them, and because it finds in its own mechanism corresponding sequences of thought. many powerful minds. We have only to take care that in expressing those truths we do not use metaphors which are misleading. We have only to remember that we must regard the mind and the laws of its operation in the light of that most assured truth the unity of nature. The mind has no "moulds" which have not themselves been moulded on the realities of the universe - no "forms" which it It was the work of a great German metaphysician towards the close of the last century to discriminate and define, more systematically than had been done before, some at least of those higher elements of thought which, over and above the mere perception of external things, the mind thus contributes out of its own structure did not receive as a part and a conse to the fabric of knowledge. In doing this he did immortal service-proving that when men talked of experience being the source of knowledge, they for got that the whole process of experience presupposes the action of innate laws of thought, without which experience can neither gather its facts nor reach their quence of a unity with the rest of nature. Its conceptions are not manufactured; they are developed. They are not made; they simply grow. The order of the laws of thought under which it renders intelligible to itself all the phenomena of the universe, is not an order which it invents, but an order which it simply feels and interpretation. "Experience," as Kant sees. And this "vision and faculty ditrated than by quoting the words most truly said, is nothing but a "synthesis of intuitions" - a building up or putting together of conceptions which the access of external nature finds ready to be awakened in the mind. The whole of this process is determined by the mind's laws - a process in which even observation of outward facts must take its place according to principles of arrangement in which alone all explanation of them consists, and out of which any understanding of them is impossible. own And yet this great fact of a large part of our knowledge and that the most important part -- coming to us out of the very furniture and constitution of the mind itself, has been so expressed and presented in the language of philosophy as rather to undermine than to establish our confidence in the certainty of knowledge. For if the mind is so spoken of and represented as to suggest the idea of something apart from the general system of nature, and if its laws of thought are looked upon as "forms" or moulds into which, by some artificial arrangement or by some mechanical necessity, everything from outside must be squeezed and made to fit then it will naturally occur to us to doubt whether conceptions cut out and manufactured under such conditions can be any trustworthy representation of the truth. Such, unfortunately, has been the mode of representation adopted by many philosophers - and such accordingly has been the result of their teaching. This is the great source of error in every form of the idealistic philosophy, but it is a source of error which can be perfectly eliminated, leaving untouched and undoubted the large body of truths which has made that philosophy attractive to so vine" is a necessary consequence of its congenital relations with the whole system of nature from being bone of its bone, flesh of its flesh - from breathing its atmosphere, from living in its light, and from having with it a thousand points of contact visible and invisible, more than we can number or understand. And yet so subtle are the suggestions of the human spirit in disparagement of its own powers - so near and ever present to us is that region which belongs to the unsatisfied reserve of power - that the very fact of our knowledge arising out of our organic relations with the rest of nature has been seized upon as only casting new discredit on all that we seem to know. Because all our knowledge arises out of these relations, therefore, it is said, all our knowledge of things must be itself relative; and relative knowledge is not knowledge of "things in themselves." Such is the argument of metaphysicians an argument repeated with singular unanimity by philosophers of almost every school of thought. By some it has been made the basis of religious proof. By some it has been made the basis of a reasoned scepticism. By others it has been used simply to foil attacks upon belief. The real truth is that it is an argument useless for any purpose whatever, because it is not itself true. The distinction between knowledge of things in their relations, and knowledge of things "in themselves," is a distinction without a meaning. In metaphysics the assertion that we can never attain to any knowledge of things in themselves does not mean simply that we know things only in a few relations out of many. It does not mean even that there may be and probably are a great many relations which in which we have not faculties enabling us to con- this favorite doctrine is expressed by Sir ceive. All this is quite true, and a most important truth. But the metaphysical distinction is quite different. It affirms that if we knew things in every one of the relations that affect them, we should still be no nearer than before to a knowledge of "things in themselves." "It is proper to observe," says Sir W. Hamilton, "that had we faculties equal in number to all the possible modes of existence, whether of mind or matter, still would our knowledge of mind or matter be only relative. If material existence could exhibit ten thousand phenomena, if we possessed ten our William Hamilton. Speaking of knowledge of matter he says: "It is a name for something known for that which appears to us under the forms of extension, solidity, divisibility, figure, motion, roughness, smoothness, color, heat, cold," etc. "But," he goes on to say, "as these phenomena appear only in conjunction, we are compelled by the constitution of our nature to think them conjoined in and by something; and as they are phenomena, we cannot think them the phenomena of nothing, but must regard them as the properties or qualities thousand senses to apprehend these ten of something that is extended, figured, thousand phenomena of material exist- etc. But this something, absolutely and ence, of existence absolutely and in itself in itself - i.e., considered apart from its we should then be as ignorant as we are at phenomena - is to us as zero. It is only present."