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At the outset, it seem desirable to recall some basic, fundamental principles of statutory construction applicable to the question under discussion.

In United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255, 261, the court recognized the principle that statutes should be construed with reference to the evil they are designed to suppress as an important aid in ascertaining the meaning of language which is ambiguous and equally susceptible of conflicting constructions. A law is to be construed so as to give effect to the object designed and for that purpose all of its provisions must be examined in the light of attendant and surrounding circumstances. In Re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 475; Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76, 89.

In Helvering v. New York Trust Company decided by the Supreme Court on May 28, 1934, the court made the following illuminating observations on the canons of statutory interpretation:

"But the expounding of a statutory provision strictly according to the letter without regard to other parts of the Act and legislative history would often defeat the object intended to be accomplished. Speaking through Chief Justice Taney in Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, this court said (p. 194): 'It is well settled that, in interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute (or statutes on the same subject) and the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its various provisions, and give to it such a construction as will carry into execution the will of the Legislature, as thus ascertained, according to its true intent and meaning.' Quite recently in Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, we said (p. 194): 'It is the duty of this court to give effect to the intent of Congress. Primarily this intent is ascertained by giving the words their natural significance; but if this leads to an unreasonable result, plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole, we must examine the matter further. We may then look to the reason of the enactment, and inquire into its antecedent history, and give it effect in accordance with its design and purpose, sacrificing, if necessary, the literal meaning in order that the purpose may not fail." 292 U. S. 455, 464.

It is, therefore, necessary to review briefly the antecedent history leading to the enactment of the Act of May 24, 1934.

The preexisting law is found in Section 1993 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Code, Title 8, Sec. 6), which was derived from the Act of February 10, 1855 (10 Stat. 604), and reads as follows:

"All children born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers may be at the time of their birth citizens of the United States, are declared to be citizens of the United States; but the right of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States."

The foregoing was the law of the United States continuously from February 10, 1855, until May 24, 1934. A child born abroad whose father at the time of the child's birth was a citizen of the United States was an American citizen by birth. The only limitation upon such transmission of citizenship is found in the provision that the right of citizenship should not descend to children whose fathers never resided in this country. In Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, it was held that citizenship attaches to such a child from birth only where the father has resided in the United States before the birth of the child. That case, however, problem here under

does not throw any light upon the consideration.

A child born of an American father in a foreign country such as Great Britain, which recognized the jus soli, necessarily was endowed with dual citizenship at birth. Thus, he might be a citizen both of the United States and of Great Britain. That situation gave rise to no difficulty for dual citizenship is a concept well known to international law. Upon attaining his majority, the child was in a position to elect the country whose citizen he would continue to remain. 3 Moore's Digest of International Law, 518; 1 Oppenheim on International Law, 542.

Prior to 1922, an American woman who married an alien lost her American citizenship. Consequently, the provision as to children born abroad whose fathers may be at the time of their birth citizens of the United States, was sufficiently broad to cover all children born abroad one of whose par

ents was an American citizen, since it was impossible for a mother to be an American citizen while the father was an alien. The situation was radically changed by the so-called Cable Act (Act of September 22, 1922, 42 Stat. 1022; U.S. Code, Title 8, Sec. 9). That enactment provided that a woman citizen of the United States should not cease to be such citizen by reason of her marriage. Thus, since 1922 women have acquired a citizenship status independent of that of their husbands. As a result, married couples where the husband is an alien and the wife is an American citizen, were no longer legally impossible.

Placing the foregoing provision of the Cable Act in juxtaposition with Section 1993 of the Revised Statutes leads to the conclusion that a child born in a foreign country whose father was an American citizen and whose mother was an alien, acquired American citizenship at birth; but a child born abroad whose father was an alien and whose mother was an American citizen was born an alien.

The purpose of Section 1 of the Act of May 24, 1934, was to confer upon mothers who were American citizens the same right to transmit American citizenship to their children as was possessed by fathers. In other words, its purpose was to continue the policy of equalizing the citizenship rights between the two sexes, which was first undertaken in the Cable Act of 1922. Manifestly, the equalization of the rights of fathers and mothers to transmit citizenship to children born abroad, was not to be attained by depriving a citizen father of the rights that he theretofore had, but by granting to citizen mothers the same rights theretofore possessed by citizen fathers.

