Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 4Tamar Szabó Gendler, John Hawthorne OUP Oxford, 25. tra 2013. - Broj stranica: 368 Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publicaton which offers a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading philosophers in North America, Europe and Australasia, it publishes exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Topics within its purview include: *traditional epistemological questions concerning the nature of belief, justification, and knowledge, the status of scepticism, the nature of the a priori, etc; *new developments in epistemology, including movements such as naturalized epistemology, feminist epistemology, social epistemology, and virtue epistemology, and approaches such as contextualism; *foundational questions in decision-theory; *confirmation theory and other branches of philosophy of science that bear on traditional issues in epistemology; *topics in the philosophy of perception relevant to epistemology; *topics in cognitive science, computer science, developmental, cognitive, and social psychology that bear directly on traditional epistemological questions; and *work that examines connections between epistemology and other branches of philosophy, including work on testimony and the ethics of belief. Anyone wanting to understand the latest developments at the leading edge of the discipline can start here. |
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Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 4 Tamar Szabó Gendler,John Hawthorne Pregled nije dostupan - 2013 |
Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Opseg 4 Tamar Szabó Gendler,John Hawthorne Pregled nije dostupan - 2013 |
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accept action agent anti-selection apparently sound argument argue attributions behavior belief revision causal children’s claim that knowledge compound experience concept of knowledge conclusion conditional probabilities confirmation bias conjunction consider controversial decision theory deductive inferences deductive reasoning deductive rules degrees of belief depend discussion Douven doxastic empirical employ reliable deductive epistemic probability epistemically permissible Epistemology evidence evidential evolutionary example expected utility explain fact false belief flatly dismiss Gelman genetic Harman’s principle inference intuitive justified in believing knowledge has probability logical concepts mental mindreading Nagel natural kind not-p objects one’s overturn common sense people’s perceptual philosophical philosophical assumptions plausible possible premise prior probabilities of conditionals problem psychology question quintessence Quintessentialists reason red things red-square experiences relevant counterargument reliable deductive rules result role scenarios Science semantics skeptical special relativity species standard credence substance suppose suspending Tim Williamson true belief what’s Williamson