OF CORRECTION

It is a maxim with many, that no parent, or tutor, should correct a child except when he is perfectly cool, and that to correct with anger defeats the purpose of it; and in confirmation of this they quote the example of one of the old philosophers, who being asked why he did not correct his slave, who had given him just provocation, replied, "Because I am angry." It appears to me, however, that this maxim may be very easily pushed too far, and by that the proper effect of discipline be lost.

Young persons seldom transgress their duty without being conscious of it, and without being sensible, at least after some time, that they deserve correction. They have also a general notion of the degree of their demerit, and consequently of the degree of provocation which it must give their parent or tutor; and the disposition to transgress for the future is best prevented by their just expectations being answered, i.e., by their being actually received by their parent or tutor, with what degree of displeasure, and the effects of it, which they are themselves sensible, or which they may be made sensible, that they deserve. But they will equally despise their tutor, if the displeasure which he expresses be either too little, or too great, for the occasion. In fact, they judge of him by themselves, and they have no notion either of being offended without being angry, or of being angry without correcting for the offence, and before their anger be subsided.

Besides, it is not the remembrance of the mere pain which correction gives them that tends to check their disposition to repeat the offence, so much as the fear of the displeasure, which they foresee their behaviour will excite in their tutor against them; and it is not possible to express displeasure with sufficient force, especially to a child, when a man is perfectly cool; and

mere reproof, without sufficient marks of displeasure and emotion, affects a child very little, and is soon forgotten.

It is certain, however, that upon the first intimation of an offence, a man is apt to conceive of it as much more heinous than it really is, and consequently to be inflamed beyond due bounds. We ought, therefore, to wait till we perfectly understand the nature of the offence, and have considered the punishment due to it; but to wait longer than is necessary for this purpose is to refine beyond the dictates of nature; which, however specious in theory, is seldom found to answer any good end in practice.

(From Observations on Education.)

RIDICULE AS A TEST OF FAITH

HAD I been acquainted with these new principles, I might have saved myself a good deal of trouble; but I am apprehensive that I should hardly have escaped a great deal of ridicule; and we ought not to forget that ridicule has been deemed the test of truth as well as this new common sense. I think with equal reason, and I flatter myself that the reign of this new usurper will not be much longer than that of his predecessor, to whom he is very nearly related.

In this some may think that I only mean to be jocular, but really I am serious. Why was ridicule ever thought to be the test of truth, but because the things at which we can laugh were supposed to be so absurd, that their falsehood was self-evident ; so that there was no occasion to examine any further? We were supposed to feel them to be false; and what is a feeling but the affection of a sense? In reality, therefore, this new doctrine of common sense being the standard of truth is no other than ridicule being the standard of truth. The words are different but not the things. I should be glad to see so acute a metaphysician as Dr. Reid, so fine a writer as Dr. Beattie, and, to adopt Dr. Beattie's compliment, so elegant an author as Dr. Oswald separately employed to ascertain the precise difference between these two schemes.

In my opinion the chief difference, besides what I have said above, consists in this, that the one may be called the sense of

truth, and the other the sense of falsehood.

There is also some

doubt whether Shaftesbury was really in earnest in proposing ridicule as the test of truth. Many think that he could never be so absurd. Whereas there can be no doubt but that this triumvirate of authors are perfectly serious. There is however another difference that will strongly recommend the claims of common sense in preference to those of ridicule, which is, that this was advanced in support of infidelity, but that in support of religion. But I should think that the greater weight we have to support, the stronger buttresses we should use.

(From Remarks on Dr. Beattie's Essay.)

EFFECTS OF A CODE OF EDUCATION

Now I appeal to any person whether any plan of education, which has yet been put in execution in this kingdom, be so perfect as that the establishing of it by authority would not obstruct the great ends of education; or even whether the united genius of man could, at present, form so perfect a plan. Every man who is experienced in the business of education well knows, that the art is in its infancy, but advancing, it is hoped, apace to a state of manhood. In this condition, it requires the aid of every circumstance favourable to its natural growth, and dreads nothing so much as being confined and cramped by the unseasonable hand of power. To put it (in its present imperfect state) into the hands of the civil magistrate, in order to fix the mode of it, would be like fixing the dress of a child, and forbidding its clothes ever to be made wider or larger.

