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eable disaffection? To my friends, of which may fewest be so unhappy, I have a remedy, as they know, more wise and manly to prescribe: but for his friends and followers, (of which many may deserve justly to feel themselves the unhappiness which they consider not in others,) I send them by his advice to sit upon the stool and strain, till their cross dispositions and contrarieties of mind shall change to a better correspondence, and to a quicker apprehension of common sense, and their own good.

His second reason is as heedless; "because that grace may change the disposition, therefore no indisposition may cause divorce."

Answ. First, it will not be deniable that many persons, gracious both, may yet happen to be very unfitly married, to the great disturbance of either. Secondly, What if one have grace, the other not, and will not alter, as the Scriptures testify there be of those, in whom we may expect a change, when" the blackamoor changes his colour, or the leopard his spots," Jer. xiii. 23. Shall the gracious therefore dwell in torment all his life, for the ungracious? We see that holiest precepts, than which there can no better physic be administered to the mind of man, and set on with powerful preaching, cannot work this cure, no not in the family, not in the wife of him that preaches day and night to her. What an unreasonable thing is it, that men, and clergymen especially, should exact such wonderous changes in another man's house, and are seen to work so little in their own!

To the second point of the position, that this unfitness hinders the main ends and benefits of marriage; he answers, " if I mean the unfitness of choler, or sullen disposition, that soft words, according to Solomon, pacify wrath."

But I reply, that the saying of Solomon is a proverb, frequently true, not universally, as both the event shews, and many other sentences written by the same author, particularly of an evil woman, Prov. xxi. 9, 19, and in ether chapters, that she is better shunned than dwelt with, and a desert is preferred before her society. What need the Spirit of God put this choice into our heads, if soft words could always take effect with her? How frivolous is not only this disputer, but he that taught him thus, and let him come abroad!

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To his second answer I return this, that although there be not easily found such an antipathy, as to hate one another like a toad or poison; yet that there is oft such a dislike in both, or either, to conjugal love, as hinders all the comfort of matrimony, scarce any can be simple as not to apprehend. And what can be that favour, found or not found, in the eyes of the husband, but a natural liking or disliking; whereof the law of God, Deut. xxiv. bears witness, as of an ordinary accident, and determines wisely and divinely thereafter. And this disaffection happening to be in the one, not without the unspeakable discomfort of the other, must te be left like a thing consecrated to calamity and depair, without redemption?

Against the third branch of the position, he denies that "solace and peace, which is contrary to discord

and variance, is the main end of marriage." What then? He will have it "the solace of male and female." Came this doctrine out of some school, or some sty? Who but one forsaken of all sense and civil nature, and chiefly of Christianity, will deny that peace, contrary to discord, is the calling and the general end of every Christian, and of all his actions, and more especially of marriage, which is the dearest league of love, and the dearest resemblance of that love which in Christ is dearest to his church? How then can peace and comfort, as it is contrary to discord, which God hates to dwell with, not be the main end of marriage? Discord then we ought to fly, and to pursue peace, far above the observance of a civil covenant already broken, and the breaking daily iterated on the other side. And what better testimony than the words of the institution itself, to prove that a conversing solace, and peaceful society, is the prime end of marriage, without which no other help or office can be mutual, beseeming the dignity of reasonable creatures, that such as they should be coupled in the rites of nature by the mere compulsion of lust, without love or peace, worse than wild beasts? Nor was it half so wisely spoken as some deem, though Austin spake it, that if God had intended other than copulation in marriage, he would for Adam have created a friend, rather than a wife, to converse with; and our own writers blame him for this opinion; for which and the like passages, concerning marriage, he might be justly taxed with rusticity in these affairs. For this cannot but be with ease conceived, that there is one society of grave friendship, and another amiable and attractive society of conjugal love, besides the deed of procreation, which of itself soon cloys, and is despised, unless it be cherished and reincited with a pleasing conversation. Which if ignoble and swinish minds cannot apprehend, shall such merit therefore be the censures of more generous and virtuous spirits ?