* The conception here is that in its qualities, only in its effects, in its there is something to be known about things in which they are not presented as in any relation to anything else. It affirms that there are certain ultimate entities in nature to which all phenomena are due, and yet which can be thought of as having no relation to these phenomena, or to ourselves, or to any other existence what ever. Now, as the very idea of knowledge consists in the perception of relations, this affirmation is, in the purest sense of the word, nonsense - that is to say, it is a series of words which have either no meaning at all or a meaning which is selfcontradictory. It belongs to the class of propositions which throw just discredit on metaphysics - mere verbal propositions, pretending to deal with conceptions which are no conceptions at all, but empty sounds. The "unconditioned," we are told, "is unthinkable:" but words which are unthinkable had better be also unspeakable, or at least unspoken. It is altogether untrue that we are compelled to believe in the existence of anything relative or phenomenal existence, that it is cognizable or conceivable; and it is only by a law of thought which compels us to think something absolute and unknown, as the basis or condition of the relative and known, that this something obtains a kind of incomprehensible reality to us." The argument here is that because phenomena are and must be the "properties or qualities of something else," therefore we are "compelled to think" of that something as having an existence separable from any relation to its own qualities and properties, and that this something acquires from this reasoning a "kind of incomprehensible reality "! There is no such law of thought. There is no such necessity of thinking nonsense as is here alleged. All that we are compelled to think is that the ultimate constitution of matter, and the ultimate source of its relations to our own organism, are unknown, and are probably inaccessible to us. But this is a very different conception from that which affirms that if we which is "unconditioned" in matter did know or could know these ultimate with no qualities in minds with no character in a God with no attributes. Even the metaphysicians who dwell on this distinction between the relative and the unconditioned admit that it is one to which no idea can be attached. Yet, in spite of this admission, they proceed to found many inferences upon it, as if it had an intelligible meaning. Those who have not been accustomed to metaphysical literature could hardly believe the flagrant unreason which is common on this subject. It cannot be better illus * Lectures, vol. i., p. 145. truths we should find in them anything standing absolutely alone and unrelated to other existences in the universe. It is, however, so important that we should define to ourselves as clearly as we can the nature of the limitations which affect our knowledge, and the real inferences which are to be derived from the consciousness we have of them, that it may be well to examine these dicta of metaphysicians in the light of specific instances. It becomes all the more important to do so when we observe that the language in which these dicta are expressed generally implies that knowledge which is "only relative" is less genuine | can be thought of or conceived as neither or less absolutely true than some other a cause nor a consequence, but solitary kind of knowledge which is not explained, except that it must be knowledge of that which has no relation to the mind. There is a sense (and it is the only sense in which the words have any meaning) in which we are all accustomed to say that we know a thing" in itself," when we have found out, for example, its origin, or its structure, or its chemical composition, as distinguished from its more superficial aspects. If a new substance were offered to us as food, and if we examined its appearance to the eye, and felt its consistency to the touch, and smelt its odor, and finally tasted it, we should then know as much about it as these various senses could tell us. Other senses, or other and unrelated. On the contrary, all that remains unexplained is the nature and cause of its relations - its relations on the one hand to the elements out of which vegetable vitality has combined it, and its relations on the other hand to the still higher vitality which it threatens to destroy. Its place in the unity of nature is the ultimate object of our search, and this unity is essentially a unity of relations, and of nothing else. That unity everywhere proclaims the truth that there is nothing in the wide universe which is unrelated to the rest. Let us take another example. Until modern science had established its methods of physical investigation, light and forms of sensation, might soon add their sound were known as sensations only. own several contributions to our knowledge, and we might discover that this substance had deleterious effects upon the human organism. This would be knowing, perhaps, by far the most important things that are to be known about it. But we should certainly like to know more, and we should probably consider that we had found out what it was "in itself," when we had discovered farther, for example, that it was the fruit of a tree. Chemistry might next inform us of the analysis of the fruit, and might exhibit some alkaloid to which its peculiar properties and its peculiar effects upon the