plete legislative authority over the people of the territories and all the departments of the territorial governments. It may do for the territories what the people, under the Constitution of the United States, may do for the States."

Congress, in the goverment of the territories, has plenary power, except as limited by the Constitution. The particular form of government it shall establish is not prescribed. It has, for example, prescribed one form of government for New Mexico, another for the District of Columbia, and still another for Alaska. In New Mexico, as in most of the territories that have in the past been created and organized by Congress, a government resembling in many respects that of the States has been established, with executive and judicial officers and a local legislature elected by the people of the territory. While Congress, in the government of the District of Columbia, is limited by provisions of the Constitution not applicable to other territory of the United States, the same power exists of establishing local government. The mere fact that a legislature elected by the people of the District of Columbia has not been provided-Congress reserving to itself, as in Alaska, that function does not operate to deprive the District of Columbia of an organized form of civil government. It follows that since Congress may legislate directly in respect of the local affairs of a territory, Alaska, which has been provided with executive and judicial officers and a civil and penal code, has a complete system of civil government, and is an organized territory of the United States. Binns v. United States, 194 U. S. 486, 48 L. ed. 1087, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 816.

The interstate commerce act is remedial legislation for the regulation of common carriers engaged in commerce in all parts of the United States, where such regulation, in the mind. of Congress, is necessary. The act uses the unqualified term "territories of the United States," which can only refer to what are known as the territories incorporated into and belonging to the United States, in which civil government has been established and in which the operation of the commerce act would be beneficial. Every reason exists for the inclusion of

Alaska. There is much traffic between its shores and the ports of the Pacific seaboard. Railroads are being built and projected into the interior of Alaska to accommodate the growing commerce due to the rapid development of the country. Every argument, therefore, favors the intent of Congress by its latest act to include this territory within the jurisdiction of the interstate Commerce Commission.

The common-law jurisdiction of the supreme court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a circuit court, to issue a writ of mandamus against an officer of the government in a proper case, will be conceded. It likewise follows that similar power is vested in the court to command the performance of a duty purely legal, and in which no act of judgment or discretion is involved by an official board or commission of the government. This power has been so long and so frequently exercised as to admit of no doubt of the existence of the authority. Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 9 L. ed. 1181; Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, 10 L. ed. 559; United States v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 379, 26 L. ed. 167; Garfield v. United States, 211 U. S. 249, 53 L. ed. 168, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62; United States ex rel. Parish v. Mac Veagh, 214 U. S. 124, 53 L. ed. 936, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556.

This brings us to consider whether this case is one calling for the exercise of jurisdiction by mandamus. Blackstone, in his Commentaries, vol. 3, 110, defines the writ of mandamus to be "a command issuing in the King's name from the court of King's bench, and directed to any person, corporation, or inferior court of judicature within the King's dominions, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, which appertains to their office and duty, and which the court of King's bench has previously determined, or at least supposes, to be consonant to right and justice." Before this extraordinary process will issue it must appear that the Interstate Commerce Commission is an official body to whom, on legal principles, the writ may be directed. It also must appear that the relator is without any other legal remedy. Referring to the latter point, when relator's complaint was dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction by the Commission, it applied for a rehearing, as provided in the interstate commerce act. When that application was denied, relator had no specific remedy, either in law or equity, except by mandamus.

We must now inquire into the official status of the Commission against whom we are asked to direct the issuance of this writ. While the powers conferred upon the Commission are exceedingly broad and of the utmost importance, they are only such as Congress in its legislative capacity possesses. It has power to require that transportation charges for passengers and property must be just and reasonable; that freight shall be properly and reasonably classified; that rebates and discriminations, undue and unreasonable preferences, pooling of freight and division of earnings, shall not exist. power to regulate the long and short haul; to require the posting and filing of schedules of rates, the publication of rates, and the regulation of joint tariffs between companies owning or operating connecting lines; to require railroad companies to construct and maintain switches and connections with lateral or connecting lines of roads; to establish through routes and just and reasonable rates applicable thereto; and, in fact, to conduct hearings and make orders generally regulating commerce within the express limitations of the commerce act.

