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THE

ANSWER TO THE SIXTH CHAPTER:

That Protestants are not heretics.

AD § 1. He that will accuse any one man, much more any great multitude of men, of any great and horrible crime, should in all reason and justice take care that the greatness of his evidence do equal, if not exceed, the quality of the crime. And such an accusation you would here make show of, by pretending, first, "to lay such grounds of it as are either already proved, or else yielded on all sides;" and, after, to raise a firm and stable structure of convincing arguments upon them. But both these I find to be mere and vain pretences; and, having considered this chapter also without prejudice or passion, as I did the former, I am enforced, by the light of truth, to pronounce your whole discourse a painted and ruinous building, upon a weak and sandy foundation.

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2. Ad § 2, 3. First, for your grounds: a great part of them is falsely said to be either proved or granted. It is true, indeed, that man by his natural wit or industry could never have attained to the knowledge of God's will to give him a supernatural and eternal happiness," nor of the means by which his pleasure was to bestow this happiness upon him. And therefore your first ground is good, "that it was requisite his understanding should be enabled to apprehend that end and means by a knowledge supernatural." I say this is good, if you mean by knowledge an apprehension or belief. But if you take the word properly and exactly, it is both false; for faith is not knowledge, no more than three is four, but eminently contained in it; so that he that knows believes, and something more, but he that believes many times does not know-nay, if he doth barely and merely believe, he doth never know; and besides, it is retracted by yourself presently, where you require "that the object of faith must be both naturally and supernaturally unknown." And again, in the next page, where you say "Faith differs from science in regard of the object's obscurity." For that science and knowedge, properly taken, are synonymous terms, and that a knowledge of a thing absolutely unknown is a plain implicancy, I think, are things so plain that you will not require any proof of them.

3. But then, whereas you add, "that if such a knowledge were no more than probable, it could not be able sufficiently to overbear our will, and encounter with human probabilities, being backed with the strength of flesh and blood; and therefore conclude, that it was further necessary that this supernatural knowledge should be most certain and infallible:" to this I answer, that I do heartily acknowledge and believe the articles of our faith to

be in themselves truths, as certain and infallible as the very common principles of geometry and metaphysics. But that there is required of us a knowledge of them, and adherence to them, as certain as that of sense or science; that such a certainty is required of us under pain of damnation, so that no man can hope to be in the state of salvation, but he that finds in himself such a degree of faith, such a strength of adherence; this I have already demonstrated to be a great error, and of dangerous and pernicious conse quence. And because I am more and more confirmed in my persuasion that the truth which I there delivered is of great and singular use, I will here confirm it with more reasons. And to satisfy you that this is no singularity of my own, my margent presents you with a protestant divine of great authority, and no way singular in his opinions, and who hath long since preached and justified the same doctrine.†

4. I say that every text of Scripture which makes mention of any that were weak, or any that were strong, in faith; of any that were of little, or any that were of great faith; of any that abounded, or any that were rich in faith; of increasing, growing, rooting, grounding, establishing, confirming in faith; every such text is a demonstrative refutation of this vain fancy, proving that faith, even true and saving faith, is not a thing consisting in such an indivisible point of perfection as you make it, but capable of augmentation and diminution. Every prayer you make to God to increase your faith, (or if you conceive such a prayer derogatory from the perfection of your faith,) the apostles praying to Christ to increase their faith, is a convincing argument of the same conclusion. Moreover, if this doctrine of yours were true, then, seeing not any the least doubting can consist with a most infallible certainty, it will follow that every least doubting in any matter of faith, though resisted and involuntary, is a damnable sin, absolutely destructive, so long as it lasts, of all true and saving faith; which you are so far from granting, that you make it no sin at all, but only an occasion of merit and if you should esteem it a sin, then must you acknowledge, contrary to your own principles, that there are actual sins merely involuntary. The same is furthermore invincibly confirmed by every deliberate sin that any Christian commits, by any progress in charity that he makes. For seeing, as St. John assures us, our faith is the victory which overcomes the world, certainly if the faith of all true

Faith be.-Oxf.

