politan parks district under the jurisdiction of the commission (2 Op. Atty-Gen. 567); and a consideration of the provisions of St. 1894, c. 288, appears to warrant a conclusion that it was contemplated by the Legislature that the commission should under such statute be authorized to construct parkways or boulevards across existing parks or open spaces under its control. This is forcibly shown by striking out of section 1 of such act such words and phrases as do not directly bear upon the present question, so that it reads as follows: The board of metropolitan park commissioners, constituted under the authority of chapter four hundred and seven of the acts of the year eighteen hundred and ninety-three is hereby authorized to take . . . any lands although the lands so taken . . . be already a street or way, and to construct and maintain . . . over the same or any other land acquired by said board by said act a suitable roadway or boulevard. The word "same" in the above extract obviously refers to lands taken under the provisions of St. 1894, c. 288; while the words "or any other land acquired by said board by said act" as obviously refer to lands taken or acquired by the commission under the provisions of St. 1893, c. 407. (See words "said act," in eighth line of St. 1894, c. 288, § 1.) It follows, therefore, in my opinion, that the Board is expressly authorized to construct, under the provisions of St. 1894, c. 288, roadways across public reservations or open spaces taken or acquired by it under the provisions of St. 1893, c. 407, and may make rules and regulations for the government and control of such roadways, under the provisions of the former statute, the so-called "boulevard act;" or, in other words, that St. 1894, c. 288, § 3, providing that the commission may "make rules and regulations for the government and use of a roadway or boulevard under its care, breaches whereof shall be breaches of the peace," is applicable as well to such roadways as to parkways or boulevards which connect with but do not cross the open spaces or reservations established under the "park act," so called. The remaining question is, whether or not a police officer appointed by the commission may arrest without warrant any per son who violates in his presence a rule or regulation duly made by the commission under either the "park act" or the "boulevard act." The powers and duties of the metropolitan park police are defined in St. 1897, c. 121, § 3, as follows: The police appointed or employed by said commission, in accordance with the provisions of chapter four hundred and seven of the acts of the year eighteen hundred and ninety-three and chapter two hundred and eighty-eight of the acts of the year eighteen hundred and ninety-four and all acts in amendment thereof and in addition thereto, shall have within the metropolitan parks district all the powers of police officers and constables of cities and towns of this Commonwealth, except the power of serving and executing civil process, and when on duty may carry such weapons as said commission shall authorize. The power of police officers and constables to arrest without warrant any person committing in their presence a breach of the peace, and to hold such person until he can be brought before a magistrate, has long been recognized. It has often been held that constables, as conservators of the peace, have power to arrest, upon view, persons violating the laws, and detain them until they can be brought before a magistrate. (Shaw, C.J., in Commonwealth v. Hastings, 9 Met. 259, 262.) And see Commonwealth v. Tobin, 108 Mass. 426, 429; Parker v. Barnard, 135 Mass. 116, 117. And the common law authority of such officers has been much broadened by statute. So it is provided in R. L., c. 31, § 2, that: The watch shall suppress and prevent all disturbances and disorders. During the night time, they may examine all persons abroad whom they have reason to suspect of an unlawful design, and may demand of them their business abroad and whither they are going; may disperse any assembly of three or more such persons; and may enter any building to suppress a riot or breach of the peace therein. Persons so suspected who do not give a satisfactory account of themselves, persons so assembled and who do not disperse when ordered, and persons making, aiding or abetting in a riot or disturbance, may be arrested by the watch, and shall thereupon be safely kept, by imprisonment or otherwise, until the next morning and then taken before a police, district or municipal court or trial justice to be examined and prosecuted. And in R. L., c. 212, § 36: Whoever is found in a state of intoxication in a public place, or is found in any place in a state of intoxication committing a breach of the peace or disturbing others by noise, may be arrested without a warrant by a sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, watchman or police officer, and kept in custody in a suitable place until he has recovered from his intoxication. In R. L., c. 212, § 47, it is provided that in the case of rogues and vagabonds and other persons enumerated in the preceding section, they may be apprehended by a sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, police officer or watchman, or by any other person by the order of a magistrate or any of said