brought up, where this is reasonably practicable, in the religion of their parents. St. 1905, c. 464, § 1. But it is the right of the children that is protected by this statute. The rights of the parents are still regulated by the same principles as before. . . . The first and paramount duty is to consult the welfare of the child. The wishes of the parent as to the religious education and surroundings of the child are entitled to weight; if there is nothing to put in the balance against them, ordinarily they will be decisive. If, however, those wishes cannot be carried into effect without sacrificing what the court sees to be for the welfare of the child, they must so far be disregarded. The court will not itself prefer one church to another, but will act without bias for the welfare of the child under the circumstances of each case. The parents' religion is prima facie the infant's religion, and the infant should be brought up in that religion and protected against disturbing influences from persons of a different religious faith; but the infant's welfare must be first of all regarded, and its requirements must be treated as paramount.

Further, the court say:

This child has been for over four years in the family of the petitioners; they were found to be suitable persons to have her custody and education; a strong affection had grown up between her and them; her interest will be greatly promoted by the adoption.

In advising you in this matter, I am therefore obliged to defer to the opinion of our highest court, and to say that the general policy of the law as to the rights of parents has not been changed by said statute, but the statute evidently intended to provide that the child should not be denied the free exercise of the religion of her parents when she is of sufficient understanding to choose for herself.

As to the final paragraph of said opinion, which reads, —

We have treated the questions arising upon these exceptions as if the effect of this decree of adoption would be to entitle the petitioners at once to the custody and control of the child. But in this case she is still in the custody of the State Board of Charity, and apparently will so remain until she shall come of age, or that Board shall consider the object of the commitment accomplished,

--

it is entirely within the discretion of the Board to keep the child in its custody until the child shall become of age, or the Board

shall consider the object of the commitment accomplished. If the Board should in their discretion decide that the object of the commitment has been accomplished, and vote to discharge the child, the adopted parents, being the petitioners, would acquire the custody and incur the responsibility of the parents in respect to such child.

The court seems to regard the whole matter as entirely within the discretion of the Board, taking into consideration the welfare of the child; and I know of no other law affecting the Board's power to discharge in this case.

A manufacturing establishment in which goods are made by the process of knitting is an establishment "engaged in the manufacture of textile goods," within the meaning of R. L., c. 106, § 27, as amended by St. 1907, c. 267, providing that "No person and no agent or officer of a person or corporation engaged in the manufacture of textile goods shall employ any minor under eighteen years of age or any woman, before six o'clock in the morning or after six o'clock in the evening."

You require my opinion as to whether or not a manufacturing establishment in which goods are made by the process of knitting is to be considered as a textile factory, as referred to in chapter 267 of the Acts of 1907.

You do not set forth the nature of the "goods" manufactured, but I assume that such goods in the raw material are textile materials, such as wool, flax, silk, cotton or hemp, and that my opinion is desired as to whether or not the process by which such materials are converted into manufactured goods serves to distinguish such goods when completed from textile fabrics.

St. 1907, c. 267, amends R. L., c. 106, § 27, so as to read as follows:

No person, and no agent or officer of a person or corporation engaged in the manufacture of textile goods, shall employ any minor under eighteen years of age, or any woman, before six o'clock in the morning or after six o'clock in the evening. Whoever violates the provisions of this section

shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty nor more than fifty dollars for each offence.

The word "textile" as an adjective is defined to be "of or pertaining to weaving. Woven, or capable of being woven; formed by weaving: as, textile fabrics; textile materials, such as wool, flax, silk, cotton." The term "textile fabrics," which may be regarded as synonymous with the words "textile goods," as used in the statute above quoted, has been defined to include those fabrics woven, as carpets, or capable of being woven or formed by weaving, and the noun "textile" to be a fabric which is woven or may be woven, a fabric made by weaving. See Wood v. Allen, 111 Ia. 97, 100.

be the generally accepted definition.

