Page images
PDF
EPUB

"One of these qualifications is that the State cannot exclude from its limits a corporation engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, established by the decision in Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. 1, 12. The other limitation on the power of the State is, where the corporation is in the employ of the general government, an obvious exception, first stated, we think, by the late Mr. Justice Bradley in Stockton v. Baltimore & New York Railroad, 32 Fed. Rep. 9, 14. As that learned justice said: 'If Congress should employ a corporation of ship-builders to construct a man-of-war, they would have the right to purchase the necessary timber and iron in any State of the Union.' And this court, in citing this passage, added, without the permission and against the prohibition of the State.' Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 186."

The last cited case had declared that "undoubtedly a corporation of one State, employed in the business of the general government, may do such business in other States without obtaining a license from them."

Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 156 Fed. 1, 16, citing the foregoing cases, stated that "Every corporation of any State in the employ of the United States has the right to exercise the necessary corporate powers and to transact the business requisite to discharge the duties of that employment in every other state in the Union without permission granted, or conditions imposed by the latter."

I accept the foregoing as applicable here. A fortiori consent of the state is not required when the corporation is owned and controlled, as well as employed, by the United States. The United States Housing Corporation was confronted with the same problem, and, as stated in the report (v. 1, p. 348): "It was finally decided that, being a purely Federal agency, the corporation is not amenable to State regulations applying to ordinary business corporations, and this view has been acquiesced in by the authorities of practically all the States where the question has come up."

I therefore conclude that it is unnecessary for the Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation to qualify and register in states other than Delaware.

"7. Is Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation subject to license, franchise, occupation, income and excise taxes?

(a) Levied by the State of Delaware?

(b) Levied by any other State in which it purchases land, builds homestead communities and enters into contracts with homesteading families?"

Preliminary fees or costs assessed by the State of Delaware which are in the nature of charges for services rendered are properly taxable against the Corporation. 18 Op. 491; 23 id. 299. Whether there may be other occasions hereafter when Delaware may levy valid charges of such nature is not before me at this time.

Beyond this, upon the authority of Williams v. Talladega, 226 U.S. 404, 419; Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269, U.S. 514; Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218; and De La Vergne Machine Co. v. State Tax Commission, 207 N.Y. S. 680, 684, I advise you, as I have with respect to your first question, supra, to contest the attempted imposition of any such taxes, the question of liability being ultimately for the courts to determine.

"8. May Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation. pay cash to secure binding options on land?"

In my opinion to you of February 7, 1934, I concluded that the Public Works Emergency Housing Corporation might lawfully acquire options as an incident of the purchase of land. The powers of the Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation are no less broad in this particular.

"9. May Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation retain local attorneys and title companies to prepare abstracts of title, certificates of title, letters of opinion of title, letters of opinion of title and forms of warranty deed, and pay reasonable fees for such services, when such title papers, after they are completed, are to be transmitted to the Office of the Attorney General as the basis for the opinion of title of the Attorney General?"

The Comptroller General, in an opinion of May 3, 1924, (v. 3, p. 569, 571) concluded that appropriations chargeable with the purchase price of land are also available for the payment of a reasonable charge for such evidences of title as may be required by the Attorney General. I approve, as

applicable to the purchase of land by the Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation, the principle thus announced, and inclose, for your ready reference, a copy of a circular issued by this Department under date of April 16, 1934; setting forth the general requirements and recommended procedure in land title matters.

"10. May Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation. carry fire, tornado and other insurance on homestead properties during the time that title remains in the Corporation? May the Corporation carry public liability insurance?"

It is not the policy of the United States Government to carry insurance on its property, which is so extensive and so widely distributed as to render ordinary insurance of doubtful practicability and economy. As to public liability insurance, it is to be remembered that the Government's liability differs materially from that of an individual or a private corporation. However, the occupants of the homesteads will have, or will in time acquire, insurable interests, and such interests may properly be insured either by the individuals themselves or by the Corporation acting in their behalf and at their expense.

