Aviation Markets: Studies in Competition and Regulatory ReformAshgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008 - 233 pages This volume is a collection of 17 papers selected from David Starkie's extensive writings over the last 25 years. Previously published material has been extensively edited and adapted and combined with new material, published here for the first time. The book is divided into five sections, each featuring an original overview chapter, to better establish the background and also explain the papers' wider significance including, wherever appropriate, their relevance to current policy issues. These papers have been selected to illustrate a significant theme that has been relatively neglected thus far in both aviation and industrial economics: the role of the market and its interplay with the development of economic policy in the context of a dynamic but partly price regulated industry. The result provides a strong flavour of how market mechanisms, and particularly competition, can operate to successfully resolve policy issues. |
Contents
Overview 37 | 3 |
Boxes | 11 |
1 | 17 |
Contestability and Sustainability in Regional Airline Markets | 19 |
A Proposal to | 25 |
Overview | 35 |
Privatisation and Structure | 41 |
1 | 42 |
Testing the Regulatory Model | 89 |
The Regulatory Dilemma | 111 |
Incentives and Airport Investment | 117 |
A Critique of the Singletill | 123 |
The Financial Performance of the Smaller UK Airports | 153 |
Overview | 171 |
The Economics of Secondary Markets in Airport Slots | 193 |
A Defence of Slot Concentration at Network Hubs | 209 |
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Common terms and phrases
activities addition aircraft airlines airports allocation allowed appear approach argued argument assets associated Authority average aviation BAA's capacity capital carriers cent chapter charges circumstances Commission competition concentration congestion Consequently considered costs delay demand designated dominant economic effect efficient entrants entry established evidence example existing expansion expected facilities fares firm flights further gain Gatwick Heathrow higher important incentives increase incumbent industry interest investment issue lead less limited London major marginal market power monopoly noted operating output ownership particular passengers period possible potential price cap privatisation profits proposals reasons reduce regulation regulatory rents result retailing routes rule runway scale scheduled significant slots Stansted suggests terminal trading traffic transfer Transport utilities