the items and confirming such bill or account. Said clerk shall not certify such orders until he has recorded them in the records of the county commissioners. Section 12 provides in part that The county treasurer may, before payment of an account rendered against the county by a county officer, in writing require of him a written statement of the specific provision of law authorizing it. Said statement shall be filed with the vouchers. The treasurer shall be personally liable for money paid out by him, except payments specifically required by law, unless there is an unexpended balance of an appropriation made for the purpose sufficient for such payment, and he shall be personally liable for any money paid by him without the voucher and certificate required by law, except as provided in section thirty-four. The county treasurer is chiefly a disbursing officer. Most of the payments made by him are made upon orders issued by the county commissioners or upon bills audited or allowed by said. commissioners or other public officers. See St. 1907, c. 170; R. L., c. 158, § 8; R. L., c. 157, §§ 16, 17. In so far as the expenses for the payment of which such orders are issued or bills approved are incurred for purposes for which expense may legally be incurred, I am of opinion that the county treasurer may exercise no discretion, and may make payment without incurring responsibility in the premises. Upon the other hand, it is clearly the duty of the county treasurer to ascertain whether or not a payment which he is called upon to make by an order or by a bill duly approved may be made by him according to law, and this necessarily requires him to satisfy himself that the expense for which the payment is to be made was legally incurred in the first instance, and for this purpose he may require a written statement of the specific provision of law by which any such expense was authorized. See R. L., c. 21, § 12. If, upon the face of the record presented by the voucher or certificate, it clearly appears that there is no legal warrant for the expenditures, no order of the county commissioners or no approval by them or by any public officer of charges so incurred is sufficient to warrant the payment. VETERAN COMMISSIONED OFFICER - GRATUITY ATTORNEY - FEE. St. 1912, c. 702, which in section 1 provides for a gratuity of $125 "for those veteran soldiers and sailors who volunteered their services in the civil war," and in section 2 provides that such gratuity "shall be paid to every person or his legal representatives . . . who served in the army or navy of the United States to the credit of the commonwealth during the civil war, . . .” includes commissioned officers as well as enlisted men. ... The Commission on Gratuities, established by section 3 of St. 1912, c. 702, is not required to make or to secure payment of the fee prescribed by section 6 to any attorney or other person entitled thereto for the prosecution of a claim for a gratuity under such statute. mission on 1912 By a communication dated July 2, 1912, you request my To the Comopinion upon two questions: first, whether St. 1912, c. 702, Gratuities. entitled "An Act to provide for suitably rewarding certain July 8. veteran soldiers and sailors" should be construed to include officers; and second, whether, under the provisions of section 6, it is the duty of the commission to pay the fee therein provided for. The act above cited provides, in section 1, that — For the purpose of promoting the spirit of loyalty and patriotism, and in recognition of the sacrifice made both for the commonwealth and for the United States by those veteran soldiers and sailors who volunteered their services in the civil war, and for the purpose of promoting the public welfare, by giving visible evidence to this generation and future generations that, if danger should again threaten the nation and the call should again come for men, Massachusetts will not forget the great service of those who volunteer, a gratuity of one hundred and twenty-five dollars to each veteran is hereby authorized to be paid from the treasury of the commonwealth under the conditions hereinafter set forth. Section 2 is as follows: The gratuity herein provided for shall be paid to every person, or his legal representatives, not being a conscript or a substitute, and not having received a bounty from the commonwealth or from any city or town therein, who served in the army or navy of the United States to the credit of the commonwealth during the civil war, and was honorably discharged from such service, and is living at the time of the passage of this act; it being intended and provided that the said gift shall not be a bounty, nor a payment in equalization of bounties, nor a payment for services rendered, nor a payment for the purpose of making the result of their contracts of enlistment more favorable to them because the contracts of other soldiers were on better terms, but a testimonial for meritorious service such as the commonwealth may rightly give, and such as her sons may honorably accept and receive. The latter section in terms provides that the gratuity "shall be paid to every person. . . not being a conscript or a substitute, and not having received a bounty from the commonwealth or from any city or town therein, who served in the army or navy of the United States to the credit of the commonwealth during the civil war, and was honorably discharged from such service, and is living at the time of the passage of this act." If, therefore, an officer