must also be God in the same relative manner th and Son? Lastly, the Father is he of whom, and and by whom, and for whom are all things; Heb. ii. 10. The Son is not he of whom, but o and that not without an exception, viz. "all things w were made," John i. 3. "All things, except him which did put all things under him," 1 Cor. xv. 27. It is evident therefore that when it is said "all things were by him," it must be understood of a secondary and delegated power; and that when the particle by is used in reference to the Father, it denotes the primary cause, as John vi. 57. "I live by the Father;" when in reference to the Son, the secondary and instrumental cause: which will be explained more clearly on a future occasion.

Again, Eph. iv. 4-6. "there is one body and one Spirit, even as ye are called in one hope of your calling; one Lord, one faith, one baptism; one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all." Here there is one Spirit, and one Lord; but the Father is one, and therefore God is one in the same sense as the remaining objects of which unity is predicated, that is, numerically one, and therefore one also in person. 1 Tim. ii. 5. “there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus." Here the mediator, though not purely human, is purposely named man, by the title derived from his inferior nature, lest he should be thought equal to the Father, or the same God, the argument distinctly and expressly referring to one God. Besides, it cannot be explained how any one can be a mediator to himself on his own behalf; according to Gal. iii. 20. “a mediator is not a mediator of one, but God is one." How then can God be a mediator of God? Not to mention that he himself uniformly testifies of himself, John viii. 28. "I do nothing of myself," and v. 42. "neither came I of myself." Undoubtedly therefore he does not act as a mediator to himself; nor return as a mediator to himself. Rom. v. 10. we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son." To whatever God we were reconciled, if he be one God, he cannot be the God by whom we are reconciled, inasmuch as that God is another person; for if he be one and the same, he must be a mediator between himself and us, and reconcile

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us to himself by himself; which is an insurmountable difficulty.

Though all this be so self-evident as to require no explanation, namely, that the Father alone is a self-existent God, and that a being which is not self-existent cannot be God,—it is wonderful with what futile subtleties, or rather with what juggling artifices, certain individuals have endeavoured to elude or obscure the plain meaning of these passages; leaving no stone unturned, recurring to every shift, attempting every means, as if their object were not to preach the pure and unadulterated truth of the gospel to the poor and simple, but rather by dint of vehemence and obstinacy to sustain some absurd paradox from falling, by the treacherous aid of sophisms and verbal distinctions, borrowed from the barbarous ignorance of the schools.

They defend their conduct, however, on the ground, that though these opinions may seem inconsistent with reason, they are to be received for the sake of other passages of Scripture, and that otherwise Scripture will not be consistent with itself. Setting aside reason therefore, let us have recourse again to the language of Scripture.

The passages in question are two only. The first is John x. 30. "I and my Father are one,"—that is, one in essence, as it is commonly interpreted. But God forbid that we should decide rashly on any point relative to the Deity. Two things may be called one in more than one way. Scripture saith, and the Son saith, I and my Father are one,-I bow to their authority. Certain commentators conjecture that they are one in essence,-I reject what is merely man's invention. For the Son has not left us to conjecture in what manner he is one with the Father, (whatever member of the Church may have first arrogated to himself the merit of the discovery,) but explains the doctrine himself most fully, so far as we are concerned to know it. The Father and the Son are one, not indeed in essence, for he had himself said the contrary in the preceding verse, my Father, which gave them me, is greater than all," (see also xiv. 28. "my Father is greater than I,") and in the following verses he distinctly denies that he made himself God in saying, "I and my Father are one;" he insists that he had only said as follows, which implies far less, v. 36, say ye of him whom the Father hath sanctified, and sent

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into the world, Thou blasphemest; because I said, I am the Son of God?" This must be spoken of two persons not only not co-essential, but not co-equal. Now if the Son be laying down a doctrine respecting the unity of the divine essence in two persons of the Trinity, how is it that he does not rather attribute the same unity of essence to the three persons? Why does he divide the indivisible Trinity? For there cannot be unity without totality. Therefore, on the authority of the opinions holden by my opponents themselves, the Son and the Father without the Spirit are not one in essence. How then are they one? It is the province of Christ alone to acquaint us with this, and accordingly he does acquaint us with it. In the first place, they are one, inasmuch as they speak and act with unanimity; and so he explains himself in the same chapter, after the Jews had misunderstood his saying: x. 38. "believe the works; that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him." xiv. 10. "believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? the words that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself, but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works." Here he evidently distinguishes the Father from himself in his whole capacity, but asserts at the same time that the Father remains in him; which does not denote unity of essence, but only intimacy of communion. Secondly, he declares himself to be one with the Father in the same manner as we are one with him,—that is, not in essence, but in love, in communion, in agreement, in charity, in spirit, in glory. John xiv. 20, 21. at that day ye shall know that I am in the Father, and ye in me, and I in you: he that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me; and he that loveth me, shall be loved of my Father." xvii. 21. " that they all may be one, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee; that they also may be one in us.' v. 23. "I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one, and that the world 'may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them as thou hast loved me.' v. 22. "the glory which thou gavest me I have given them, that they may be one, even as we are one. When the Son has shewn in so many modes how he and the Father are one, why should I set them all aside? why should I, on the strength of my own reasoning, though in opposition to reason itself, devise another mode, which makes

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them one in essence; or why, if already devised by some other person, adopt it, in preference to Christ's own mode? If it be proposed on the single authority of the Church, the true doctrine of the orthodox Church herself teaches me otherwise; inasmuch as it instructs me to listen to the words of Christ before all other."

