September 24, 1940, questing information concerning the certification by the Board of the Interional Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union as the exclusive repretative, for the purposes of collective bargaining, of certain longshoremen on › Pacific Coast, I submit herewith the comprehensive answer which I promised u in my letter of September 27, 1940. The Decision and Certification of Representatives of the Board, a copy of which attached, is entitled In the Matter of Shipowners' Association of the Pacific Coast al. (Cases Nos. R-638 and R-572) and is reported in 7 NLRB.1002. The bsequent litigation concerning this decision, which is outlined in a letter to you ted September 16, 1940, from Beatrice M. Stern, Assistant Secretary of the ard, appears under the title of American Federation of Labor v, N. L. R. B., and reported in 103 F. (2d) 933, 308 U. S. 401, and 6 L. R. R. 575. I am enclosing rewith copies of the decisions of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and e District Court in this matter. You will note that in the litigation which has en concluded, although the certification was attacked, the Board's position has en sustained. The present petitions before the Board, the status of which is so described in Mrs. Stern's letter of September 16, 1940, were filed by the ternational Longshoremen's Association, affiliated with the A. F. of L., Locals os. 38-83, 38-86, and 38-97, in Matter of Shipowners Association of the Pacific oast et al., Cases Nos. XIX-R-568, XIX-R-569, and XIX-R-570. The original Decision and Certification of Representatives was initiated by a etition, filed with the Board by International Longshoremen's and Warehouseen's Union, District No. 1 (I. L. W. U.), affiliated with the Congress for Induscial Organization, for certification pursuant to Section 9 (c) of the Act as the xclusive bargaining agent for the longshoremen on the Pacific Coast. The Amercan Federation of Labor, the International Longshoremen's Association (I. L. A.) nd Pacific Coast District International Longshoremen's Association No. 38, opposed this application. After lengthy hearings and a brief filed on behalf of the mployers' associations, the Board entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, nd certification. The Board found that the employees engaged in longshore work in the Pacific Coast ports of the United States for the companies which are members of certain employers' associations constituted a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining under the Act, and that the I. L. W. U. had been designated by a majority of the employees in that unit as their representative for purposes of collective bargaining. Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the Board therefore certified the I. L. W. U. as their representative. This was not a "geographical certification," nor in it did the Board designate all longshore employees on the Pacific Coast as the appropriate unit for collective bargaining. The Board's action was limited to the employees of members of the affiliated employers' associations who acted as a unit in bargaining with their employees. It is true, however, that almost all companies using longshore labor are members of these associations. The basic facts found by the Board upon which its action was taken were as follows: Until 1937 the longshoremen on the Pacific Coast were members of the I. L. A. and the A. F. of L. Between 1934 and 1937, at the insistence of the I. L. A., collective bargaining on the Pacific Coast was carried on on a coast-wide basis; this resulted in agreements between the I. L. A. and the various employers' associations. In 1937 a large majority of the members of I. L. A. on the Coast voted to affiliate with the C. I. O. After the I. L. W. U. had been chartered by the C. I. O., all but four of the I. L. A. locals, containing only 904 out of 11,479 longshoremen, applied for I. L. W. U. charters. The employees, through the I. L. W. U., continued to bargain collectively with the employers' associations, which in June 1937 had united into a single waterfront Employers' Association of the Pacific Coast. In July 1937 the agreements between the longshoremen and the employers in the associations were continued on a coast-wide basis by the associations and the I. L. W. U. Cards introduced into evidence at the hearing showed that as of the time of the hearing 9,557 out of a total of 12,860 longshoremen employed by members of the associations had designated the I. L. W. U. as their representative. The Board held that the statute permitted it to find that the employees of members of an association of employers were an appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining, and that in the light of the past and existing organization of the employers and the employees, the employees of the members of the employers' associations were the appropriate unit in the instant case. Since the I. L. W. U. was shown to represent a majority of those employees, it was certifiesi as their exclusive representative for purposes of collective bargaining. The Board based its finding that the employees of members of an association of employers were an appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining upon Section 9 (b) of the Act which authorizes the Board to determine that the “employer" unit is the unit most appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining; upon Section 2 (2) of the Act which by definition includes within the term "employer" "any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly"; and upon Section 2 (1) of the Act which defines "persons" as including "one