Against the last point of the position, to prove that contrariety of mind is not a greater cause of divorce than corporal frigidity, he enters into such a tedious and drawling tale" of burning, and burning, and lust and burning," that the dull argument itself burns too for want of stirring; and yet all this burning is not able to expel the frigidity of his brain. So long therefore as that cause in the position shall be proved a sufficient cause of divorce, rather than spend words with this phlegmy clod of an antagonist, more than of necessity and a little merriment, I will not now contend whether it be a greater cause than frigidity or no.

His next attempt is upon the arguments which I brought to prove the position. And for the first, not finding it of that structure as to be scaled with his short ladder, he retreats with a bravado, that it deserves no answer. And I as much wonder what the whole book

deserved, to be thus troubled and solicited by such a paltry solicitor. I would he had not cast the gracious eye of his duncery upon the small deserts of a pamphlet, whose every line meddled with uncases him to

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that follow. Then he stumbles that I should say, "the | tioned certain heads of discourse, which I referred to a place more proper according to my method, to be treated there at full with all their reasons about them, this brain-worm, against all the laws of dispute, will needs deal with them here. And as a country hind, sometimes ambitious to shew his betters that he is not so simple as you take him, and that he knows his advantages, will teach us a new trick to confute by. And would you think to what a pride he swells in the contemplation of his rare stratagem, offering to carp at the language of a book, which yet he confesses to be generally commended; while himself will be acknowledged, by all that read him, the basest and the hungriest enditer, that could take the boldness to look abroad. Observe now the arrogance of a groom, how it will mount. I had written, that common adultery is a thing which the rankest politician would think it shame and disworship, that his law should countenance. First, it offends him, that "rankest" should signify aught but his own smell: who that knows English should not understand me, when I say a rank serving-man, a rank pettifogger, to mean a mere serving-man, a mere and arrant pettifogger, who lately was so hardy, as to lay aside his buckram-wallet, and make himself a fool in print, with confuting books which are above him? Next, the word "politician" is not used to his maw, and thereupon he plays the most notorious hobby-horse, jesting and frisking in the luxury of his nonsense with such poor fetches to cog a laughter from us, that no antic hobnail at a morris, but is more handsomely facetious. Concerning that place Deut. xxiv. 1, which he saith to be "the main pillar of my opinion,” though I rely more on the institution than on that: these two pillars I do indeed confess are to me as those two in the porch of the temple, Jachin and Boaz, which names import establishment and strength; nor do I fear who can shake them. The exposition of Deut. which I brought, is the received exposition, both ancient and modern, by all learned men, unless it be a monkish papist here and there: and the gloss, which he and his obscure assistant would persuade us to, is merely new and absurd, presuming out of his utter ignorance in the Hebrew to interpret those words of the text; first, in a mistaken sense of uncleanness, against all approved writers. Secondly, in a limited sense, whenas the original speaks without limitation," some uncleanness, or any:" and it had been a wise law indeed to mean itself particular, and not to express the case which this acute rabbi hath all this while been hooking for; whereby they who are most partial to him may guess that something is in this doctrine which I allege, that forces the adversary to such a new and strained exposition; wherein he does nothing for above four pages, but founder himself to and fro in his own objections; one while denying that divorce was permitted, another while affirming that it was permitted for the wife's sake, and after all, distrusts himself. And for his surest retirement, betakes him to those old suppositions, "that Christ abolished the Mosaic law of divorce; that the Jews had not sufficient knowledge in this point, through the darkness of the dispensation of heavenly things; that under the plen

gentlest ends of marriage," confessing that he understands it not. And I believe him heartily: for how should he, a serving-man both by nature and by function, an idiot by breeding, and a solicitor by presumption, ever come to know or feel within himself what the meaning is of "gentle?" He blames it for " a neat phrase," for nothing angers him more than his own proper contrary. Yet altogether without art sure he is not; for who could have devised to give us more briefly a better description of his own servility?