+ Mr. Hooker, in his Answer to Travers's Supplication;- "I have taught, that the assurance of things which we believe by the word, is not so certain as of that we perceive by sense. And is it as certain? Yea, I taught, that the things which God doth promise in his word are surer unto us than any thing which we touch, handle, or see. But are we so sure and certain of them? If we be, why doth God so often prove his promises unto us, as he doth, by arguments taken from our sensible experience? We must be surer of the proof than of the thing proved, otherwise it is no proof. How is it, that if ten men do all look upon the moon, every one of them knoweth it as certainly to be the moon as another; but many helieving one and the same promise, all have not one and the same fulness of persuasion? How falleth it out, that men being assured of any thing by sense, can be no surer of it than they are; whereas the strongest in faith that liveth upor the earth, hath always need to labour, and strive, and pray, that his assurance concerning heavenly and spiritual things may grow. increase, and be augmented?"-Ecclesiastical Polity, vol. iii. p. 718. Oxf. edit. 1836.

I say then, that.-Oxf.

believers were perfect-and if true faith be capable of no imperfection, if all faith be a knowledge most certain and infallible, all faith must be perfect; for the most imperfect that is, according to your doctrine, if it be true, must be "most certain," and sure the most perfect that is cannot be more than most certain-then certainly their victory over the world, and therefore over the flesh, and therefore over sin, must of necessity be perfect, and so it should be impossible for any true believer to commit any deliberate sin; and therefore he that commits any sin must not think himself a true believer. Besides, seeing faith worketh by charity, and charity is the effect of faith, certainly if the cause were perfect, the effect would be perfect; and consequently, as you make no degrees in faith, so there would be none in charity, and so no man could possibly make any progress in it, but all true believers should be equal in charity, as in faith you make them equal; and from thence it would follow unavoidably, that whosoever finds in himself any true faith, must presently persuade himself that he is perfect in charity; and whosoever, on the other side, discovers in his charity any imperfection, must not believe that he hath any true faith. These, you see, are strange and portentous consequences; and yet the deduction of them from your doctrine is clear and apparent; which shows this doctrine of yours, which you would fain have true, that there might be some necessity of your church's infallibility, to be indeed plainly repugnant, not only to truth, but even to all religion and piety, and fit for nothing but to make men negligent of making any progress in faith or charity. And therefore I must entreat and adjure you either to discover unto me (which I take God to witness I cannot perceive) some fallacy in my reasons against it, or never hereafter to open your mouth in defence of it.

5. As for that one single reason which you produce to confirm it, it will appear upon examination to be resolved finally into a groundless assertion of your own, contrary to all truth and experience, and that is, "that no degree of faith less than a most certain and infallible knowledge, can be able sufficiently to overbear our will, and encounter with human probablilities, being backed with the strength of flesh and blood." For who sees not that many millions in the world forego many times their present ease and pleasure, undergo great and toilsome labours, encounter great difficulties, adventure upon great dangers, and all this not upon any certain expectation, but upon a probable hope of same future gain and commodity, and that not infinite and eternal, but finite and temporal? Who sees not that many men abstain from many things they exceedingly desire, not upon any eertain assurance, but a probable fear of danger that may come after? What man ever was there so madly in love with a present penny, but that he would willingly spend it upon any little hope, that by doing so he might gain a hundred thousand pounds? And I would fain know, "what gay probabilities" you could devise to dissuade from this resolution. And if you can devise none, what reason then or sense is there, but that a probable hope of infinite and eternal happiness, provided for all those that obey Christ Jesus, and much more a firm faith, though not so certain, in

some sort, as sense or science, may be able to sway our will to obedience, and encounter with all those temptations which flesh and blood can suggest to avert us from it? Men* may talk their plea sure of an obsolute and most infallible certainty, but did they generally believe that obedience to Christ were the only way to present and eternal felicity, but as firmly and undoubtedly as that there is such a city as Constantinople, nay, but as much as Cæsar's Commentaries, or the History of Sallust; I believe the lives of most men, both papists and protestants, would be better than they are. Thus therefore out of your own words I argue against you: he that requires to true faith an obsolute and infallible certainty, for this only reason," because any less degree could not be able to overbear our will," &c., imports, that if a less degree of faith may be able to do this, then a less degree of faith may be true, and Divine, and saving faith: but experience shows, and reason confirms, that a firm faith, though not so certain as sense or science, may be able to encounter and overcome our will and affections: and therefore it follows, from your own reason, that faith, which is not a most certain and infallible knowledge, may be true, and Divine, and saving faith.

