even without the two texts already examined,' (on which indeed some admit that no reliance is to be placed) if it can be demonstrated from a sufficient number of Scripture testimonies that the name, attributes, and works of God, as well as divine honours, are habitually ascribed to the Son. To proceed therefore in the same line of argument, I do not ask them to believe that the Father alone and none else is God, unless I shall have proved, first, that in every passage each of the particulars abovementioned is attributed in express terms only to one God the Father, as well by the Son himself as by his apostles. Secondly, that wherever they are attributed to the Son, it is in such a manner that they are easily understood to be attributable in their original and proper sense to the Father alone; and that the Son acknowledges himself to possess whatever share of Deity is assigned to him by virtue of the peculiar gift and kindness of the Father; as the apostles also testify. And lastly, that the Son himself and his apostles acknowledge throughout the whole of their discourses and writings, that the Father is greater than the Son in all things.

I am aware of the answer which will be here made by those who, while they believe in the unity of God, yet maintain that the Father alone is not God. I shall therefore meet their objection in the outset, lest they should raise a difficulty and outcry at each individual passage. They twice beg the question, or rather require us to make two gratuitous concessions. In the first place, they insist, that wherever the name of God is attributed to the Father alone, it should be understood οὐσιωδῶς, not ὑποστατικῶς, that is to say, that the name of the Father, who is unity, should be understood to signify the three persons, or the whole essence of the Trinity, not the single person of the Father. This is on many accounts a ridiculous distinction, and invented solely for the purpose of supporting their peculiar opinion; although in reality, instead of supporting it, it will be found to be dependent on it, and therefore if the opinion itself be invalidated, for which purpose a simple denial is sufficient, the futile distinction falls to the ground at the same time. For the fact is, not merely that the distinction is a futile one, but that it is no distinction at

9 So Hammond and Gerhard: Si hoc genuinum sit, prorsus evertitur illorum (sc. Arianorum) hæresis; si vero supposititium sit, doctrina trinitatis ex aliis scripturæ locis luculentur probatur.'

all; it is a mere verbal quibble, founded on the use of synonymous words, and cunningly dressed up in terms borrowed from the Greek to dazzle the eyes of novices. For since essence and hypostasis mean the same thing, as has been shown in the second chapter,' it follows that there can be no real difference of meaning between the adverbs essentially and substantially, which are derived from them. If then the name of God be attributed to the Father alone essentially, it must also be attributed to the Father alone substantially; since one substantial essence means nothing else than one hypostasis, and vice versa.. I would therefore ask my adversaries, whether they hold the Father to be an abstract ens or not? Questionless they will reply, the primary ens of all. I answer, therefore, that as he has one hypostasis, so must he have one essence proper to himself, incommunicable in the highest degree, and participated by no one, that is, by no person besides, for he cannot have his own proper hypostasis, without having his own proper essence. For it is impossible for any ens to retain its own essence in common with any other thing whatever, since by this essence it is what it is, and is numerically distinguished from all others. If therefore the Son, who has his own proper hypostasis, have not also his own proper essence, but the essence of the Father, he becomes on their hypothesis either no ens at all, or the same ens with the Father; which strikes at the very foundation of the Christian religion. The answer which is commonly made, is ridiculous—namely, that although one finite essence can pertain to one person only, one infinite essence may pertain to a plurality of persons; whereas in reality the infinitude of the essence affords an additional reason why it can pertain to only one person. All acknowledge that both the essence and the person of the Father are infinite; therefore the essence of the Father cannot be communicated to another person, for otherwise there might be two, or any imaginable number of infinite persons.

The second postulate is, that wherever the Son attributes Deity to the Father alone, and as to one greater than himself, he must be understood to speak in his human character, or as mediator. Wherever the context and the fact itself require

1 See p. 21.

6

2 The form, by which the thing is what it is, is oft so slender and undistinguishable,' &c. &c.-Tetrachordon. Prose Works, III. 342.

VOL. IV.

H

mistranslated:

M. wrote "hypostatice"

this interpretation, I shall readily concede it, without losing anything by the concession; for however strongly it may be contended, that when the Son attributes every thing to the Father alone, he speaks in his human or mediatorial capacity, it can never be inferred from hence that he is one God with the Father. On the other hand, I shall not scruple to deny the proposition, whenever it is to be conceded not to the sense of the passage, but merely to serve their own theory; and shall prove that what the Son attributes to the Father, he attributes in his filial or even in his divine character to the Father as God of God, and not to himself under any title or pretence whatever.