But what will become now of the business I know not; for the man is suddenly taken with a lunacy of law, and speaks revelations out of the attorney's academy only from a lying spirit: for he says, "that where a thing is void ipso facto, there needs no legal proceeding to make it void :" which is false, for marriage is void by adultery or frigidity, yet not made void without legal proceeding. Then asks my opinion of John-a-Noaks and John-a-Stiles: and I answer him, that I, for my part, think John Dory was a better man than both of them; for certainly they were the greatest wranglers that ever lived, and have filled all our lawbooks with the obtunding story of their suits and trials. After this he tells a miraculous piece of antiquity, how "two Romans, Titus and Sempronius, made feoffments,” at Rome sure, and levied fines by the common law. But now his fit of law past, yet hardly come to himself, he maintains, that if marriage be void, as being neither of God nor nature," there needs no legal | proceeding to part it," and I tell him that offends not me: then, quoth he, "this is nothing to your book, being the Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce." But that I deny him; for all discipline is not legal, that is to say, juridical, but some is personal, some economical, and some ecclesiastical.

Lastly, If I prove that contrary dispositions are joined neither of God nor nature, and so the marriage void, he will give me the controversy." I have proved in that book to any wise man, and without more ado the institution proves it.

Where I answer an objection usually made, that "the disposition ought to be known before marriage," and shew how difficult it is to choose a fit consort, and how easy to mistake: the servitor would know "what I mean by conversation," declaring his capacity nothing refined since his law-puddering, but still the same it was in the pantry, and at the dresser. Shall I argue of conversation with this hoyden, to go and practise at his opportunities in the larder? To men of quality I have said enough; and experience confirms by daily example, that wisest, soberest, justest men are sometimes miserably mistaken in their choice. Whom to leave thus without remedy, tossed and tempested in a most unquiet sea of afflictions and temptations, I say is most unchristianly.

But he goes on to untruss my arguments, imagining them his master's points. Only in the passage following I cannot but admire the ripeness and the pregnance of his native treachery, endeavouring to be more a fox than his wit will suffer him. Whereas I briefly men

teous grace of the gospel we are tied by cruellest com- | stancing in circumcision, sacrifices, washings. But pulsion to live in marriage till death with the wicked- what are these ceremonial things to the changing of a est, the worst, the most persecuting mate." These moral point in household duty, equally belonging to ignorant and doting surmises he might have read con- Jew and Gentile? Divorce was then right, now wrong; futed at large, even in the first edition; but found it then permitted in the rigorous time of law, now forbidsafer to pass that part over in silence. So that they den by law, even to the most extremely afflicted, in who see not the sottishness of this his new and tedious the favourable time of grace and freedom. But this is exposition, are worthy to love it dearly. not for an unbuttoned fellow to discuss in the garret at his trestle, and dimension of candle by the snuff; which brought forth his scullionly paraphrase on St. Paul, whom he brings in discoursing such idle stuff to the maids and widows, as his own servile inurbanity forbears not to put into the apostle's mouth, “of the soul's conversing:" and this he presumes to do, being a bayard, who never had the soul to know what conversing means, but as his provender and the familiarity of the kitchen schooled his conceptions.

His explanation done, he charges me with a wicked gloss, and almost blasphemy, for saying that Christ in teaching meant not always to be taken word for word; but like a wise physician, administering one excess against another, to reduce us to a perfect mean. Certainly to teach us were no dishonest method: Christ himself hath often used hyperboles in his teaching; and gravest authors, both Aristotle in the second of his "Ethics to Nichomachus," and Seneca in his seventh "de Beneficiis," advise us to stretch out the line of precept oftimes beyond measure, that while we tend further, the mean might be the easier attained. And whoever comments that 5th of Matthew, when he tomes to the turning of cheek after cheek to blows, and the parting both with cloak and coat, if any please to be the rifler, will be forced to recommend himself to the same exposition, though this chattering lawmonger be bold to call it wicked. Now note another precious piece of him; Christ, saith he, " doth not say that an ntbaste look is adultery, but the lusting after her;" as if the looking unchastely could be without lusting. This gear is licensed for good reason; "Imprimatur." Next he would prove, that the speech of Christ is not tered in excess against the Pharisees, first," because be speaks it to his disciples," Matth. v. which is false, for he spake it to the multitude, as by the first verse is evident, among which in all likelihood were many Pharisees, but out of doubt all of them pharisean disciples, and bred up in their doctrine; from which extremes of errour and falsity Christ throughout his whole sermon labours to reclaim the people. Secondiy, saith he, "because Christ forbids not only putting way, but marrying her who is put away." Acutely, as if the Pharisees might not have offended as much in marrying the divorced, as in divorcing the married. The precept may bind all, rightly understood; and yet the vehement manner of giving it may be occasioned aly by the Pharisees.