can satisfy the commission that, not being a conscript or a substitute, he has served in the army or navy of the United States to the credit of the Commonwealth during the civil war, and has been honorably discharged from service, I am of opinion that he would be entitled to receive the gratuity, notwithstanding that bounties were in the first instance payable only to enlisted men. See St. 1864, cc. 48, 143, 211. The present statute does not contemplate that the payment of a gratuity under its terms shall be in lieu of bounty. With respect to your second question, I am of opinion that the commission is not required to make payments to an attorney or other person entitled thereto for the prosecution of a claim under the statute. Section 6, to which your communication refers, is as follows: The fee for the prosecution of a claim under this act shall not exceed the sum of five dollars; and the fee agreed upon between the parties, not exceeding the said amount, shall be paid to the attorney or other person entitled thereto out of the amount allowed on the certificate of the commission allowing the same. Any attorney or other person who demands or receives for his services any greater compensation than the sum above specified shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall for every such offence be punished by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars or by imprison ment at hard labor for a term not exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment. There is nothing in this section to impose upon the commission the duty to secure payment of the fee named therein to the attorney or other person who may be entitled to it. LICENSE KEEPER OF HOSPITAL FOR INSANE OR FEEBLE- Under the provisions of St. 1909, c. 504, § 24, that "the governor and council may, In behalf of the State Board of Insanity you have requested To the my opinion upon the following question: Whether under section 24, chapter 504, Acts of 1909, the State Board of Insanity is limited in its recommendations to individuals or whether it can recommend that licenses be granted to partnerships. The section of the statute referred to provides as follows: The governor and council may, upon the recommendation of the state board of insanity, license any suitable person to establish and keep a hospital or private house for the care and treatment of the insane, epileptic, feeble-minded, and persons addicted to the intemperate use of narcotics or stimulants, and may at any time revoke such license. No such recommendation shall be made unless the said board is satisfied that the person applying therefor is a duly qualified physician, as provided in section thirty-two, and has had practical experience in the care and treatment of such patients. Any person owning or maintaining such a hospital or private house on the date of the passage of this act shall be entitled to maintain the same under the provisions of law in force at that time, except that every such hospital or house shall be subject to the visitation. and supervision of the state board of insanity. The word "person," as used in different statutes, varies much in the comprehensiveness of its scope, and its meaning in any State Board of Charity. 1912 August 12. particular statute must usually be determined by the context and by consideration of the object of the statute in which it is used. It has sometimes been construed as including a corporation, an artificial person, and as used in some statutes it has undoubtedly been sometimes held to include a copartnership. Considering the word as it is used in the statute in question with reference to its context and with reference to the purpose of the statute, the term "suitable person" and the term "the person applying therefor" in my opinion are to be considered as referring to one and the same person, and since the Board, in order to make its recommendation to the Governor and Council, must state that the applicant for a license in addition to being otherwise "suitable" is "a duly qualified physician, as provided in section thirty-two," it becomes clear that the word 'person" was not intended to include a partnership as such, since a partnership cannot be "a duly qualified physician." 66 Considering the meaning of the word with reference to the clear purpose of the statute leads to the same conclusion. The provisions of law requiring the license as a prerequisite to the right to establish or keep such a hospital as is described in the act were obviously to keep the control and management of such hospitals under only such physicians as were deemed by the Board to be suitable and duly qualified to conduct them. If the word "person" were to be construed to include a partnership, and if the words "person applying therefor" were to be construed as requiring simply that the one member of the partnership who made the application should be a duly qualified physician, the result would be not only that the application in the name of the physician would not in fact be the application of the partnership, but also the very object of the law might be defeated because the physician might be the only physician among the partners, or might be merely a nominal or silent partner, or one of several partners having only an insignificant part of the management of the hospital. In a previous opinion to the Board I have advised that the only person entitled to be licensed under the statute referred to was the responsible head of such hospital or private house, that is, "the one who exer |