by the legislative body that the act should apply to the Commonwealth as the employer in its various departments, or to persons directly employed by the Commonwealth in those departments. In my opinion, therefore, the statute in question is not to be considered as applicable to the Commonwealth or to those directly employed by the Commonwealth within the field of the jurisdiction of the State Board of Education. To the Massachusetts Highway Commission. 1912 September 17. LICENSE TO OPERATE AUTOMOBILE REVOCATION TION JUDGMENT OF GUILTY PLACED ON FILE. CONVIC The Massachusetts Highway Commission, under the provisions of St. 1909, c. 534, § 22, that "a conviction of a violation of this section shall be reported forthwith by the court or trial justice to the commission, which shall revoke immediately the license of the person so convicted," is warranted in treating a judgment of guilty placed on file by the trial court as a conviction. Your inquiry of August 27 in substance requires my opinion upon the question whether or not a judgment of guilty placed on file by the court constitutes a conviction within the meaning of St. 1909, c. 534, § 22. The section cited establishes, among other offences, that of operating an automobile or motor cycle recklessly or so that the lives and safety of the public may be endangered, and your communication states that the judgment or finding of guilty was upon facts tending to prove this offence. The section then proceeds as follows: A conviction of a violation of this section shall be reported forthwith by the court or trial justice to the commission, which shall revoke immediately the license of the person so convicted. If it appears by the records of the commission that the person so convicted is the owner of a motor vehicle, or has exclusive control of any motor vehicles as a manufacturer or dealer, the commission may revoke the certificate of registration of all motor vehicles so exclusively owned or controlled. Whenever any person so convicted appeals, the commission shall suspend forthwith the license of the person so convicted, and shall order the license delivered to it, and shall not reissue said license unless such person is acquitted in the appellate court, or unless the commission in its discretion, after an investigation or upon a hearing, decides to reissue it. No new license or certificate shall be issued by the commission to any person convicted of a violation of this section until after sixty days from the date of such final conviction, nor thereafter except in the discretion of the commission. The question is not free from difficulty. In Munkley v. Hoyt, 179 Mass. 108, where it was provided in St. 1896, c. 397, § 9, that the Board of Registration in Pharmacy, after hearing, might suspend the registration and certificate of a registered pharmacist, or might revoke such registration and certificate altogether, but which contained the proviso that "the license or certificate of registration of a registered pharmacist shall not be suspended or revoked for a cause punishable by law until after conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction,” the court held that the placing of the case on file after a plea of guilty was a sufficient conviction to warrant the suspension or revocation of the license. The court said, at page 111: It is the intention of the statute to give a pharmacist charged with a crime the right to a trial in the court having jurisdiction of his offence, but if his guilt be there established so that the court may impose sentence according to its powers, then it is sufficiently established for the Board of Pharmacy to act upon their finding, and to impose the penalty according to their powers. And again, at page 112: The problems before the respective tribunals are entirely different, and, the guilt of the accused being established through conviction by plea or verdict in the one and by the finding after a hearing in the other, the accused is subject to such punishment as the respective tribunals may lawfully impose, and the right of either to proceed to judgment is not affected by the fact that the other sees fit to decline to proceed to judgment. And it appears to be well settled that in its ordinary legal sense the word "conviction," as used in the statutes of the Commonwealth, signifies that the defendant has pleaded guilty or has been found guilty by the verdict of a jury or the finding of a court. 1 Op. Atty.-Gen. 499; Commonwealth v. Lockwood, 109 Mass. 323. In some cases, however, the word is employed in statutes to designate the judgment and sentence of the court upon a verdict, finding or confession of guilt. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Kiley, 150 Mass. 325, under the provision of St. 1887, c. 392, that "the conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction of a person licensed under the provisions of chapter one hundred of the Public Statutes, for violation of any of the provisions of said chapter, and the several acts in amendment thereof, shall of itself make the license of said person void," the court held that a verdict of guilty found by a jury in the Superior Court, from which an appeal was taken, was not a conviction within the meaning of the statute above cited, and the court said: Under this provision, the effect of a conviction of the kind named is to deprive the defendant of a valuable right, without an opportunity for further trial or investigation. We are of opinion that nothing less than a final judgment, conclusively establishing the guilt, will satisfy the meaning of the word "conviction" as here used. At any time before