officers, without a warrant and be kept in custody for not more than twenty-four hours, Sunday or a legal holiday excepted; and at or before the expiration of such time he shall be taken before a police, district or municipal court or trial justice and proceeded against, as provided in the preceding section, or discharged as such court or justice shall determine. See also St. 1906, c. 403; R. L., c. 212, §§ 57-62, etc. It would seem, therefore, that the metropolitan park police, having all the powers of police officers and constables with respect to offences against the law, may arrest without warrant in case of any breach of the peace committed in their presence or in the case of any criminal act when by statute a warrant is dispensed with; and it remains to determine whether or not a breach of the rules and regulations established by the Metropolitan Park Commission is a breach of the peace within the rule apparently established by the decisions. In the case of rules or regulations made under the provisions of St. 1894, c. 288, no difficulty arises, for by section 3 breaches thereof are expressly made "breaches of the peace, punishable as such in any court having jurisdiction of the same." St. 1893, c. 407, does not contain identical language with this section, the words in that statute (section 4) being that the Metropolitan Park Commission may "make rules and regulations for the government and use of the public reservations under their care, and for breaches thereof affix penalties. . . to be imposed by any court of competent jurisdiction;" and it is, of course, conceivable that the addition of the specific declaration in the later act, that violations of the rules and regulations relating to parkways and boulevards shall be breaches of the peace, was intended to create a distinction between the rules relating to reservations and public open spaces, and those applicable to parkways and boulevards; even if this be so, however, the distinction is not of great importance, for, so far as the violations of rules established under St. 1893, c. 407, § 4, do in fact constitute disturbances of the public peace upon such reservations or open spaces, they may be so treated, and the offender may be arrested without warrant, the officer in such case acting by authority inherent in his office. See Commonwealth v. Tobin, 108 Mass. 426, 429. And this class of offences must include by far the larger number of the cases in which the officer is called upon to act. Replying directly to the question as submitted, therefore, I am of opinion that a police officer appointed by the commission may arrest without warrant any person who violates in his presence any rule or regulation duly made by the commission by authority of St. 1894, c. 288, the so-called "boulevard act," and may arrest without warrant any person who violates in his presence any rule or regulation duly made by the commission by authority of St. 1893, c. 407, the so-called "park act," whenever such violation involves acts which are in fact breaches of the public peace. To the Treasurer and Receiver- May 23. TREASURER AND RECEIVER-GENERAL- BONDS OF COMMON- ISSUE TRANSFER TO EXECUTOR OR ADMINIS WEALTH The Treasurer and Receiver-General, under R. L., c. 6, § 74, which provides "that the treasurer may . . . issue in substitution for mutilated, defaced or indorsed bonds presented to him other bonds of like or equivalent issues," may, at the request of an executor or administrator, transfer to such executor or administrator in his individual capacity bonds issued by the Commonwealth to a decedent or to the executor or administrator of a decedent, provided that in the case of an executor there is nothing in the will restricting his general authority in the premises. You request my opinion as to whether you may, at the request of an executor or administrator, transfer bonds issued by the Commonwealth to such executor or administrator in his individual capacity. I assume that your question applies to bonds registered in the name of the decedent as well as to those registered in the name of an executor or administrator as such. Your authority to transfer bonds is derived from section 74 of chapter 6 of the Revised Laws, which provides that: The treasurer may . . issue in substitution for mutilated, defaced or indorsed bonds presented to him other bonds of like or equivalent issues. There can be no doubt that in the case of bonds registered in the name of a deceased person, or of an executor or administrator as such, that the executor or administrator is the proper person to endorse them. You may, therefore, in the ordinary case legally register bonds so endorsed in the name of the transferee, upon satisfying yourself that the endorser is the executor or administrator. In my opinion, your duties in this regard are analogous to those of corporations with respect to the transfer of their corporate shares. It has been held that a corporation must be presumed to know what are the legal powers of an executor, but not the particular provisions of any will; nor is it required to determine whether or not the executor is acting properly. Hutchins v. State Bank, 12 Met. 421 (423). When a transfer of its stock is presented to a corporation, it is bound at its peril to see that it is a genuine transfer by one who has |