condemnation to be estimated and paid in the same manner as provided by law in cases of lands taken for railroad uses. Any corporation owning, operating, or controlling the same is hereby authorized to make sale, lease or conveyance to the said terminal company of property which the company is hereby authorized to acquire. The Portland Terminal Company is hereby authorized to purchase or build railway repair shops within its limits and to operate the same under its own management. Within the railroad locations included in the terminal the terminal company may locate according to law and build, maintain and operate electric railroads; and may purchase or lease, maintain and operate electric street railroads within the limits of said terminal. Section 6 provided as follows: The Boston & Maine Railroad and the Maine Central Railroad Company, and any other railroad company using the terminal facilities by agreement with the terminal company, are each hereby authorized to guarantee the payment of the bonds issued by the Portland Terminal Company under this act, and to lease or convey to said Portland Terminal Company any or all property within the limits of said terminal. Under these provisions said Portland Terminal Company is authorized, within the limits of the railroad terminal established for the purpose, to operate railroads, both steam and electric, and the amount of trackage comprised within the cities mentioned in the act is of considerable extent. It is, therefore, in a broad sense a "railroad" company, as held in Coughlan v. Cambridge, 166 Mass. 268, and in Wall v. Platt, 169 Mass. 398; and see ante, p. 43. When this last opinion was given, however, the statutes relating to investments for savings banks contained no mention of a terminal company, as such. This first appears in St. 1908, c. 590, § 68, cl. 3, subdivision a, in which it is provided that investments may be made as follows: In the bonds or notes, issued in accordance with the laws of this commonwealth, of a railroad corporation incorporated therein the railroad of which is located wholly or in part therein, which has paid in dividends in cash an amount equal to not less than four per cent per annum on all its outstanding issues of capital stock in each fiscal year for the five years next preceding such investment, or in the first mortgage bonds of a ter minal corporation incorporated in this commonwealth and whose property is located therein, which is owned and operated, or the bonds of which are guaranteed as to principal and interest, or assumed, by such railroad corporation. The evident intention of the Legislature to distinguish between terminal companies within Massachusetts and those outside of this Commonwealth is significant, and leads me to the conclusion that it was not intended to permit investment by savings banks in the bonds of a terminal corporation, as such, organized and actually situated in some other New England State. In the present case, while the matter is not entirely free from difficulty, I am of opinion that the bonds of the Portland Terminal Company may be considered bonds of a railroad corporation, and therefore legal investments for savings banks so far as this specific inquiry is concerned. I have been informed, and assume to be facts, that the Portland Terminal Company has exercised its authority to take over the property of the Boston & Maine Railroad and the Maine Central Railroad within the terminal limits established by the act; that it runs regular passenger trains from Union Station in Portland to Portland Junction on the Grand Trunk Railroad; that it owns fifteen locomotives, rents six, and owns its own equipment of flat cars, derrick cars, and other rolling stock, and operates passenger cars; that it issues time-tables and advertises the arrival and departure of its trains; that it sells its own passenger tickets and receives the compensation therefor; and that it employs a large number of people, including engineers, firemen, brakemen, conductors, baggage-masters, freight agents, ticket agents, ticket sellers and lost-article agents. Within its limits, therefore, it seems to be doing the business of a common carrier of passengers, baggage and express. It therefore appears that said corporation, in addition to being a terminal company, is a railroad company within the meaning of the provisions of law hereinbefore cited. The foregoing conclusion is upon the assumption that said bonds, when issued, will be in all other respects in accordance with the requirements of our statute. It appears, however, that a part of the property to be covered by the mortgage securing said bonds is subject to a prior consolidated mortgage of the Maine Central Railroad maturing April 1, 1912. This, in my opinion, will prevent said bonds from becoming legal investments for Massachusetts savings banks until after the expiration of said mortgage on April 1, 1912. MARRIAGE NOTICE OF INTENTION OF MARRIAGE ENTRY Under the provision of R. L., c. 151, § 16, as amended by St. 1911, c. 736, § 1, that Secretary. 1912 January 2. You have requested my opinion as to the manner in which To the the time which must elapse between the entry of notice of intention of marriage and the issuing of the certificate thereof is to be computed. R. L., c. 151, § 16, as amended by St. 1911, c. 736, § 1, is as follows: Persons who intend to be joined in marriage in this commonwealth shall, not less than five days before their marriage, cause notice of their intention to be entered in the office of the clerk or registrar of the city or town in which they respectively dwell, or, if they do not dwell within the commonwealth, in the office of the clerk or registrar of the city or town in which they propose to have the marriage solemnized. R. L., c. 151, § 23, as amended by St. 1911, c. 736, § 2, is, in part, as follows: After the expiration of five days from the date of the entry of such intention the clerk or registrar shall deliver to the parties a certificate signed by him, specifying the time when notice of the intention of marriage was entered with him and all facts relative to the marriage which are required by law to be ascertained and recorded, except those relative to the person by whom the marriage is to be solemnized. R. L., c. 151, § 25, as amended by St. 1911, c. 736, § 3, prescribes a penalty for the improper issuing of a certificate of intention of marriage. The language used in section 16, as amended, to describe the five days' period is different from that used in section 23, as amended. It describes, however, the same period of time, and must be construed in the same way. In computing the five days' period in accordance with section 23, as amended, the date of the entry of intention must be excluded. Bemis v. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502. The language clearly indicates that five days are to expire before the delivery of the certificate, that is, the day of such delivery is to be excluded from the computation. Fractions of a day are, of course, to be disregarded (see Hannum v. Tourtellott, 10 Allen, 494), as a day means twentyfour hours and begins at midnight. As to Sunday, the general rule is that "when a statute fixes a limitation of time within which a particular act may or may not be done," if the time limited "is less than a week, Sunday is excluded." Cunningham v. Mahan, 112 Mass. 58, 59. I know of no reason why the general rule should not be applied to the statute in question. The meaning of this statute is that persons who are interested in an intended marriage are entitled to a reasonable opportunity on each of five days to examine the records in the office of the clerk or registrar of the city or town for the notice of intention of such marriage. On Sunday the clerk or registrar is not required to keep his office open and his records are not ordinarily open to inspection. Similarly, he is not required to keep his office open on a legal holiday. R. L., c. 8, § 5, cl. 9. Such a holiday should, therefore, in my opinion, be excluded from the computation. See, however, my opinion to the Governor of the Commonwealth, under date of June 1, 1911. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL AND AGENTS RETURNS COMPENSATION. The provision of R. L., c. 3, § 24, requiring the keeping of a docket for the entry Secretary. 1912 January 9. You have requested my opinion with reference to R. L., To the c. 3, §§ 23, 24, 25 and 30, in substance as to whether a general statement that a legislative counsel or agent is employed "on all matters of interest to said corporation," is in compliance with the law. Said section 24, after requiring the keeping of a docket in which shall be entered the names of legislative counsel and agents, provides that Such entries shall include the name and business address of the employer, the name, residence and occupation of the person employed, the date of the employment or agreement therefor, the duration of the employment, if it can be determined, and the special subjects of legislation, if any, to which the employment relates. Under this section, in my opinion, no entry is required other than one such as "on all matters of interest to said corporation," unless said employment is for some special subject of legislation. There may be a general employment other than employment in connection with specific legislation. Section 25, however, requires further entries, both by the employer and the employee. Under the requirements of this section I am of the |