Finally, he winds up his text with much doubt and trepidation; for it may be his trenchers were not raped, and that which never yet afforded corn of savour to his noddle, the saltcellar was not rubbed: and therefore in this haste easily granting, that his answers fall foul upon each other, and praying, you, would not thank he writes as a prophet, but as a man, he runs to the black jack, fills his flagon, spreads the table, and erves ap dinner.

After waiting and voiding, he thinks to void my second argument, and the contradictions that will follow both in the law and gospel, if the Mosaic law were abrogated by our Saviour, and a compulsive prohibition fred justead: and sings his old song, "that the gospel counts unlawful that which the law allowed," in

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He passes to the third argument, like a boar in a vineyard, doing nought else, but still as he goes champing and chewing over, what I could mean by this chimæra of a "fit conversing soul," notions and words never made for those chops; but like a generous wine, only by overworking the settled mud of his fancy, to make him drunk, and disgorge his vileness the more openly. All persons of gentle breeding (I say

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gentle," though this barrow grunt at the word) I know will apprehend, and be satisfied in what I spake, how unpleasing and discontenting the society of body must needs be between those whose minds cannot be sociable. But what should a man say more to a snout in this pickle? What language can be low and degenerate enough?

The fourth argument which I had was, that marriage being a covenant, the very being whereof consists in the performance of unfeigned love and peace; if that were not tolerably performed, the covenant became broke and revocable. Which how can any, in whose mind the principles of right reason and justice are not cancelled, deny? For how can a thing subsist, when the true essence thereof is dissolved? Yet this he denies, and yet in such a manner as alters my assertion; for he puts in," though the main end be not attained in full measure:" but my position is, if it be not tolerably attained, as throughout the whole discourse is apparent.

Now for his reasons: “Heman found not that peace and solace which is the main end of communion with God, should he therefore break off that communion ?"

I answer, that if Heman found it not, the fault was certainly his own; but in marriage it happens far otherwise sometimes the fault is plainly not his who seeks divorce; sometimes it cannot be discerned whose fault it is; and therefore cannot in reason or equity be the matter of an absolute prohibition.

His other instance declares, what a right handicraftsman he is of petty cases, and how unfit to be aught else at highest, but a hackney of the law. "I change houses with a man; it is supposed I do it for my own ends; I attain them not in this house; I shall not

therefore go from my bargain." How without fear might the young Charinus in Andria now cry out,

"What likeness can be here to a marriage?" In this | marriage or divorce, he breaks the ordinance of marbargain was no capitulation, but the yielding of pos-riage least. And what in religious prudence can be session to one another, wherein each of them had his charity to himself, and what to his wife, either in conseveral end apart. In marriage there is a solemn vow tinuing or in dissolving the marriage-knot, hath been of love and fidelity each to other: this bargain is fully already oft enough discoursed. So that what St. Paul accomplished in the change; in marriage the covenant saith of circumcision, the same I stick not to say of a still is in performing. If one of them perform nothing civil ordinance, made to the good and comfort of man, tolerably, but instead of love, abound in disaffection, not to his ruin; marriage is nothing, and divorce is disobedience, fraud, and hatred; what thing in the nothing, "but faith which worketh by love." And nature of a covenant shall bind the other to such a this I trust none can mistake. perdurable mischief? Keep to your problems of ten groats, these matters are not for pragmatics and folkmooters to babble in.

Concerning the place of Paul," that God hath called us to peace," 1 Cor. vii. and therefore, certainly, if any where in this world, we have a right to claim it reasonably in marriage; it is plain enough in the sense which I gave, and confessed by Paræus, and other orthodox divines, to be a good sense, and this answerer | doth not weaken it. The other place, that "be who hateth, may put away," which if I shew him, he promises to yield the whole controversy, is, besides Deut. xxiv. 1, Deut. xxi. 14, and before this, Exod. xxi. 8. Of Malachi I have spoken more in another place; and say again, that the best interpreters, all the ancient, and most of the modern, translate it as I cite it, and very few otherwise, whereof perhaps Junius is the chief.