The other passage, and which according to the general opinion affords the clearest foundation for the received doc>trine of the essential unity of the three persons, is 1 John v. 7. "there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and these three are one. But not to mention that this verse is wanting in the Syriac and the other two Oriental versions, the Arabic and the Ethiopic, as well as in the greater part of the ancient Greek manuscripts, and that in those manuscripts which actually contain many various readings occur, it no more necessarily proves those to be essentially one, who are said to be one in heaven, than it proves those to be essentially one, who are said in the following verse to be one on earth. And not only Erasmus, but even Beza, however unwillingly, acknowledged (as may be seen in their own writings) that if John be really the

it

6 The best of those that then wrote (in the first ages of Christianity) disclaim that any man should repose on them, and send all to the Scriptures.' Of Reformation in England, Prose Works, I. 375.

7 This is true of the manuscripts of the old Syriac version, but the printed editions of the Syriac as well as of the Armenian versions contain the disputed clause. See Bishop Marsh's Letters to Archdeacon Travis. Preface, Notes, 8, 9, 10, 11. Mill. Adnotat. ad locum, in the volume of tracts published by Bishop Burgess, p. 43; Wetsten, ibid. p. 79; Bengelius, ibid. p. 144; Selden, ibid. p. 206; Buddæus, ibid. p. 225; and especially Schmidius, ibid. p. 243. With respect to the Greek manuscripts Milton expresses himself cautiously. Griesbach has shewn that the clause is found in only one Greek manuscript, and that a manuscript of the fifteenth or sixteenth century. For an elaborate account of the arguments for and against its authenticity, see Horne's Introduction, &c. Part II. Chap. iv. Sect. 5. § 6. where references are given to the principal authorities. See also Hey's Lectures, Book IV. Appendix; where a list, though not a very perfect one, is given of the chief opposers and defenders of the genuineness of the text.

8 Annon illico poterunt tergiversari, de consensu dictum esse, non de eadem essentia? Nihil autem æque confirmat auctoritatem testimonii ut consensus. Itaque consentiunt in terra Spiritus, aqua et sanguis. An hæc tria sunt unum, sicut Pater, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus unum sunt? Nemo dicit, opinor, sed testimonii consensu sunt unum; ita Pater, Verbum

author of the verse, he is only speaking here, as in the last quoted passage, of an unity of agreement and testimony. Besides, who are the three who are said to bear witness? That they are three Gods, will not be admitted; therefore neither is it the one God, but one record or one testimony of three witnesses, which is implied. But he who is not coessential with God the Father, cannot be co-equal with the Father. This text, however, will be discussed more at large in the following chapter.

But, it is objected, although Scripture does not say in express words that the Father and Son are one in essence, yet reason proves the truth of the doctrine from the texts quoted above, as well as from other passages of Scripture.

In the first place, granting, (which I am far from doing,) that this is the case, yet on a subject so sublime, and so far above our reason, where the very elements and first postulates, as it were, of our faith are concerned, belief must be founded, not on mere reason, but on the word of God exclusively, where the language of the revelation is most clear and particular. Reason itself, however, protests strongly against the doctrine in question; for how can reason establish (as it must in the present case) a position contrary to reason? Undoubtedly the product of reason must be something consistent with reason, not a notion as absurd as it is removed from all human comprehension. Hence we conclude, that this opinion is agreeable neither to Scripture nor reason. The other alternative therefore must be adopted, namely, that if God be one God, and that one God be the Father, and if notwithstanding ! the Son be also called God, the Son must have received the name and nature of Deity from God the Father, in conformity with his decree and will, after the manner stated before. This doctrine is not disproved by reason, and Scripture teaches it in innumerable passages.

But those who insist that the Son is one God with the Father, consider their point as susceptible of ample proof,

et Spiritus Sanctus sunt unum.' Erasmi Responsio ad Notationes novas Ed. Leid. Tom. IX. p. 278. Edit. Lug. Bat. 1703. Et hi tres unum sunt; id est, ita prorsus consentiunt ac si unus testis essent; uti re vera unum sunt si ovoíav spectes; sed de illa (ut mihi quidem videtur) non agitur hoc in loco.' Beza in loc.