"11. Are employees of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads in Washington, and employees of Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation on the various projects in the various states entitled to the benefits of the United States Employees' Compensation Act?"

It appears that this question is more properly for consideration by the United States Employees' Compensation Commission. 31 Op. 252; 34 id. 120; 34 id. 363. In the first mentioned opinion the Attorney General concluded that it was within the province of the Commission" to decide whether employees of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, or other persons, are entitled to the benefits of the provisions of the act"; and in the two later opinions he interpreted the Act, upon request of the Commission through the President, as applied to particular employees of the Fleet Corporation.

I therefore respectfully suggest that you handle the matter with the United States Employees' Compensation Commission.

"12. In the event that the Secretary of the Interior should promulgate a regulation that livestock, tools, implements, seed, fertilizer, and household furnishings and furniture are to be included within the definition of a 'subsistence homestead,' will Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation be empowered, under such regulation, to make loans for the purchase of these items, or to purchase them and re-sell them on credit to homesteaders?"

It is necessarily true that some of the aided families will be without certain of the articles enumerated and will be without financial means to supply them. To place them thus within four bare walls and on an uncultivated plot of ground would conceivably fall short of providing "subsistence homesteads " which they are to occupy and which they are to be assisted in holding and acquiring as their own property. I therefore conclude that the Corporation may make loans for the purchase of the items named, or may itself purchase and resell them to the occupants of the homesteads, when determined to be reasonably necessary in order to carry out the purposes of the statute, and assuming that such regulation as may be issued comes within its terms.

Respectfully,

HOMER CUMMINGS.

To the SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

CITIZENSHIP OF CHILD BORN ABROAD OF AN AMERICAN AND AN ALIEN PARENT

A child born abroad subsequently to May 24, 1934, one of whose parents is a citizen of the United States and the other an alien, acquires American citizenship at birth. Such citizenship is subject to being divested if such child thereafter fails to comply with the two conditions prescribed in section 1 of the Act of May 24, 1934, 48 Stat. 797, which must be regarded as conditions subsequent and not as conditions precedent.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
July 21, 1934.

SIR: I have the honor to respond to your request of May 29, 1934, for my opinion concerning the construction of Section 1 of the Act of May 24, 1934 (Public No. 250), which

amended Section 1993 of the Revised Statutes dealing with the citizenship status of children born abroad of American parents.

Section 1 of Public No. 250 (48 Stat. 797), is as follows: That section 1993 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 1993. Any child hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose father or mother or both at the time of the birth of such child is a citizen of the United States, is declared to be a citizen of the United States; but the rights of citizenship shall not descend to any such child unless the citizen father or citizen mother, as the case may be, has resided in the United States previous to the birth of such child. In cases where one of the parents is an alien, the right of citizenship shall not descend unless the child comes to the United States and resides therein for at least five years continuously immediately previous to his eighteenth birthday, and unless, within six months after the child's twenty-first birthday, he or she shall take an oath of allegiance to the United States of America as prescribed by the Bureau of Naturalization."

The question presented in your request for an opinion is "whether a child born abroad of an American and alien parent is to be regarded as an American citizen at birth or whether such citizenship attaches only after the child has resided in the United States five years immediately preceding its eighteenth birthday and has taken the oath of allegiance within six months following its twenty-first birthday."

In other words, does a child born abroad of one American and one alien parent acquire citizenship by birth, on conditions subsequent, i.e., subject to defeasance in the event that he fails to come to the United States and reside therein for at least five years continuously immediately previous to his eighteenth birthday or fails within six months after his twenty-first birthday to take an oath of allegiance to the United States; or are the foregoing requirements to be regarded as conditions precedent to the child's acquiring American citizenship, so that such a child is born an alien, but may become an American citizen at the age of twentyone if he has complied with these prerequisites?

« PreviousContinue »