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Reductions in compensation and dismissals for inefficiency shall be made by heads of departments in all cases whenever the efficiency ratings warrant, as provided herein, subject to the approval of the board.

The board may require that one copy of such current ratings shall be transmitted to and kept on file with the board.

Under such regulations as may be prescribed by the Civil Service Administrator with the approval of the President

There shall be established in each Department one or more Boards of Review, each of which shall be composed of three or more members, the Chairman to be designated by the Civil Service Administrator and the other members to be designated by the head of the Department concerned. The Boards of Review shall meet at the call of their respective chairmen for the purpose of considering the passing upon the merits of such efficiency ratings assigned to employees as may be submitted to such Boards of Řevier as hereinafter provided. Any employee shall, upon written request to the chairman of the appropriate Board of Review of his department, be entitled, as a matter of right, to o hearing and a review by such Board of Review of his efficiency rating. After any such hearing, the Board of Review may make such adjustments in any such efficiency rating as it may find to be proper.

Section 2 of the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (U. S. C., 1934 ed., title 31, sec. 2), is amended by section 301' (e) of the Senate bill.

SEC. 2. When used in this Act

The terms "department and establishment” and “department or establishment” mean any executive department, independent commission, board, bureau, office, agency or other establishment of the Government, including any independent establishment as defined in section 5 of the Reorganization Act of 1937, and the municipal government of the District of Columbia, but do not include the Legislative Branch of the Government or the Supreme Court of the United States;

The term “the Budget” means the Budget required by section 201 to be transmitted to Congress;

The term "Bureau" means the Bureau of the Budget;
The term “Director" means the Director of the Bureau of the Budget; and

The term “Assistant Director" means the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

The first two sentences of Section 207 of the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (U. S. C., 1934 ed., title 31, sec. 16) are amended by section 301 (f) of the Senate bill.

Sec. 207. There is hereby created [in the Treasury Department a bureau? an independent agency to be known as the Bureau of the Budget. There shall be in the Bureau a Director and an Assistant [Director, who shall be appointed by the President and receive salaries of $10,000 and $7,500 a year, respectively] Director. The Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive a salary at the rate of $10,000 a year. The Director shall appoint the Assistant Director, subject to the civil-service laws, and his salary shall be fixed in accordance with the Classification Act of 1923, as amended.




The country today is in the throes of despair. Business is stagnant. Credit has ceased to exist, and the employment of our people in industrial centers is at its lowest stage, due entirely to a lack of a definite constructive policy and to a lack of confidence.

It would have given the people of the country some hope if hearings could have been had on the reorganization bill before the House committee reported it out this morning, but that was refused. There is evidently an intention of bringing the bill to a vote in the House without a proper opportunity for hearings and without proper debate and without proper consideration.

We are going to try and explain some of the worst features of the bill so that the people may realize what can be done to them if it is passed and what can be done to them insofar as it relates to the promotion of practices against the people's interests if the record of this administration in the past is anything to go by.

The House committee voted to substitute the four bills, which it has previously reported, for the entire Senate reorganization bill. It contains four titles.

Title I provides for the reorganization of executive departments and for the creation of the new Department of Public Welfare. This involves a delegation of power to the President which we know he will not exercise-judging by past experience, when he had the power and didn't use it—in the interests of economy and efficiency. It is a delegation of power which is dangerous for the Congress to give up. There is no reservation of any protection on the part of the Congress of its rights or the right to veto a reorganization program of the President which is not in the public interest, except by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress. In addition, this title creates the Department of Public Welfare, to which the President can transfer at least $4,000,000,000 of governmental activities. Such a department will be cumbersome, inefficient, and of course would take more money out of the taxpayers' pockets.

Title II provides for six new administrative assistants to act as a medium of communication between the subordinate officers of governmental departments and agencies. This will destroy entirely any Executive control on the part of the Cabinet members and the heads of the independent agencies of the Government. It is bad!

Title III relates to the auditing of governmental accounts. The Senate bill provides for an auditor in the Bureau of the Budget-a most ridiculous set-up, and one where the President would have absolute control over the operations of the auditor. The Director of the Budget Bureau would hold office during the pleasure of the President. Nothing in the nature of protection of the Treasury is provided. In other words, the President, who is the head of the executive departments, would be able to tell the chief auditor just

what he should do and just how he should rule upon the availability of any appropriations. Otherwise, the auditor's head would come off.

In the House amendment, the Comptroller General is retained, but it is provided that he shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. Some other provisions with reference to the Budget and Accounting Act are a little better than the Senate bill. By statute the Comptroller General is continued as an independent officer, but the House amendment, by making the Comptroller General subject to removal at the will of the President, makes the House amendment nearly as bad as the Senate bill.

At the present time the Comptroller General is appointed for a term of 15 years and his removal can only be brought about by a joint resolution of Congress and approval by the President. This has permitted the Comptroller General independently to refuse to stand for violations of the law by departments of the Government and for illegal attempts to spend the people's money-even by the President himself.