body are due. This, again, we should certainly consider as knowing what it is "in itself." But other questions respecting it would remain behind. How the tree can extract this alkaloid from the inorganic elements of the soil, and how, when so extracted, it should have such and such peculiar effects upon the animal body, these, and similar questions, we may ask, and probably we shall ask in vain. But there is nothing in the inaccessibility of this knowledge to suggest that we are absolutely incapable of under That is to say, they were known in terms of the mental impressions which they immediately produce upon us, and in no other terms whatever. There was no proof that in these sensations we had any knowledge "in themselves" of the external agencies which produce them. But now all this is changed. Science has discovered what these two agencies are "in themselves;" that is to say, it has defined them under aspects which are totally distinct from seeing or hearing, and is able to describe them in terms addressed to wholly different faculties of conception. Both light and sound are in the nature of undulatory movements in elastic media to which undulations our organs of sight and hearing are respectively adjusted or "attuned." In these organs, by virtue of that adjustment or attuning, these same undulations "translated" into the sensations which we know. It thus appears that the facts as described to us in this language of sensation are the true equivalent of the facts as described in the very different language of intellectual analysis. The eye is now understood to be an apparatus for are standing the answer if it were explained enabling the mind instantaneously to to us. On the contrary, the disposition we have to put such questions raises a strong presumption that the answer would be one capable of that assimilation by our intellectual nature in which all understanding of anything consists. There is nothing in the series of phenomena which this substance has exhibited to us nothing in the question which they raise which can even suggest the idea that all these relations which we have traced, or any others which may remain behind, are the result of something which appreciate differences of motion which are of almost inconceivable minuteness. The pleasure we derive from the harmonies of color and of sound, although mere sensations, do correctly represent the movement of undulations in a definite order; whilst those other sensations which we know as discords represent the actual clashing and disorder of interfering waves. In breathing the healthy air of physical discoveries such as these, although the limitations of our knowledge continually haunt us, we gain nevertheless a trium phant sense of its certainty and of its | come from luminous bodies. This was a truth. Not only are the mental impres- relation - but a relation of the vaguest sions, which our organs have been so con- and most general kind. As compared structed as to convey, a true interpretation with this vague relation the new relation of external facts, but the conclusions we under which we know them is knowledge draw as to their origin and their source, of a more definite and of a higher kind. and as to the guarantee we have for the Light and sound we now know to be accuracy of our conceptions, are placed on words or ideas representing not merely the firmest of all foundations. The any one thing or any two things, but espemirror into which we look is a true mirror, cially a relation of adjustment between a reflecting accurately and with infinite fine- number of things. In this adjustment ness the realities of nature. And this light and sound, as known to sense, do great lesson is being repeated in every "in themselves "consist. Sound becomes new discovery, and in every new applica- known to us as the attunement between tion of an old one. Every reduction of certain aerial pulsations and the auditory phenomena to ascertained measures of apparatus. Light becomes known to us force; every application of mathematical as a similar or analogous attunement beproof to theoretical conceptions; every tween the ethereal pulsations and the detection of identical operations in diverse optic apparatus. Sound in this sense is departments of nature; every subjection not the aerial waves "in themselves," but of material agencies to the service of in their relation to the ear. Light is not mankind; every confirmation of knowl- the ethereal undulations “in themselves," edge acquired through one sense by the but in their relation to the eye. It is only evidence of another, every one of these when these come into contact with a preoperations adds to the verifications of arranged machinery that they become science, confirms our reasonable trust in what we know and speak of as light and the faculties we possess, and assures us sound. This conception, therefore, is that the knowledge we acquire by the found to represent and express a pure careful use of these is a real and substan- relation; and it is a conception higher tial knowledge of the truth. than the one we had before, not because cause its relativity is to a higher faculty of the intellect or the understanding. If now we examine the kind of knowl-it is either less or more relative, but beedge respecting light and sound which recent discoveries have revealed to us, as compared with the knowledge which we And indeed, when we come to think of had of them before these discoveries it, we see that all kinds of knowledge were made, we shall find that there is an must take their place and rank according important difference. The knowledge to this order of precedence. For as all which we had before was the simple and knowledge consists in the establishment elementary knowledge of sensation. As of relations between external facts and compared with that knowledge the new knowledge we have acquired respecting light and sound is a knowledge of these things "in themselves." Such is the language in