6. All these reasons I have employed to show, that such a most certain and infallible faith as here you talk of, is not so necessary, but that without such a high degree of it, it is possible to please God. And therefore the doctrines delivered by you, sect. 25, are most presumptuous and uncharitable, viz. "That such a most certain and infallible faith is necessary to salvation," necessitate finis or medii; so necessary, that "after a man is come to the use of reason, no man ever was or can be saved without it." Wherein you boldly intrude into the judgment-seat of God, and damn men for breaking laws, not of God's, but your own making. But withal you clearly contradict yourself, not only where you affirm,t" that your faith depends finally upon the tradition of age to age, of father to son," which cannot be a fit ground, but only for a moral assurance; nor only where you pretend, "that not alone hearing and seeing," but also "histories, letters, relations of many," (which certainly are things not certain and infallible,) are yet foundations good enough to support your faith: which doctrine if it were good and allowable, protestants might then hope, that there histories, and letters, and relations, might also pass for means sufficient of a sufficient certainty, and that they should not be excluded from salvation for want of such a certainty. But indeed the pressure of the present difficulty compelled you to speak here what I believe you will not justify, and with a pretty tergiversation to show Dr. Potter your means of moral certainty; whereas the objection was, that you had no means or possibility of infallible certainty, for which you are plainly at as great a loss, and as far to seek, as any of your adversaries. And therefore it concerns you highly not to damn others for want of it, lest you involve yourselves in the same condemnation; according to those terrible words of St. Paul,§ Thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art that judgest: for wherein thou judgest another • may therefore talk.-Oxf. + P. 1. c. 2. ¿14. P. 2. c. 5, 32. In the Oxford edit. there are or ly two words of the citation, viz. Inexcusabilis

&c.

thou condemnest thyself; for thou that judgest doest the same things, &c. In this therefore you plainly contradict yourself. And lastly most plainly, in saying as you do here, you contradict and retract your pretence of charity to protestants in the beginning of your book: for there you make profession, that "you have no assurance, but that protestants, dying protestants, may possibly die with contrition, and be saved:" and here you are very peremptory, that "they cannot but want a means absolute necessary to salvation, and, wanting that, cannot but be damned."

7. The third condition you require to faith is, that our assent to Divine truths should "not only be unknown and unevident by any human discourse," but that "absolutely also it should be obscure in itself, and, ordinarily speaking, be void even of supernatural evidence." Which words must have a very favourable construction, or else they will not be sense. For who can make anything of these words taken properly, that "faith must be an unknown, unevident assent, or an assent absolutely obscure?" I had always thought that known and unknown, obscure and evident, had been affections not of our assent, but the object of it; not of our belief, but the thing believed. For well may we assent to a thing unknown, obscure, or unevident; but that our assent itself should be called therefore unknown or obscure, seems to me as great an impropriety, as if I should say, your sight were green or blue, because you see something that is so. In other places therefore I answer your words, but here. I must answer your meaning: which I conceive to be, that it is necessary to faith, that the objects of it, the points which we believe, should not be so evidently certain, as to necessitate our understanding to an assent, that so there might be some merit in faith, as you love to speak (who will not receive, no, not from God himself, but a pennyworth for a penny), but as we, some obedience in it, which can hardly have place where there is no possibility of disobedience; as there is not, where the understanding does all, and the will nothing. Now seeing the religion of protestants, though it be much more credible than yours, yet is not pretended to have the absolute evidence of sense or demonstration; therefore I might let this doctrine pass without exception, for any prejudice that can redound to us by it. But yet I must not forbear to tell you, that your discourse proves indeed this condition requisite to the merit, but yet not to the essence of faith: without it faith were not an act of obedience, but yet faith may be faith without it; and this you must confess, unless you will say either the apostles believed not the whole gospel which they preached, or that they were not eye witnesses of a great part of it; unless you will question St. John for saying, That which we have seen with our eyes, and which our hands have handled, &c., declare we unto you: nay, our Saviour himself for saying, Thomas, because thou seest, thou believest; blessed are they which have not seen, and yet have believed. Yet if you will say, that in respect of the things which they saw, the apostles' assent was not pure and proper and mere faith, but somewhat more, an assent containing faith, but superadding to it, I will not contend with you; for it will be a contention about words. But then again I must crave leave to tell