a final judgment of the court a motion in arrest of judgment may be made, or the verdict may be set aside upon a motion for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence, or for other good cause; and, upon further proceedings, it may turn out that the defendant is not guilty. And see Commonwealth v. Gorham, 99 Mass. 420; Fay v. Harlan, 128 Mass. 244. The distinction between the case of Munkley v. Hoyt and the case of Commonwealth v. Kiley, and other similar decisions, appears to rest upon the fact that in the latter the conviction itself voids or revokes the license so that the loss of the license in effect becomes a part of the sentence rather than a consequence of the verdict or finding of guilty, whereas in the former case the determination of the guilt of the licensee did no more than confer jurisdiction upon an independent tribunal to proceed with a separate inquiry resulting in the revocation or suspension of the license. The case presented by the inquiry of the commission appears to lie somewhere between the above decisions. Under the provisions of section 22, above quoted, which are mandatory, the commission is not vested with any discretion in the premises, and their function in connection with the revocation of the license is purely ministerial, so that at least to the extent of making the revocation of the license a necessary consequence of the conviction of the licensee, the statute resembles that considered by the court in Commonwealth v. Kiley. Upon the other hand, the provision of section 22 that "whenever any person so convicted appears, the commission shall suspend forthwith the license of the person so convicted," appears to contemplate action upon the part of the commission before the final judgment which constitutes a conviction as defined in Commonwealth v. Kiley. The purpose of the section is undoubtedly to protect the public against the reckless operation of automobiles or motor cycles. Taking into consideration that the purpose of section 22 is to secure the safety of the public upon highways where automobiles and other motor vehicles may be operated at a high rate of speed, it is apparent that there is sound and adequate reason why a person who has pleaded or has been found guilty of reckless operation should not be permitted to continue operating until a final judgment has been rendered in his case, but should be forthwith deprived of his license, not as a punishment for the offence but as a measure of protection to the public. This, I am advised, is the view heretofore adopted by the commission in dealing with similar cases. While the question cannot be said to be entirely free from doubt, I am of opinion that for the reasons above discussed and in view of the purpose of the statute and the obvious considerations of public safety involved, the commission is so far warranted in treating a judgment of guilty as a sufficient conviction to require the revocation of the license of the person so convicted as not to be required to change the policy already pursued by it, until the precise point has been adjudicated otherwise by the courts. To the Bank FIXED DIVIDEND REQUIRING TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM The provision of St. 1908, c. 520, § 3, that the accounts of the savings department of a trust company "shall be kept separate and distinct from the general business of the corporation," prohibits the promise of a fixed dividend or rate of interest upon money deposited in the savings department of a trust company, which for its maintenance requires a transfer of funds from the general banking department of the company to the savings department. Your letter of September 24 requires my opinion as to the authority of a trust company which has established a savings department, under the provisions of St. 1908, c. 520, to promise to pay a definite rate of interest or dividends upon money deposited therein, any deficiency in the earnings of the savings department to be made up by a transfer of funds necessary to complete the required amount of dividends or interest from the general banking department of the trust company. St. 1908, c. 520, §§ 1, 2 and 3, are as follows: SECTION 1. Every trust company soliciting or receiving deposits (a) which may be withdrawn only on presentation of the pass-book or other similar form of receipt which permits successive deposits or withdrawals to be entered thereon; or (b) which at the option of the trust company may be withdrawn only at the expiration of a stated period after notice of intention to withdraw has been given; or (c) in any other way which might lead the public to believe that such deposits are received or invested under the same conditions or in the same manner as deposits in savings banks; shall have a savings department in which all business relating to such deposits shall be transacted. SECTION 2. All such deposits shall be special deposits and shall be placed in said savings department, and all loans or investments thereof shall be made in accordance with the statutes governing the investment of deposits in savings banks. The duties of the board of investment relative to the investment of such deposits shall be performed by a board or committee appointed by the board of directors of such corporation. SECTION 3. Such deposits and the investments or loans thereof shall be appropriated solely to the security and payment of such deposits, and shall not be mingled with the investments of the capital stock or other money or property belonging to or controlled by such corporation, or be liable for the debts or obligations thereof until after the deposits in |