which we should naturally express our sense of that difference, and in so expressing it we should be expressing an important truth. The newer knowledge is a higher knowledge than the older and simpler knowledge which we had before. And why? Wherein does this higher quality of the new knowledge consist? Is it not in the very fact that the new knowledge is the perception of a higher kind of relation than that which we had perceived before? There is no difference between the two kinds of knowledge in respect to the mere abstract character of relativity. The old was as relative as the new; and the new is as relative as the old. Before the new discoveries sound was known to come from sonorous bodies, and light was known to the various faculties of the mind, the highest knowledge must always be that in which such relations are established with those intellectual powers which are of the highest kind. Hence we have a strictly scientific basis of classification for arranging the three great subjects of all human inquiry-the what, the how, and the whence or why. These are steps in an ascending series. What things are, how they come to be, and for what purpose they are intended in the whole system of nature - these are the questions, each rising above the other, which correspond to the order and the rank of our own faculties in the value and importance of their work. It is the result of this analysis to establish that, even if it were true that there could be anything in the universe existing out of relation with other things around it, or if it were conceivable that there could be any knowledge of things as they so exist, it would be not higher knowledge, but infinitely lower knowledge than that which we actually possess. It could at the best be only knowledge of the "what," and that too in the lowest conceivable form - knowledge of the barest, driest, nakedest existence, without value or significance of any kind. And further, it results from the same analysis that the relativity of human knowledge, instead of casting any doubt upon its authenticity, is the very characteristic which guarantees its reality and its truth. It results further that the depth and completeness of that knowledge depends on the degree in which it brings the facts of nature into relation with the highest faculties of mind. It must be so if man is part of the great system of things in which he lives. It must be so, especially if in being part of it, he is also the highest visible part of it -the product of its "laws" and (as regards his own little corner of the universe) the consummation of its history. From The Cornhill Magazine. FINA'S AUNT. SOME PASSAGES FROM MISS WILLIAMSON'S DIARY. I. From Miss Sophy King in Switzerland to Miss Williamson in Old Street, London, W. Your "DEAREST MISS WILLIAMSON, two letters have come flying through the ravines and over the waterfalls, and the sunlight on the plains and the half-way storms, and through all the freshness as well as the less agreeable whiffs from the village. We are very comfortably en camped at our hotel; mamma is wonderfully well for her. My father is in Scotland, but we are not lonely, and have found several friends here. Chief among them are your friends the Arnheims, who only went down to Interlaken this morning we follow on Monday. Mr. Arnheim has an engagement to play at the concerts there. Fina, the little girl, has started up shoulder. I told her I should be writing to you, and she sent you her love and Nor can there be any doubt as to what wonderfully, and reaches her father's are the supreme faculties of the human mind. The power of initiating changes in the order of nature and of shaping begged me to tell you that she mends her them from the highest motives to the noblest ends this, in general terms, may be said to include or to involve them all. They are based upon the ultimate and irresolvable power of will, with such freedom as belongs to it; upon the faculty of understanding the use of means to ends, and upon the moral sense which recognizes the law of righteousness, and the ultimate authority on which it rests. If the universe or any part of it is ever to be really understood by us - if anything in the nature of an explanation is ever to be reached concerning the system of things in which we live, these are the perceptive powers to which the information must be given these are the faculties to which the explanation must be addressed. When we desire to know the nature of things "in themselves," we desire to know the highest of their relations which are conceivable to us: we desire, in the words of Bishop Butler, to know "the Author, the cause, and the end of them." * * Sermon "On the Ignorance of Man." father's clothers now, and adds up the bills, and keeps all the money. She has grown very like her poor mother, whom I remember seeing at your lodgings in Old Street. I wonder if those very disagreeable people, her relations, are living near you still; that pompous Miss Ellis and the colonel, and the silent younger sister and the delightful old lady; and I wonder if you, too, are in your usual corner, where I can see you as plainly as I can see mamma in her chair on the terrace opposite. This is written from a broad green balcony overhung with clematis; all the people come out of the diningroom and sit here to look at the mountains. "The day the Arnheims were here they took me out for a long day in the mountains. Mr. Arnheim led the way, Fina and I followed: One cannot talk, but one goes on climbing ever through changing lights, from one height to another, higher and higher still. We left autumn at the foot of the mountain, and after a time found ourselves in summer and spring once more. Far above, striking the blue sky, hung winter snows and crystals, but round us was spring. A flood of fragrant Alpine flowers spread by every rocky ridge, along every Alp and plateau, rhododendrons crimson incandescent; violets and saxifrage, and light iris lilies with a |