Against the fifth argument, that a Christian, in a higher order of priesthood than that Levitical, is a person dedicate to joy and peace; and therefore needs not in subjection to a civil ordinance, made to no other end but for his good, (when without his fault he finds it impossible to be decently or tolerably observed,) to plunge himself into immeasurable distractions and temptations, above his strength; against this he proves nothing, but gads into silly conjectures of what abuses would follow, and with as good reason might declaim against the best things that are.

Against the sixth argument, that to force the continuance of marriage between minds found utterly unfit and disproportional, is against nature, and seems forbid under that allegorical precept of Moses, "not to sow a field with divers seeds, lest both be defiled; not to plough with an ox and an ass together,” which I deduced by the pattern of St. Paul's reasoning what was meant by not muzzling the ox; he rambles over a long narration, to tell us that "by the oxen are meant the preachers:" which is not doubted. Then he demands, "if this my reasoning be like St. Paul's." And I answer him, yes. He replies, that sure St. Paul would

Another thing troubles him, that marriage is called "the mystery of joy." Let it still trouble him; for what hath he to do either with joy or with mystery? He thinks it frantic divinity to say, it is not the outward continuance of marriage that keeps the covenant of marriage whole; but whosoever doth most accord-be ashamed to reason thus. And I tell him, no. He ing to peace and love, whether in marriage or divorce, he breaks marriage least. If I shall spell it to him, he breaks marriage least, is to say, he dishonours not marriage; for least is taken in the Bible, and other good authors, for, not at all. And a particular marriage a man may break, if for a lawful cause, and yet not break, that is, not violate, or dishonour the ordinance of marriage. Hence those two questions that follow are left ridiculous; and the maids at Aldgate, whom he flouts, are likely to have more wit than the serving-man at Addle-gate.

Whereas he taxes me of adding to the Scripture in that I said love only is the fulfilling of every commandment, I cited no particular scripture, but spake a general sense, which might be collected from many places. For seeing love includes faith, what is there that can fulfil every commandment but only love? and I meant, as any intelligent reader might apprehend, every positive and civil commandment, whereof Christ hath taught us that man is the lord. It is not the formal duty of worship, or the sitting still, that keeps the holy rest of sabbath; but whosoever doth most according to charity, whether he works or works not, he breaks the holy rest of sabbath least. So marriage being a civil ordinance, made for man, not man for it; be who doth that which most accords with charity, first to himself, next to whom he next owes it, whether in

grants that place which I alleged, 2 Cor. vi. of unequal yoking, may allude to that of Moses, but says, “I cannot prove it makes to my purpose,” and shews not first how he can disprove it. Weigh, gentlemen, and consider, whether my affirmations, backed with reason, may hold balance against the bare denials of this pot derous confuter, elected by his ghostly patrons to be my copesmate.

Proceeding on to speak of mysterious things in nature, I had occasion to fit the language thereafter; matters not, for the reading of this odious fool, who thas ever, when he meets with aught above the cogitation of his breeding, leaves the noisome stench of his ride slot behind him, maliguing that any thing should be spoke or understood above his own genuine baseness; and gives sentence that his confuting hath been em ployed about a frothy, immeritous, and undesery ng discourse. Who could have believed so much inse lence durst vent itself from out the hide of a varlet, thus to censure that which men of mature judgment have applauded to be writ from good reason? But this contents him not, he falls now to rave in his barbarous abusiveness; and why? a reason befitting such an tificer, because he saith the book is contrary to all ha man learning; whenas the world knows, that all both human and divine learning, till the canon law, allowe divorce by consent, and for many causes without c

sent. Next, he dooms it as contrary to truth; whenas it hath been disputable among learned men, ever since it was prohibited and is by Peter Martyr thought an opinion not impious, but hard to be refuted; and by Erasmus deemed a doctrine so charitable and pious, as, if it cannot be used, were to be wished it could; but is by Martin Bucer, a man of dearest and most religious memory in the church, taught and maintained to be either most lawfully used, or most lawfully permitted. And for this, for I affirm no more than Bucer, what censure do you think, readers, he hath condemned the book to? To a death no less impious than to be burnt the hangman. Mr. Licenser, (for I deal not now with this caitiff, never worth my earnest, and now not seasonable for my jest,) you are reputed a man discreet enough, religious enough, honest enough, that is, to an ordinary competence in all these. But now your turn is, to hear what your own hand hath earned ye; that when you suffered this nameless hangman to cast into public such a despiteful contumely upon a name and person deserving of the church and state equally to yourself; and one who hath done more to the present advancement of your own tribe, than you or many of them bave done for themselves; you forgot to be either honest, religious, or discreet. Whatever the state might do concerning it, supposed a matter to expect evil from, I should not doubt to meet among them with wise, and honourable, and knowing men: but as to this brute libel, so much the more impudent and lawless for the abused authority which it bears; I say again, that I abominate the censure of rascals and their licensers. With difficulty I return to what remains of this ignoble task, for the disdain I have to change a period more with the filth and venom of this gourmand, swelled into a confuter; yet for the satisfaction of others I

