issue of fact joined in any such case, and all such proceedings shall be at the suit of, and in the name of, the United States." Sec. 11, 12, and 13 have no possible bearing on the questions involved.

Acting upon the recommendation of the commission of exports, the Secretaries of the Treasury, of Agriculture, and of Commerce and Labor, respectively, adopted certain rules and regulations for carrying out the provision of the foregoing act, on October 17th, 1906, and published the same.

Regulation 28 was amended to take effect on April 1, 1910. This states the derivative of the several drugs enumerated in sec. 8, and names the several preparations containing them respectively. Derivatives of or from, and preparations containing, acetanilid, are enumerated as follows:

"Acetanilid (antifebrin, phenylacetamide): Derivatives: "Acetphenitidin, citrophen, diacetanilid, lactophenin, methoxy-acetanilid, para-iodacetanilide, phenaretine.

methylacetanilid,

and

"Preparations containing acetanilid or derivatives: "Analgesics, antineuralgics, antirheumatics, cachets, capsules, cold remedies, elixirs, granular effervescing salts, headache powders, mixtures, pain remedies, pills, and tablets."

"The regulation concludes as follows: "In declaring the quality or proportion of any of the specified substances, the names by which they are designated in the act shall be used, and in declaring the quantity or proportion of the derivatives of any of the specified substances, in addition to the tradename of the derivative, the name of the specified substance shall also be stated, so as to indicate clearly that the product is a derivative of the particular specified substance."

Mr. Clarence R. Wilson, United States District Attorney, and Mr. Stanton C. Peele, Assistant for the appellant.

Mr. Daniel W. Baker, Mr. Joseph C. Sheehy, and Mr. Frank J. Hogan for the appellee.

Mr. Chief Justice SHEPARD delivered the opinion of the Court:

1. A preliminary contention on behalf of the appellants is that the act, being remedial, and not penal, should be liberally construed. This contention seems to be of little or no practical importance in the present case, as the substantial question presented is one of power, rather than construction. Without discussion, therefore, it may be conceded that the act, while it contains penal provisions without which it could not be enforced, was enacted to remedy the great mischief resulting from the unrestricted sale of adulterated drugs and articles of food, and ought to be given, where possible, a construction that will effect the general legislative intention.

2. The substantial questions for determination arise upon two propositions that have been submitted in support of the contention of error in the dismissal of the bill on the exceptions A stated. The first of these is that the packages of the drugs. are misbranded, because the labels fail to recite that acetphenitidin contained therein is a derivative of acetanilid.

It seems clear that this omission is not in express violation of the requirement of sec. 8 of the act, for the reason that the label states the true name of the drug, acetphenitidin, which, though not one of those specifically named in the section, is a derivative of one of them, acetanilid.

Now, while persons skilled in chemistry and pharmacy would known that acetphenitidin is a derivative of acetanilid, it is certain that the average purchaser and user of drugs would not. For this reason, no doubt, the commission of expert chemists, whose recommendations were adopted by the three Secretaries, suggested the regulation requiring the label of a derivative of one of the drugs specified in sec. 8 to show not only the tradename of the same, but also the name of the substance of which it is a derivative. It is well settled that where an act of Congress has for its object the raising of revenue, the administration of the affairs committed to an executive department, as of the public lands and the like, or the execution of

the power over commerce, matters of detail looking to the promulgation of regulations for carrying the law into effect, as, for example providing for the proceedings thereunder, the fixing of standards, brands, and labels, or the ascertainment of necessary facts upon which the law may operate, may be expressly delegated to an executive officer. In such instances Congress legislates on the subject as far as is reasonably practicable, and from the recognized necessities of the case is compelled to leave to executive officers the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute. United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. 238, 9 L. ed. 113; Caha v. United States, 152 U. S. 211, 38 L. ed. 415, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 513; Re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526, 41 L. ed. 813, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 444; Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 36 L. ed. 294, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 51 L. ed. 523, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 52 L. ed. 1061, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616; Bong v. Alfred S. Campbell Art Co. 214 U. S. 236, 53 L. ed. 979, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 628, 16 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1126; see also Coopersville Co-op. Creamery Co. v. Lemon, 89 C. C. A. 595, 163 Fed. 145; Prather v. United States, 9 App. D. C. 82; Kollock v. United States, 9 App. D. C. 420.