or associations * * The legislative history of the Act, cited in the Board's brief in the Court of Appeals, is in accord with this express language of the statute. This interpretation of the Act has been upheld by the Courts. (N. L. R. B. v. Lund, 103 F. (2d) 815, C. C. A. 8). more * * Contrary to your information, this is not the only time in history that such a certification in an association-wide (or multiple-employer) unit has been made by the Board. On numerous occasions, the Board has found, on petitions of both the A. F. of L. and the C. I. O., and in many instances with the acquiescence of the employer, that a single unit composed of employees of members of a trade association is the unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining. For example, in Matter of Mobile Steamship Association (8 N. L. R. B. 1297), all the longshoremen in the port of Mobile were held to constitute an appropriate unit; in Matter of Admiar Rubber Company (9 N. L. R. B. No. 35), the Board found that the employees of two companies which were members of the Association of Doll Manufacturers of New York City did not constitute separate bargaining units; in Matter of Monon Stone Company (10 N. L. R. B. No. 6) all the employees of certain companies which were members of the Indiana Limestone Institute were included in a single unit; and in Matter of Hyman-Michaels Company (11 N. L. R. B. No. 60), the Board found that the employees of one company which was a member of the San Francisco Scrap Iron Dealers Association did not constitute a separate bargaining unit. Other cases in which the Board has found multiple-employer units appropriate are Matter of F. E. Booth & Company, 10 N. L. R. B. 1491; Matter of Alston Coal Company, 13 N. L. R. B. 683; Matter of Stevens Coal Company, 19 N. L. R. B. No. 14; Matter of Associated Banning Company, 19 N. L. R. B. No. 20; Matter of C. A. Lund Company, 6 N. L. R. B. 423; Matter of Union Premier Food Stores, Inc., 10 N. L. R. B. 370, 11 N. L. R. B. 270. A discussion of "Employers Organization as a Single Unit," with a citation of cases, appears in the Board's report to the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, at Volume 3, pp. 538–539, of the Hearings before that Committee on Bills to Amend the National Labor Relations Act, April 26, 1939. I should like to emphasize that neither in the Shipowners' case, nor in any other case, did the Board establish a multiple-employer unit except where employers had themselves combined to bargain as a group, except where there had been a previous history of collective bargaining upon such a basis, and, of course, except where the machinery for such bargaining was already in existence. The Shipowners' case, as will be seen by what has already been set forth, is an example of each of these criteria. As you will observe, the procedure which preceded the certification in the Shipowners' case did not involve an election conducted by the Board. The Board, instead, made its certification on the record and based its finding of a majority on a comparison between the cards signed by longshoremen designating the I. L. W. U. as their representative for the purpose of collective bargaining cards introduced in evidence under appropriate safeguards and the lists of longshoremen furnished by the employers' associations which showed, as the Board found, that approximately 75 per cent of the longshoremen employed by the members of the association had designated the I. L. W. U. as their representative. Until July 1939, the policy of the Board was, in such circumstances, to certify, without the necessity of an election, the labor organization which presented evidence which the Board considered adequate proof that such organization represented a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit. This policy is set forth in the Fourth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, at pp. 81, 82: "F. ADEQUATE PROOF OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION WHERE NO ELECTION IS HELD "Section 9 (c) of the act empowers the Board to certify representatives with our without an election. If a labor organization can present evidence which the Board considers adequate proof that such organization represents a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit, it may be certified without the necessity of an election. Under Sections 8 (5) and 9 (a) of the act, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively and exclusively with representatives selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate unit. The proof which the Board has required as to majority representation for certification without an election or for a finding of an unfair labor practice under sections 8 (5) and 9 (a) of the act has been essentially the same during the last fiscal year as has been described in detail in prior Annual Reports. No significant additions have been made to this material during the fiscal period covered by this report." See Matter of Wadsworth Watch Case Company and Metal Polishers, Buffers, Platers and Helpers International Union, 4 N. L. R. B. 487; Matter of BilesColeman Lumber Company and Puget Sound District Council of Lumber and Sawmill Workers, 4 N. L. R. B. 679; Matter of The Jacobs Bros. Co., Inc. and United Electrical and Radio Workers of America Local No. 1226, 5 N. L. R. B. 620. (3rd Annual Report, p. 151). In July 1939, however, the Board changed this policy. "In Matter of The Cudahy Packing Co. and United Packinghouse Workers of Amer.; Local No. 21, 13 N. L. R. B. No. 61, the Board pointed out that in the past it had certified representatives without an election where one of