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on the part of the Executive of the State; nor is there any clause or provision in the Constitution which arms the government of the United States with this power.

And, further, the court said:

It does not purport to give authority to the State Executive to arrest and deliver the fugitive, but requires it to be done, and the language of the law implies an absolute obligation which the State authority is bound to perform. And when it speaks of the duty of the Governor, it evidently points to the duty imposed by the Constitution in the clause we are now considering. The performance of this duty, however, is left to depend on the fidelity of the State Executive to the compact entered into with the other States when it adopted the Constitution of the United States, and became a member of the Union. It was so left by the Constitution, and necessarily so left by the act of 1793."

See also McNichols v. Pease, 207 U. S. 100, and cases there cited.

The provisions of the Constitution of the United States and of the Revised Statutes of the United States above quoted are the supreme law of the land with reference to extradition, and no statute of this Commonwealth can impose restrictions or limitations upon the operation of this law of the United States. No statute of this Commonwealth, therefore, can alter the duty imposed upon the Executive of this Commonwealth by the Constitution and laws of the United States. For this reason the provision of the Revised Laws of Massachusetts, chapter 217, section 12, that the Governor may consider the question of the expediency of complying with an application for extradition, is to be construed as giving Your Excellency the right to consider questions of expediency or discretion only upon applications by this Commonwealth upon other States, or upon demands for persons held here in custody to answer for crimes against this Commonwealth or the United States, or by force of any civil

process.

This ruling is in harmony with the settled practice in this Commonwealth and with the opinion of one of my predecessors in this office, given on Aug. 21, 1902, in which the Governor of

this Commonwealth was advised as follows, in response to a request for an opinion not only as to the law of the case but also as to the expediency of the Governor's favorable action upon the demand of the Executive of North Carolina for the extradition of a negro who contended that mob violence would prevent him from having a fair trial in a southern State:

I am of opinion, however, that my investigation must be confined to the legal aspects of the case, and that Your Excellency's action must be controlled by the requirements of the Constitution and statutes of the United States, and that the Massachusetts statutes cannot be operative except in so far as is consistent with the federal law. Upon this view, the right of Your Excellency to consider questions of expediency or discretion exists only upon applications for requisition going from this Commonwealth, or upon demands for persons held here in custody to answer for crimes against this Commonwealth, or the United States, or by force of any civil process. (2 Op. Atty.-Gen. 368.)

The case now before Your Excellency is not a case which falls within the class in which the law may be said to authorize the exercise of discretion, and the scope of proper inquiry by Your Excellency as a guide to action is, therefore, narrowly limited by law. Certain questions of law and of fact are, however, open to Your Excellency's inquiry. The duty to surrender to the demanding State the alleged fugitives does not arise unless the demand is in proper form. Your Excellency, therefore, is justified in inquiring into the technical sufficiency of the application for extradition and the accompanying documents.

In accordance with the long-established practice, upon receipt of the extradition papers by Your Excellency from the Executive of Connecticut, they were referred to the Attorney-General for an opinion as to whether, as matter of law, the papers were in proper form and the requisition might lawfully be complied with.

In accordance with Your Excellency's request, I examined the papers in these cases with reference to their technical sufficiency. The law requires that the person demanded shall be charged with the commission of an offence against the laws of the demanding State, in these cases Connecticut. It is im

material under the law whether the offence charged is a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth. If a crime is substantially charged in the papers, that is sufficient, and it is immaterial that the complaint or indictment is inartificially drawn or is imperfect as a matter of pleading, if it substantially charges a crime. Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U. S. 387, and cases cited. In my opinion the papers in these cases satisfied that requirement of the law.