On the other hand, it is equally well settled that the power conferred to make regulations for carrying the law into effect must be exercised within the powers delegated, that is to say, confined to details for regulating the mode of proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted by Congress, It cannot be extended to amending or adding to the requirements of the act itself. Morrill v. Jones, 106 U. S. 466, 27 L. ed. 267, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423; United States v. Symonds, 120 U. S. 46, 30 L. ed. 557, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 411; United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, 36 L. ed. 591, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 764; Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 52 L. ed. 278, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 163.

The decisions cited mark the general boundary line between the powers that may be delegated to administrative officers, and

those that may not be. It remains to determine on which side ✓ of that line the power claimed in the present case falls.

It must be borne in mind that the food and drugs act [34 Stat. at L. 768, chap. 3915, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 1187] does not confer upon executive officers the power to prescribe the forms of brands and labels upon drugs, as was done by the oleomargarin act, that was considered in Kollock's Case, supra. The only power conferred is that in sec. 3, which provides that the three Secretaries named "shall make uniform rules and regulations for carrying out the provisions of this act, including the collection and examination of specimens of foods and drugs," etc.

Sec. 8 declares when an article shall be deemed to be misbranded: "First: If it be an imitation of, or offered for sale under the name of, another article. Second: * * * If [among other things] the package fail to bear a statement on the label of the quantity or proportion of any alcohol, morphin, opium, cocain, heroin, alpha or beta eucain, chloroform, cannabis indica, chloral hydrate, or acetanilid, or any derivative or preparation of any such substances contained therein."

In so far as the regulation designates the several derivatives of the drugs enumerated in sec. 8, and the preparations containing the same, we are of the opinion that it is within the power conferred in sec. 3 to make uniform rules and regulations for carrying out the provisions of the act. It was not reasonably practicable for Congress to ascertain and declare these several derivatives and preparations which might then have existed, much less to anticipate those which might later come into existence and use. Having declared that the quantity or proportion of the several derivatives of the named drugs shall be stated on the labels, the ascertainment of such derivatives was a matter of detail properly confided to the executive officers in carrying out the provisions of the law. The regula tion having named acetphenitidin as a derivative of acetanilid, the manufacturer complied therewith to the extent of naming the proportion of said derivative contained in the antikamnia tablets, but did not comply with the requirement of the same

that it should also recite that it was, in fact, a derivative of acetanilid. The last requirement was in our opinion an amendment of, or an addition to, the act itself, and therefore beyond the powers of the executive authority. Congress reserved to itself the statement of the contents of the labels, and did not require that when a drug was a derivative merely, the name of the drug from whence derived should also be recited. Had it intended that this should be done, it would have so declared distinctly. In this respect the case is clearly differentiated from Re Kollock, supra, and comes within the rule governing the second class of cases before recited, including United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677-688, 26 L. ed. 591-594, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 764; and Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425-462, 52 L. ed. 278-297, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 163. In the case last cited, the question was whether a false oath made in final proof required by a regulation of the Commissioner of the Land Office constituted perjury. The statute made certain requirements in regard to preliminary proofs, and reiterated some of them in the section relating to final proofs, but omitted the one which, by the regulations made by the Commissioner under the power conferred by the act to give effect to its provisions, was required. It was held that the power to adopt rules and regulations for the enforcement of the act could not be construed to warrant one that was in fact an addition to the act.

Since the submission of this case, the Supreme Court of the United States has rendered a decision, the opinion in which, delivered by Mr. Justice Lamar, clearly draws the line between those powers which may be delegated by Congress to an executive officer, and those which may not. United States v. Grimaud, 1911, 220 U. S. 506, 55 L. ed., 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 480. That was an indictment for violating a regulation of the Secretary of Agriculture relating to the use and occupancy of public forest reservations. It was said that in the nature of things it was impracticable for Congress to provide regulations for the various and varying details of the management of the forest reservations, and that it was within its

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