With regard to the name of God, wherever simultaneous mention is made of the Father and the Son, that name is uniformly ascribed to the Father alone, except in such passages as shall be hereafter separately considered. I shall quote in the first place the texts of the former class, which are by far the more considerable in point of number, and form a large and compact body of proofs. John iii. 16. “ so God loved the world, that he gave his own Son," &c. vi. 27. "him hath God the Father sealed." v. 29. "this is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent." xiv. 1. "ye believe in God, believe also in me.” What is meant by believing in any one, will be explained hereafter; in the mean time it is clear that two distinct things are here intended-in God and in me. Thus all the apostles in conjunction, Acts iv. 24, "lifted up their voice to God with one accord, and said, Lord, thou art God which hast made heaven and earth. . . . .who by the mouth of thy servant David hast said, Why did the heathen rage.....against the Lord, and against his Christ?" Rom. viii. 3. "God sending his own Son.' 1 Thess. iii. 11. "now God himself, and our Father, and our Lord Jesus Christ, direct our way unto you.' Col. ii. 2. "to the acknowledgement of the mystery of God, and of the Father, and of Christ." iii. 3. "your life is hid with Christ in God." 2 Tim. iv. 1. "I charge thee there

3 Τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ. Gr. of God, even of the Father, and of Christ. Macknight's Translation. This, however, is inadmissible on the principle of Mr. Granville Sharp's rules on the use of the copulative kai. See Middleton on the Greek Article, note on Acts xx. 28. See also Hammond and Whitby on the passage.

fore before God and the Lord Jesus Christ." 1 John iv. 9. "the love of God toward us, because that God sent his only begotten Son." So also where Christ is named first in order. Gal. i. 1. "by Jesus Christ, and God the Father, who raised him from the dead." 2 Thess. ii. 16. "now our Lord Jesus Christ himself, and God, even our Father." The same thing may be observed in the very outset of all the Epistles of St. Paul and of the other apostles, where, as is natural, it is their custom to declare in express and distinct terms who he is by whose divine authority they have been sent. Rom. i. 7, 8. 1 Cor. i. 1-3. 2 Cor. i. 1-3. and so throughout to the book of Revelations. See also Mark i. 1.

The Son likewise teaches that the attributes of divinity belong to the Father alone, to the exclusion even of himself. With regard to omniscience. Matt. xxiv. 36. " of that day and hour knoweth no man, no not the angels of heaven, but my Father only;" and still more explicitly, Mark xiii. 32. "not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father."

994

With regard to supreme dominion both in heaven and earth, the unlimited authority and full power of decreeing according to his own independent will. Matt. vi. 13. "thine is the kingdom and the power and the glory for ever." xviii. 35.

so likewise shall my heavenly Father do also unto you, if ye from your hearts forgive not," &c.-xxvi. 29. "in my Father's kingdom." xx. 23. "to sit on my right hand and on my left, is not mine to give, but it shall be given to them for whom it is prepared of my Father. It is not mine-," in my mediatorial capacity, as it is commonly interpreted. But questionless when the ambition of the mother and her two sons incited them to prefer this important demand, they ad

4 See this text explained, and reconciled with the consubstantiality of Christ, Hey's Lectures, Book iv. Art. 2, Sect. 32. Hill's Lectures, Book iii. chap. 8. A certain limitation of faculties was essential to the human nature of Christ, as very man.'

4 Father eternal, thine is to decree,

Mine, both in Heaven and Earth, to do thy will
Supreme.

Paradise Lost, X. 68.

5 See Poole's Synopsis in loc. But Whitby explains it as signifying only a perfect conformity to His Father's will, without implying any defect in His own power. He quotes in support of this interpretation Luke xxii. 29. Rev. iii. 21. 1 Cor. xii. 5.

dressed their petition to the entire nature of Christ, how exalted soever it might be, praying him to grant their request to the utmost extent of his power whether as God or man; v. 20. "worshipping him, and desiring a certain thing of him," and v. 21. " grant that they may sit." Christ also answers with reference to his whole nature-it is not mine to give; and lest for some reason they might still believe the gift belonged to him, he declares that it was altogether out of his province, and the exclusive privilege of the Father. If his reply was meant solely to refer to his mediatorial capacity, it would have bordered on sophistry, which God forbid that we should attribute to him; as if he were capable of evading the request of Salome and her sons by the quibble which the logicians call expositio prava or æquivoca, when the respondent answers in a sense or with a mental intention different from the meaning of the questioner. The same must be said of other passages of the same kind, where Christ speaks of himself; for after the hypostatical union of two natures in one person, it follows that whatever Christ says of himself, he says not as the possessor of either nature separately, but with reference to the whole of his character, and in his entire person, except where he himself makes a distinction. Those who divide this hypostatical union at their own discretion, strip the discourses and answers of Christ of all their sincerity; they represent every thing as ambiguous and uncertain, as true and false at the same time; it is not Christ that speaks, but some unknown substitute, sometimes one, and sometimes another; so that the words of Horace may be justly applied to such disputants:

Quo teneam vultus mutantem Protea nodo ?6

Luke xxiii. 34. "Father, forgive them," &c. John xiv. 2. "in my Father's house." So also Christ himself says, Matt. xxvi. 39. "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt." Now it is manifest that those who have not the same will, cannot have the same essence. It appears, however, from many passages, that the Father and Son have not, in a numerical sense, the same intelligence or will. Matt. xxiv. 36. 61 Ep. i. 90. Milton employs the same allusion in Paradise Lost:

....call up unbound

In various shapes old Proteus from the sea.

III. 603.