opinion that although the original employment may be general, a counsel or agent before acting with reference to any specific piece of legislation must make an entry of that specific legislation upon the docket. You also request my opinion in substance as to whether the return by a legislative counsel or agent of employment on an annual salary, which salary is not stated, is in compliance with the law. Said section 30 requires that the employer "shall render to the secretary of the commonwealth a complete and detailed statement, under oath, of all expenses incurred or paid in connection with the employment of legislative counsel or agents, or with promoting or opposing legislation." This does not, in my opinion, require an employer to make a detailed payment for each particular service. The statute, however, is not complied with by a mere statement that the legislative counsel is employed upon an annual salary. If the service performed as legislative counsel or agent is substantial in amount, so that it must have been taken into consideration in fixing the amount of the annual salary, there is expense incurred within the meaning of the statute which should be made to appear in some manner. It is not clear just how this should be done in case no apportionment is made by the employer. If the annual salary is stated it would seem to cover the requirement of the statute, or if a fair apportionment of said salary was made, and that part apportioned to legislative work is returned, the provisions of the statute would seem to be fulfilled. A mere return of an annual salary, without stating any amount, is not in my opinion, a compliance with the law. ATTORNEY-GENERAL· ORDER FIXING LIMIT OF TIME FOR PERFORMANCE OF DUTY TO ADVISE GENERAL COURT STREET RAILWAY CORPORATION - - NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY-OWNERSHIP ANCE. The General Court has no authority to fix a limit of time within which the AttorneyGeneral shall discharge his statutory duty of advising the General Court or either branch of it. The action of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company in divesting itself of all interest in or control over the New England Investment and Security Company, which, through the instrumentality of the Springfield Railway Companies, owned and controlled the Springfield Street Railway Company, and by placing the stock of such street railway company in the ownership and control of the New England Investment and Security Company, whose trustees and officers are not connected as officers or directors with the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company and have entered into no agreement, trust or other undertaking with said company, with respect to their acts as officers or trustees of the New England Investment and Security Company, if performed in good faith, constitutes a compliance with the decree of the Supreme Judicial Court dated June 23, 1908, which enjoined the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company from subscribing for or taking or holding, directly or indirectly, the stock of the Springfield Street Railway Company, and from assuming or exercising the franchise or privilege of subscribing for, taking or holding the stock of such corporation. On June 2, 1911, the General Court adopted an order in the To the following terms: Ordered, That the Attorney-General report to the General Court not later than Jan. 15, 1912, whether the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company has complied, with respect to the Springfield Street Railway Company, with the order of the court, as more particularly set out in a decree, under date of June 23, 1908, of the Supreme Judicial Court; and, if so, how said railroad company has divested itself of its interest in said railway in accordance with said decree. With respect to the form of the order, it is to be observed that the General Court has no authority to fix a limit of time within which the Attorney-General shall discharge his statutory duty of advising the General Court, or either branch of it. See II Op. Atty.-Gen. 125, 405. General Court. 1912 January 29. It may be doubted, also, whether the order as framed presents any such question of law as is contemplated by the provision of R. L., c. 7, § 7, that the Attorney-General “shall give his opinion upon questions of law submitted to him by the governor and council or by either branch of the general court," inasmuch as no sufficient facts are presented to raise any question of law; and the order apparently contemplates not so much a determination of a question of law as an investigation into existing facts and a report thereon. Inasmuch, however, as it appears that certain facts with respect to the action of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company in the premises have been presented to the Board of Railroad Commissioners in connection with a petition of the Springfield Street Railway Company and the Western Massachusetts Street Railway Company and a petition of the Uxbridge & Blackstone Street Railway Company and the Worcester & Blackstone Valley Street Railway Company for the approval by such Board of proposed consolidations of the companies joining in each of the respective petitions, upon which such Board has officially acted, and the same facts were submitted to certain individual members of the Committee on Railroads at the session preceding that at which the order above quoted