Clearly, if the Comptroller General or whoever has charge of the auditing is subject to removal at the will of the President, there can be no safety. Moneys appropriated by Congress will be used for purposes other than that for which they are appropriated, as they have been for the last 5 years, and with a subservient auditor there will be no recourse.

The liberties of the American people and of the English-speaking people have been dependent upon the power of the Congress over appropriations. When that power is given up, either voluntarily by Congress, or without providing an independent auditor who can be depended upon to protect the interests of the people and see that money is spent for what it is appropriated, the power of Congress is gone and the liberties of the American people are gone.

Title IV relates to the Civil Service Commission. It destroys the bipartisan Civil Service Commission which we now have, and substitutes in place of it a single-headed partisan administrator. It will tend to provide political control over the appointment and retention of all Government employees and no civil-service employee can feel safe in a position with the set-up that is provided. A ridiculous advisory board is provided, of seven members, which could not possibly function, and without any power whatever except to make recommendations.

Titles I, II, and IV are only a little different in the House amendment than they are in the Senate bill. We think that the provisions of the House amendment as to the civil-service proposition and as to the reorganization proposition are perhaps better than the provisions of the Senate bill, but the provisions of all three of these titles in both the House and Senate proposals are absolutely vicious. We recommend the defeat of this bill.




March 30, 1938.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the

state of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. CELLER, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the



(To accompany H. R. 10014]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 10014) to provide for the appointment of additional judges for certain United States district courts, circuit courts of appeals, and certain courts of the United States for the District of Columbia, after consideration, report the same favorably to the House with the recommendation that the bill do pass.

It is unnecessary here to dwell on the denial of justice resulting when calendars of courts are congested and judges overworked. Meritorious claims are compromised on harsh terms when litigants of ordinary circumstances are confronted with interminable delays before a trial can be had and an appeal heard. A speedy trial is a constitutional right of one accused of crime.

Judges should be attentive to their duties, but it is not good economy for the Government to ask judges to risk the impairment of their health from too much work. Moreover, a weary judge cannot give the character of consideration to cases before him which it is the right of those concerned to have from him. In short, it is essential to the efficiency and good repute of the courts that they be adequately manned.

With the shifting of population in this country, the increasing complexity of life and the expansion of Federal jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, inevitably increases in the personnel of the judiciary must be made from time to time.

Your committee has given careful study to the volume and status of the business of the courts of the United States. It has had the benefit of investigations made by individual members of the committee in their respective circuits. It has had before it the recommendations of the Judicial Conference, composed of the Chief Justice and senior circuit judges of each circuit, whose duty it is under the statute establishing the conference (U.S.C., title 28, sec. 218) to make recommendations with respect to the business of the courts. The committee has also had the benefit of the recommendations of the Attorney General, the Honorable Homer Cummings, and wishes to acknowledge the unfailing courtesy and helpfulness of the Attorney General and his staff, especially Hon. Joseph B. Keenan, the Assistant to the Attorney General, and Mr. Alexander Holtzoff, special assistant to the Attorney General, in quickly responding to every request of the committee for data and statistics relative to judicial business. Data furnished by the Department of Justice is incorporated in this report by circuits and districts for the information of the House.

As the result of its studies, the committee recommends the creation of 25 additional judgeships, which are embodied in the reported bill, and which are as follows:



One circuit judge for the second circuit.
One circuit judge for the fifth circuit.
One circuit judge for the sixth circuit.
One circuit judge for the seventh circuit.

One associate justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia.

Two circuit judges for the third circuit, with the proviso that the first two vacancies occurring by reason of the retirement, disqualification, resignation, or death of circuit judges in office on June 24, 1936, shall not be filled.

One district judge for the western district of Louisiana.
One district judge for the southern district of Texas.
One district judge for the eastern district of Michigan.
One district judge for the western district of Washington.
One district judge for the southern district of California.
One district judge for the northern district of Illinois.
One district judge for the northern district of Ohio.
One district judge for the northern district of Georgia.
One district judge for the district of Massachusetts.
One district judge for the district of New Jersey.
One district judge for the western district of Virginia.

One district judge for the northern district of California, whose official residence shall be Sacramento.

One district judge for the southern district of New York, provided that the first vacancy occurring in the office of district judge for the southern district of New York shall not be filled.

One district judge for the eastern and western districts of Arkansas.

One district judge for the eastern and middle districts of Tennessee, provided that no successor shall be appointed to the judgeship for the eastern and middle districts of Tennessee.

Three associate justices of the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia.

The committee also recommends that restrictions be removed prohibiting the appointment of successors to one district judge now sitting in the district of Montana, and one district judge now sitting in the eastern district of Pennsylvania.

Of the above list, the following are recommended both by the Judicial Conference and the Attorney General:

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