It has

Severe penalties are prescribed for the violation of the duties and obligations imposed by the act and for the failure of a carrier to comply with the orders of the Commission. But the act specifically provides that any violation of its penal provisions "shall be prosecuted in any court of the United States having jurisdiction of crimes within the district in which such violation was committed or through which the transportation may have been conducted." 32 Stat. at L. 847, chap. 708; 36 Stat. at L. 547. In respect of the enforcement of the orders of the Commission, it is provided that "if any carrier fails or neglects to obey any order of the Commission other than for the payment of money, while the same is in effect, the Interstate Commerce Commission or any party injured thereby, or the United States by its Attorney General, may

apply to the commerce court for the enforcement of such order. If, after hearing, that court determines that the order was regularly made and duly served, and that the carrier is in disobedience of the same, the court shall enforce obedience to such order by a writ of injunction or other proper process, mandatory or otherwise, to restrain such carrier, its officers, agents, or representatives, from further disobedience of such order, or to enjoin upon it or them obedience to the same." 36 Stat. at L. 555.

Thus it will be observed that by the provisions of the last general act of Congress conferring power and jurisdiction upon the Interstate Commerce Commission, the commerce court was created. Cases from the Commission do not reach that court by the usual avenue of appeal, but by original proceedings to enforce or restrain the orders of the Commission. A careful review of the acts conferring jurisdiction upon the Commission fail to disclose the bestowal by Congress upon it of any of those powers to enter judgments and decrees belonging to courts of general jurisdiction. Its acts are administrative, and not judicial. Like all executive and administrative officers and boards of the government, it possesses quasi judicial functions which require the exercise of judgment and discretion in deciding questions of fact and applying the law thereto as defined in the statutes. But it takes more than this to make a court of general or special jurisdiction. The power that resides in courts to enter final judgments and decrees and to enforce them is wanting in this Commission. Its duty is confined to administering powers conferred in Congress by the commerce clause of the Constitution, and delegated, under proper limitations, to the Commission to administer.

It is insisted that the Commission, in arriving at a decision: that it was without jurisdiction to consider relator's complaint,. exercised judicial discretion, and that mandamus will not lie to compel it to take jurisdiction. After the petition was filed. by relator, evidence was taken and a hearing had at which arguments were made. It was upon consideration of the case so presented that a decision was reached by the Commission

that it was without jurisdiction in the premises. It is elementary law that a writ of mandamus will issue to require an inferior court to assume jurisdiction of and decide a matter within its jurisdiction, and pending before it for judicial determination, but the writ will not issue to control its decision. Ex parte Flippin, 94 U. S. 348, 24 L. ed. 194; Ex parte Denver & R. G. R. Co. 101 U. S. 711, 25 L. ed. 872; Ex parte Burtius, 103 U. S. 238, 26 L. ed. 392; Ex parte Morgan, 114 U. S. 174, 29 L. ed. 135, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 825.

It is well settled that where the question of jurisdiction is a peremptory one enjoined by law, it matters not that the officer, board, or tribunal may have granted a hearing before deciding that issue. If jurisdiction depended upon the ascertainment or determination of some preliminary fact or facts, the case would be different. It would not in that instance be solely a question of law, and mandamus would not lie to direct the action that should be taken in deciding the preliminary issues of fact. In determining whether or not an officer, tribunal, commission, or board has jurisdiction to act in a given case, there can be no such thing as preliminary or temporary assumption of jurisdiction where no jurisdictional facts are involved. When jurisdiction is expressly imposed by law, no amount of preliminary inquiry to determine that question can deprive the party injured by an erroneous ruling thereon of his right to have such ruling corrected, and, in the absence of any other legal remedy, he is entitled to the relief afforded by manda

mus.

In the case at bar the power of determining in what particular territory the Commission shall exercise jurisdiction is not left to its discretion. No question of fact is involved in its determination. Its jurisdiction in that respect is defined by the positive declaration of the law-making power. It is purely a question of law, and not one of fact, or of mixed law and fact. No exercise of discretion by the Commission in its administrative capacity is involved in passing upon the extent of its territorial jurisdiction under the act of Congress. It matters not, therefore, the extent of the hearing indulged by the Commission in this case before it arrived at the conclusion