was adopted, in connection with the passage of St. 1910, c. 601, authorizing the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company to acquire, purchase, hold and own the whole, or any part not less than half, of the capital stock of the Berkshire Street Railway Company, it may fairly be presumed that such facts were known to the General Court. I shall, therefore, assume that the question of law intended to be submitted by the order of the General Court was, in substance, whether or not the acts of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company as presented to the Board of Railroad Commissioners constitute a proper compliance with the terms of the decree of June 23, 1908, referred to in said order. The history of the litigation between the Commonwealth and the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company is fully discussed in the reports of my predecessor to the General Court for the years 1907 (p. xiii.) and 1908 (p. xv.). The decree referred to was rendered upon an information in equity brought by the Attorney-General under the provisions of St. 1906, c. 372, in substance alleging that the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, a corporation duly organized under the laws of this Commonwealth for the purpose, among others, of owning and operating a railroad therein, had directly and indirectly subscribed for, taken and held the stock and bonds and had guaranteed the bonds and dividends and was then directly and indirectly holding the stock and bonds and was guaranteeing the bonds and dividends of certain street railway companies incorporated under the laws of this Commonwealth, to wit, the Worcester & Southbridge Street Railway Company, the Worcester & Blackstone Valley Street Railway Company, the Worcester & Webster Street Railway Company, the Webster & Dudley Street Railway Company, the Berkshire Street Railway Company and the Springfield Street Railway Company, and that the stock and bonds held and the bonds and dividends guaranteed by said railroad company were so held and guaranteed without authority from the General Court, or any law thereof, and that the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, by reason of the acts described, had assumed and exercised and was assuming and exercising a franchise and privilege and had transacted and was transacting a kind of business not authorized by its charter or by the laws of this Commonwealth, to wit, the franchise and privilege of acquiring, taking and holding the stock and bonds of such domestic street railway corporations and of guaranteeing the bonds and dividends of said corporations and of owning and operating said street railway corporations and the business of acquiring or purchasing said stock and bonds and of guaranteeing said bonds and dividends, and of owning and operating street railway corporations, in violation of law and to the prejudice and damage of the Commonwealth. The petition then concludes Wherefore, the Attorney-General prays the consideration of this court in the premises, and that a writ of injunction issue restraining said New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company from the further use and enjoyment of said franchise and privilege and from the further prosecution of the said business, and for such other relief in the premises as equity and justice may require. The decree, so far as it is material to the question now presented, is as follows: It is ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows: The defendant is, and its officers, directors, attorneys, agents and employees, respectively and collectively, are hereby enjoined and restrained: 1. From subscribing for or taking, directly or indirectly, the capital stock of the Worcester & Southbridge Street Railway Company, the Worcester & Blackstone Valley Street Railway Company, the Worcester & Webster Street Railway Company, the Webster & Dudley Street Railway Company, the Berkshire Street Railway Company and the Springfield Street Railway Company, or either of them, all being street railway corporations incorporated under and by virtue of the laws of this Commonwealth, and mentioned in the information. 2. From assuming or exercising the franchise or privilege of subscribing for, or taking, directly or indirectly, the stock of said street railway corporations, or either of them. 3. From holding, directly or indirectly, the stock of said street railway corporations, or either of them, after the first day of July, in the year 1909. 4. From assuming or exercising the franchise or privilege of holding, directly or indirectly, the stock of said street railway corporations, or either of them, after the first day of July, in the year 1909. Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall affect existing leases executed in accordance with the provisions of chapter 293 of the Acts of the year 1901 of this Commonwealth. From this decree the defendant appealed, and the decree was finally affirmed in Attorney-General v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 201 Mass. 370. The state of facts to which this decree was applicable arose as follows: the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, a consolidated corporation created by the concurrent legislation of the State of Connecticut and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, acquired in the years 1903 and 1904 all the shares of stock of the Worcester & Connecticut Eastern |