Such appears to

I am of opinion that the process of knitting is to be considered as a form of weaving, if the material used is a textile material. So the word is defined as meaning, "To weave by looping or knotting a continuous thread; form by working up yarn or thread with knitting-needles into a fabric held together by a series of knots or inter-loopings; as to knit stockings. Hence-To form as if by knotting or weaving; put together;

" Thus it has been held under the Constitution of Louisiana, which exempted capital, machinery and other property employed in the manufacture of textile fabrics, that a manufactory of fish lines, ropes and other hempen articles was an establishment employed in the manufacture of textile fabrics, and the court said: "Such articles as fish lines and ropes can only be made by being woven from raw materials, and are themselves textil efabrics." See Cohn v. Parker, 41 La. Ann. 894; New Orleans v. Arthurs, 36 La. Ann. 98.

Although the statute is a penal one, and must be strictly construed, it is nevertheless my opinion that, since knitting may fairly be considered as a form of weaving, and since the product if made from textile materials may be a textile fabric, and so "textile goods," an establishment where the process of knitting is employed for the manufacture of such goods must be held to come within the terms of the statute.

To the

Adjutant
General.

1907

November 15.

Under St. 1907, c. 458, § 1, which provides that "a veteran of the civil war in the service of the Commonwealth, if incapacitated for active duty, shall be retired from active service . . . at one-half the rate of compensation paid to him when in active service . . ." a veteran so retired is not entitled to receive compensation based upon the estimated cash value of benefits in the nature of living expenses, occupancy of a dwelling house free from rent, and like privileges, in addition to the fixed salary paid to him from the treasury of the Commonwealth.

I am requested by you to define the meaning of Acts of 1907, c. 458, § 1, which provides that, —

A veteran of the civil war in the service of the Commonwealth, if incapacitated for active duty, shall be retired from active service, with the consent of the governor, at one half the rate of compensation paid to him when in active service, to be paid out of the treasury of the Commonwealth, —

as to whether or not a veteran eligible under the provisions of this statute for retirement, who has been receiving benefits in the nature of living expenses, occupancy of a dwelling house free from rent, and like privileges, in addition to the salary paid to him from the treasury of the Commonwealth, is entitled to be retired at one-half such salary plus one-half the cash value of whatever benefit he may have been receiving at the time of his application.

R. L., c. 6, § 58, provides that,

Salaries payable from the treasury shall, unless otherwise provided, be paid on the first of each month and shall be in full for all services rendered to the Commonwealth by the person to whom they are paid,

and this section in itself, in my opinion is decisive of the question now under consideration.

House rent, living expenses and like advantages which certain employees of the Commonwealth may enjoy are given to such employees not as salary which they have a right to demand, but as privileges which the nature or place of their duties requires the Commonwealth to grant to them to secure the highest

degree of efficiency. Such privileges may at any time be discontinued, and the employee required to provide both his own living expenses and his own house, should such a course be possible without injuring the efficiency of the employee or of any other employee who may occupy the same position.

It is, moreover, most unlikely that the Legislature intended to reduce such items as living expenses, house rent and the like to a monetary value, and to include such value in the term 'compensation," without providing some means other than the claims of the employee himself for determining the exact cash equivalent of such privileges. It must follow, I think, that the word "compensation" is to be limited to salaries, the exact amount of which is determined by law, and may always be speedily ascertained by the Governor and Council, and does not extend to benefits or privileges received by an employee, which may not only vary in their character, but in their value, as the price of necessities of living rises or falls.

CIVIL SERVICE EXEMPTION CLERK IN THE OFFICE OF
STATE FORESTER GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL APPROVAL

OF EMPLOYMENT.

Under St. 1904, c. 409, § 4, which authorizes the State Forester to hire such assistants as he may need in the performance of his duties, and to fix their salaries, "subject to the approval of the Governor and Council," such approval is not equivalent to confirmation by the Executive Council within the meaning of R. L., c. 19, § 9, which exempts from the operation of the civil service law and rules officers . . . whose appointment is subject to confirmation by the Executive Council."

Service Com

Your letter of October 30 seeks my opinion upon the question To the Civil whether or not the position of clerk in the office of the State mission. Forester is within the classified civil service.

St. 1904, c. 409, § 4, which relates to the State Forester, so far as it is applicable to the present question, is as follows:

The state forester is hereby empowered, subject to the approval of the governor and council, to hire such assistants as he may need in the performance of his duties, and to fix their salaries.

1907 November 15.