Your Excellency is also justified in satisfying yourself that the persons demanded are fugitives from justice. The term "fugitive from justice" is frequently misunderstood, for the reason that it is popularly supposed that to be a fugitive from justice one must have fled to escape detection or avoid prosecution. That, however, is not the legal meaning of the term as defined by the United States Supreme Court. In Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, at page 97, the court said:

To be a fugitive from justice, in the sense of the act of Congress regulating the subject under consideration, it is not necessary that the party charged should have left the State in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, after an indictment found, or for the purpose of avoiding a prosecution anticipated or begun, but simply that having within a State committed that which by its laws constitutes a crime, when he is sought to be subjected to its criminal process to answer for his offence he has left its jurisdiction and is found within the territory of another.

The motive with which the demanded person left the demanding State is, therefore, not material to the decision of the questions presented for Your Excellency's determination in this Commonwealth. It appeared by sworn evidence in the papers accompanying the demand of the Governor of Connecticut that the persons demanded were in Connecticut at the time when the crime is alleged to have been committed, and that they subsequently left the State and have been found within this Commonwealth. Nothing appeared to contradict that statement, and Your Excellency is, in my opinion, justified in finding that requirement of the law satisfied. See Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222.

Your Excellency may also satisfy yourself that the persons demanded are in fact the persons now held in this Commonwealth under the fugitive warrant. No question was raised as to the matter of identity; and it appeared by sworn evidence in the papers that the persons now held under the fugitive warrant in this Commonwealth are the persons demanded by the Executive of Connecticut.

The affidavits in the papers appear to have been taken before magistrates under the law of Connecticut. No question as to the good faith of the Executive of Connecticut was raised. The papers were certified as authentic by the Executive of Connecticut; that certification of the papers by that Executive in itself sufficiently authenticates the complaints or affidavits as being sworn to before a magistrate, and such certification, under the ruling of the United States Supreme Court, precludes Your Excellency from going behind such certificate to the truth of the facts so stated. In the case of Kentucky v. Dennison, cited above, the court said:

It will be observed that the judicial acts which are necessary to authorize the demand are plainly specified in the act of Congress; and the certificate of the Executive authority is made conclusive as to their verity when presented to the Executive of the State where the fugitive is found. He has no right to look behind them, or to question them, or to look into the character of the crime specified in this judicial proceeding. The duty which he is to perform is, as we have already said, merely ministerial that is, to cause the party to be arrested and delivered to the agent or authority of the State where the crime was committed.

The Constitution of the United States, in Article IV., Section I, provides that

Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.

I have already quoted above the law enacted by Congress with respect to requisitions; and since the proof of these rec

ords and judicial proceedings of the State of Connecticut complies with the requirements of the statutes, that proof is to be accepted by Your Excellency as conclusive.

After careful consideration of all these matters, I have reported to Your Excellency that the demand of the Executive of Connecticut was proper in form, and that the requisition might lawfully be complied with.

Since, therefore, the demand of the Executive of Connecticut appears to be in proper form, and since the specified facts concerning which Your Excellency may lawfully inquire have been established in the manner prescribed by law, I must advise Your Excellency that, under the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States and of this Commonwealth, Your Excellency has no legal discretion to deny the requisition of the Governor of Connecticut.

In reply to the further inquiry of Your Excellency as to whether the petitioners have been afforded by me opportunity for a full hearing at which they could present all proper objections to the granting of the application, I have the honor to reply that counsel for the alleged fugitives was, at his request, afforded an opportunity for a full hearing upon all points which I am authorized by law to investigate and consider in cases of demands by other States upon this Commonwealth, and that representatives of labor organizations interested were present, and that opportunity was given to every person present to speak upon the points in issue, or to ask for information. The questions of the innocence or guilt of the persons involved, or of the justice or injustice of the prosecution of the charge were not inquired into, since those questions may be tried only in Connecticut, the State having jurisdiction of the offence charged, and may not lawfully be inquired into by me. Counsel for both the complainant and the alleged fugitives were heard at length. Counsel for the alleged fugitives discussed thoroughly and forcibly the matter of the technical sufficiency of the papers, and attacked the validity of the papers on various points. The arguments were taken down by a stenographer, and all objections were carefully noted.

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