two rival unions introduced in evidence membership cards, the authenticity of which was not questioned, signed by a majority of employees in an appropriate unit, and the other union failed to produce evidence which challenged this majority. The Board said, however, that it was of the opinion that the policies of the act would best be effectuated if henceforth elections were directed in such situation to establish representatives for future bargaining purposes, if one of the parties so requested. The Board also pointed out that this policy was inapplicable to situations arising in the determination of whether or not a company had committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain collectively within the meaning of section 8 (5) of the act, since there a present election would not answer the question whether or not the union at some time prior to the hearing when it had requested the company to bargain collectively represented a majority of employees. In Matter of Armour & Co. and United Packinghouse Workers Local Industrial Union No. 13, 13 N. L. R. B., No. 64, the Board, following the Cudahy case, directed that an election should be held, despite the fact that the only union involved introduced evidence that a majority of employees had designated it as the bargaining agent, where the company contested the union's claim and asked that an election be held." (ibid. ftn. p. 82) I trust that the foregoing answer complies with your request for information. Should you have any further questions, I will be happy to answer them. Sincerely yours, Enclosures. EDWIN S. SMITH. (Decision and Certification of Representatives In the Matter of Shipowners Association of the Pacific Coast, Waterfront Employers Association of the Pacific Coast, et al. Cases Nos. R-638, R-572, was received in evidence, marked "N. L. R. B. Exhibit No. 440-D", and is on file with the committee.) (The decision of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the case of American Federation of Labor et al v. National Labor Relations Board was received in evidence, marked "N. L. R. B. Exhibit No. 440-E", and is on file with the committee.) (The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of American Federation of Labor et al v. National Labor Relations Board was received in evidence, marked "N. L. R. B. Exhibit No. 440-F", and is on file with the committee.) IN. L. R. B. Exhibits Nos. 453 to 489, received as N. L. R. B. Supplement to Exhibit No. 1621, intreft in evidence in Volume 28, November 28, 1940, and ordered to be printed with the hearing of ALegit 1940] N. L. R. B. EXHIBIT No. 453 To: All Regional Directors. M-905-7 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, From: Nathan Witt, Secretary, Robert B. Watts, Associate General Counsel. Subject: Comparison of Old Rules and Regulations and revised Rules and Reg. lations. This is to supplement our memorandum of July 11, 1939, M-905, on the outstanding changes in procedure involved in the promulgation of the Board's revised Rules and Regulations-Series 2, effective July 14, 1939. The text of each of the old Rules and Regulations-Series 1, as amended, and the text of each of the revised Rules and Regulations-Series 2, Articles 11 an! III, with comments on the changes and differences between the old and the rew Rules are set forth below. Articles I, IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII of the old Rules remain unchanged in the revised Rules. The changes and revisions are in section of Articles II and III only. ARTICLE II. PROCEDURE UNDER SECTION 10 OF THE ACT FOR THE PREVENTION OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Old Rule-Section 1. CHARGE A charge that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor practice affecting commerce may be made by any person or labor organization. A charge may be withdrawn only with the consent of the Regions Director with whom such charge was filed or of the Board. Upon withdrawal of any charge, the Regional Director shall dismiss any complain* based thereon. New Rule-Section 1. CHARGE A charge that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor practice affecting commerce may be made by any person or labor organization. A charge may be withdrawn only with the consent of the Regional Director with whom such charge was filed or of the Board. Upon withdrawa of any charge, any complaint based thereon shall be dismissed by the Regional Director issuing the complaint, by the Trial Examiner designated to conduct the hearing, or by the Board. Comment: The new rule provides that upon withdrawal of a charge, the Trial Examiner or the Board, in addition to the Regional Director, shall dismiss any complaint thereon. Old Rule.-Section 2. Except as provided in Section 37 of this Article, such charge shall be filed with the Regional Director for the Region in which the alleged unfair labor practice has occurred or is occurring. A charge alleging that an unfair labor practice has occurred or is occurring in two or more Regions may be filed with the Regional Director for any of such Regions. New Rule-Section 2. Except as provided in Section 36 of this Article, such charge shall be filed with the Regional Director for the Region in which the alleged unfair labor practice has occurred or is occurring. A charge alleging that an unfair labor practice has occurred or is occurring in two or more Regions may be filed with the Regional Director for any of such Regions. Comment: No changes of substance. Old Rule-Section 3. Such charge shall be in writing, the original being signed and sworn to before any notary public or any agent of the Board authorized to administer |