endure all this.

Against the seventh argument, that if the canon law and divines allow divorce for conspiracy of death, they may as well allow it to avoid the same consequence from the likelihood of natural causes.

First, he denies that the canon so decrees.

I answer, that it decrees for danger of life, as much as for adultery, Decret. Gregor. J. 4, tit. 19, and in other places: and the best civilians, who cite the canon law, so collect, as Schneidewin in Instit. tit. 10, p. 4, de Divort. And indeed, who would have denied it, but one of a reprobate ignorance in all he meddles with? Secondly, he saith the case alters; for there the offender," who seeks the life, doth implicitly at least act

a divorce."

And I answer, that here nature, though no offender, dith the same. But if an offender, by acting a divorce, shall release the offended, this is an ample grant against himself. He saith, nature teaches to save life from one who seeks it. And I say, she teaches no less to save it from any other cause that endangers it. He saith, that here they are both actors. Admit they were, it would not be uncharitable to part them; yet sometimes they are not both actors, but the one of them Thost lamentedly passive. So he concludes, we must not take advantage of our own faults and corruptions

to release us from our duties. But shall we take no advantage to save ourselves from the faults of another, who hath annulled his right to our duty? No, says he, "let them die of the sullens, and try who will pity them." Barbarian, the shame of all honest attorneys! why do they not hoise him over the bar and blanket him?

Against the eighth argument, that they who are destitute of all marriageable gifts, except a body not plainly unfit, have not the calling to marry, and consequently married and so found, may be divorced: this, he saith, is nothing to the purpose, and not fit to be answered. I leave it therefore to the judgment of his

masters.

Against the ninth argument, that marriage is a human society, and so chiefly seated in agreement and unity of mind: if therefore the mind cannot have that due society by marriage, that it may reasonably and humanly desire, it can be no human society, and so not without reason divorcible: here he falsifies, and turns what the position required of a reasonable agreement in the main matters of society into an agreement in all things, which makes the opinion not mine, and so he leaves it.

At last, and in good hour, we are come to his farewell, which is to be a concluding taste of his jabberment in law, the flashiest and the fustiest that ever corrupted in such an unswilled hogshead.

Against my tenth argument, as he calls it, but as I intended it, my other position, " That divorce is not a thing determinable by a compulsive law, for that all law is for some good that may be frequently attained without the admixture of a worse inconvenience: but the law forbidding divorce never attains to any good end of such prohibition, but rather multiplies evil; therefore the prohibition of divorce is no good law." Now for his attorney's prize: but first, like a right cunning and sturdy logician, he denies my argument, not mattering whether in the major or minor: and saith," there are many laws made for good, and yet that good is not attained, through the defaults of the party, but a greater inconvenience follows."

But I reply, that this answer builds upon a shallow foundation, and most unjustly supposes every one in default, who seeks divorce from the most injurious wedlock. The default therefore will be found in the law itself; which is neither able to punish the offender, but the innocent must withal suffer; nor can right the innocent in what is chiefly sought, the obtainment of love or quietness. His instances out of the common law are all so quite beside the matter which he would prove, as may be a warning to all clients how they venture their business with such a cockbrained solicitor. For being to shew some law of England, attaining to no good end, and yet through no default of the party, who is thereby debarred all remedy, he shews us only how some do lose the benefit of good laws through their own default. His first example saith, "it is a just law that every one shall peaceably enjoy his estate in lands or otherwise." Does this law attain to no good end? The bar will blush at this most incogitant wood

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