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flowers; thickets which being lined with most pleasant shade were witnessed so too by the cheerful disposition of many well-tuned birds: each pasture stored with sheep, feeding with sober security, while the pretty lambs with bleating oratory craved the dams' comfort: here a shepherd's boy piping as though he should never be old; there a young shepherdess knitting, and withal singing, and it seemed that her voice comforted her hands to work, and her hands kept time to her voice-music.

3. Pamela and Philoclea.

THE elder is named Pamela, by many men not deemed inferior to her sister: for my part, when I marked them both, methought there was more sweetness in Philoclea, but more majesty in Pamela; methought love played in Philoclea's eyes and threatened in Pamela's; methought Philoclea's beauty only persuaded, but so persuaded as all hearts must yield; Pamela's beauty used violence, and such violence as no heart could resist. And it seems that such proportion is between their minds; Philoclea so bashful, as though her excellencies had stolen into her before she was aware; so humble that she will put all pride out of countenance; in sum, such proceedings as will stir hope, but teach good manners. Pamela of high thoughts, who avoids not pride with not knowing her excellencies, but by making it one of her excellencies to be void of pride; her mother's wisdom, greatness, nobility, but (if I can guess aright) knit with a more constant temper.

4. The uses of Poetry.

THE ending of all earthly learning being virtuous action, those skills that serve most to bring forth that, have a most just title to be princes over the rest: wherein if we can shew

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it rightly the poet is worthy to have it before any other competitors: among whom principally to challenge it step forth the moral philosophers; whom methinks I see coming towards me with a sullen gravity, as though they could not abide vice by daylight; rudely clothed, for to witness outwardly their contempt of outward things; with books in their hands against glory, whereto they set their names; sophistically speaking against subtilty, and angry with a man in whom they see the foul fault of anger. ... The historian scarce gives leisure to the moralist to say so much, but that he, loaden with old mouse-eaten records; better acquainted with a thousand years ago than with the present age; a wonder to young folks and a tyrant in table-talkdenieth, in a great chafe, that any man for teaching of virtue and virtuous actions is comparable to him. . . . . . The philosopher, therefore, and the historian are they which would win the goal, the one by precept, the other by example; but both not having both, do both halt. For the philosopher, sitting down with the thorny arguments, the bare rule is so hard of utterance, and so misty to be conceived, that one that hath no other guide but him shall wade in him until he be old, before he shall find sufficient cause to be honest. . . . On the other hand, the historian, wanting the precept, is so tied, not to what should be but to what is—to the particular truth of things and not the general reason of things-that his example draweth not necessary consequence, and therefore a less fruitful doctrine. Now doth the peerless poet perform both for whatsoever the philosopher saith should be done he giveth a perfect picture of it, by some one by whom he presupposeth it was done; so as he coupleth the general notion with the particular example. . . . . . . Tully taketh much pains, and many times not without poetical helps, to make us know what force the love of our country hath

in us let us but hear old Anchises speaking in the midst of Troy's flames, or see Ulysses in the fulness of all Calypso's delights, bewailing his absence from barren Ithaca! Anger, the Stoics said, was a short madness; let but Sophocles bring you Ajax on a stage, killing or whipping sheep and oxen, thinking them the army of the Greeks, with their chieftains. Agamemnon and Menelaus; and tell me if you have not a more familiar insight into anger than finding in the schoolmen its genus and difference.

V.

FRANCIS BACON, LORD VERULAM.

1560-1626.

FRANCIS BACON was born Jan. 1560-1. His father was Sir Nicholas Bacon, Lord Keeper of the Great Seal. He matriculated Fellow Commoner at Trinity, Cambridge, at the early age of 12. In 1576 his father, having in view for him a public career, sent him to Paris in the employment of the Ambassador, Sir Amyas Paulett. But on the death of his father, finding himself left with only a slender fortune, he was compelled to enter the profession of the law, and was admitted barrister in 1582. Two years afterwards he entered the House of Commons as Member for Melcombe Regis.

For many years to come he was compelled to toil in a profession in which his heart was not. He writes to Burleigh, 'that he had contemplative ends as vast as his civil ends were moderate, for he had taken all knowledge to be his province;' and to the Queen, 'my mind turns upon other wheels than those of profit.' Promotion was slow in reaching him, and he did not rise to be Attorney-General till 1613; but it was rapid, and in March 1616-7 he received the Great Seal. He was created successively Baron Verulam and Viscount St. Alban.

He was disgraced on a charge of judicial corruption, but the extent of his culpability has been greatly exaggerated by party malice. A cold, caught in the process of an experiment to test the preserving qualities of snow, carried him off in April, 1626.

Bacon had wasted, in the pursuit of professional preferment, powers which were worthy to have been better employed. Yet

he has left behind him a name which is hardly second to any in the annals of philosophy, as the inaugurator or restorer of the Inductive Method in Science.

He wrote many works both in Latin and English; of the latter, the principal are, Of the Proficience and Advancement of Learning, Essays Civil and Moral, History of the Reign of King Henry the Seventh, and The New Atlantis.

1. Of the use of Reason in Religion.

THE use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the former, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed; the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon. The former extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how? by way of illustration, and not by way of argument. The latter consisteth indeed of probation and argument. In the former we see God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, in the expressing of his mysteries in sort as may be sensible unto us; and doth grift his revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason, and applieth his inspirations to open our understanding, as the form of the key to the ward of the lock. For the latter, there is allowed us an use of reason and argument, secondary and respective, although not original and absolute. For after the articles and principles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences from and according to the analogy of them, for our better direction. In nature this holdeth not; for both the principles are examinable by induction, though not by a medium or syllogism; and besides, those principles or first positions have no discordance with that reason which draweth down and deduceth the inferior positions. But yet

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