Manufacturers and artists of several kinds already complain of the obstruction which is given to their arts, by the injudicious acts of former parliaments; and it is the object of our wisest statesmen to get these obstructions removed, by the repeal of those acts. I wish it could not be said, that the business of education is already under too many legal restraints. Let these be removed, and a few more fair experiments made of the different methods of conducting it, before the legislature think proper to interfere any more with it, and by that time, it is hoped, they will see no reason to interfere at all. The business would be conducted to much better purpose, even in favour of

their own views, if those views were just and honourable, than it would be under any arbitrary regulations whatever.

To show this scheme of an established method of education in a clearer point of light, let us imagine that what is now proposed had been carried into execution some centuries before this time. For no reason can be assigned for fixing any mode of education at present, which might not have been made use of, with the same appearance of reason, for fixing another approved method a thousand years ago. Suppose Alfred, when he founded the University of Oxford, had made it impossible, that the method of instruction used in his time should ever have been altered. Excellent as that method might have been for the time in which it was instituted, it would now have been the worst method that is practised in the world. Suppose the number of the arts and sciences, with the manner of teaching them, had been fixed in this kingdom, before the revival of letters and of the arts, it is plain they could never have arrived at their present advanced state among us. We should not have had the honour to lead the way in the most noble discoveries, in the mathematics, philosophy, astronomy, and I may add divinity too. And for the same reason, were such an establishment to take place in the present age, it would prevent all great improvements in futurity.

I may add, in this place, that if we argue from the analogy of education to other arts which are most similar to it, we can never expect to see human nature, about which it is employed, brought to perfection, but in consequence of indulging unbounded liberty, and even caprice in conducting it. The power of nature in producing plants cannot be shown to advantage, but in all possible circumstances of culture. The richest colours, the most fragrant scents and the most exquisite flavours, which our present gardens and orchards exhibit, would never have been known, if florists and gardeners had been confined in the processes of cultivation; nay if they had not been allowed the utmost licentiousness of fancy in the exercise of their arts. Many of the finest productions of modern gardening have been the result of casual experiment, perhaps of undesigned deviation from established rules. Observations of a similar nature may be made on the methods of breeding cattle, and training animals of all kinds. And why should the rational part of the creation be deprived of that opportunity of diversifying and improving itself, which the vegetable and animal world enjoy?

From new, and seemingly irregular, methods of education, perhaps something extraordinary and uncommonly great may spring. At least there would be a fair chance for such productions; and if something odd and eccentric should, now and then, arise from this unbounded liberty of education, the various business of human life may afford proper spheres for such eccentric geniuses.

Education, taken in its most extensive sense, is properly that which makes the man. One method of education, therefore, would only produce one kind of men; but the great excellence of human nature consists in the variety of which it is capable. Instead then of endeavouring, by uniform and fixed systems of education, to keep mankind always the same, let us give free scope to everything which may bid fair for introducing more variety among us. The various character of the Athenians was certainly preferable to the uniform character of the Spartans, or to any uniform national character whatever.

Is it not universally considered as an advantage to England, that it contains so great a variety of original characters ? And is it not on this account preferred to France, Spain, or Italy?

Uniformity is the characteristic of the brute creation. Among them every species of bird build their nests with the same materials, and in the same form; the genius and disposition of one individual is that of all; and it is only the education which men give them that raises any of them much above others. But it is the glory of human nature, that the operations of reason, though variable, and by no means infallible, are capable of infinite improvement. We come into the world worse provided than any of the brutes, and for a year or two of our lives, many of them go far beyond us in intellectual accomplishments. But when their faculties are at a full stand, and their enjoyments incapable of variety or increase, our intellectual powers are growing apace; we are perpetually deriving happiness from new sources, and even before we leave this world are capable of tasting the felicity of angels.

Have we, then, so little sense of the proper excellence of our natures, and of the views of Divine Providence in our formation, as to catch at a poor advantage adapted to the lower nature of brutes? Rather, let us hold on in the course in which the Divine Being Himself has put us, by giving reason its full play, and throwing off the fetters which short-sighted and ill-judging men