Yet if the second sentence of Section 1 of the Act of May 24, 1934, is to be construed as providing that a child born abroad of one citizen parent and one alien parent shall not become an American citizen until he fulfills certain conditions and attains the age of twenty-one, the effect of such an interpretation will be to deprive citizen fathers of the right to transmit citizenship to their children born abroad-a right which has been theirs continuously since 1855. If such a child is to be regarded as being born an alien, he is subject to exclusion under the Immigration Laws if his parents at

tempt to bring him to the United States. That an American citizen having a child born abroad may be precluded from bringing him into this country seems so abhorrent to our natural instincts that an intention to accomplish such a harsh result should not be imputed to Congress unless it is expressed in clear and unmistakable language. If barred from entry into the United States, such a child may never be in a position to comply with the requirements of the Act and thereby attain the very privilege of citizenship which the law would confer upon him. In many states such a child, as an alien, would not be in a position to take title to real estate and would, therefore, be prevented from inheriting real property even from his own father or mother. If admitted to this country, he would be subject to all of the disabilities of an alien until he reached his majority.

In Church of the Holy Trinity v. The United States, 143 U.S. 457, the Supreme Court went as far as to depart from the literal construction of an unambiguous statutory provision in order to avoid a harsh and absurd result. The same thing was recently done in Helvering v. New York Trust Company, supra. In the present instance it is not necessary to resort to such an extreme measure in order to reach a reasonable construction of the act consonant with the purpose and intent of the Congress.

A study of the legislative history of the statute convincingly supports the view that the purpose of Congress was to equalize the rights of men and women in respect of transmitting citizenship to their children born abroad, by conferring upon women the same rights that had been theretofore lodged in men-not by depriving men of the rights which they had theretofore possessed. The hearing before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the House of Representatives (73d Congress, 1st Session; Hearing No. 73.1.1, Mar. 28, 1933) on H.R. 3673—the bill which matured into the Act of May 24, 1934-record the appearance of a number of representatives of various organizations of women urging that the provisions of Section 1993 of the Revised Statutes be extended so as to apply to the children of American mothers. The report of the House Committee (73d Congress, 1st Session, House Report No. 131)

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stated that "the purpose of the bill is to complete the provisions of the Cable Act of 1922 so as to establish complete equality between American men and women in the matter of citizenship for themselves and for their children."

When the bill was debated on the floor of the House of Representatives, Congressman Dirksen, a member of the committee in charge of the bill, who opened the discussion, stated that the object of the measure was to give the mother of a child that is born outside of the United States the same right to transmit citizenship to that child that is possessed by the father (Congressional Record, Vol. 78, p. 20771). While Congressman Dickstein, the Chairman of the Committee, stated in answer to a question directed to him on the floor that a child born abroad of one American parent and one alien parent is born an alien and may acquire citizenship cnly in compliance with the conditions proposed in the bill (Congressional Record, Vol. 78, p. 73421), it is quite apparent that that view was not shared by other members of the committee. Thus it was remarked by Congressman Taylor that "if it has been deemed wise that the protection and privileges of our Government should be extended to the children of American fathers, it would seem to be extraordinary that the same principle should not apply to the children of American mothers." (Id. p. 7332).

When the bill came before the Senate, Senator Thomas of Utah stated that (Congressional Record, Vol. 78, p. 8470): "As the bill is drafted, it is rather impossible to tell with certainty whether the child during his first 21 years is an alien or a citizen; this applies to a case of a foreign-born child, only one of whose parents is a citizen."

Accordingly, he proposed a substitute explicitly providing that a child born outside of the United States whose father and mother were citizens should be a citizen from birth; and that any such child, one of whose parents was a citizen and the other an alien, might become a citizen upon complying with the conditions prescribed in the Act. The Senator stated that under his substitute such a child would clearly be born an alien.

Speaking in opposition to the substitute, Senator O'Mahoney stated that under the pending bill," the child becomes

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