For the foregoing reasons the judgment must be reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded, with directions to grant a new trial. Reversed and remanded.

ADRIAANS v. DILL.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; CONTRACTS; INFANTS; LACHES; NOTICE; EQUITY.

1. A contract for a contingent fee of one fifth of an estate and a deed of trust on the estate, securing the performance of the contract, procured by attorneys from a widow, a woman seventy-eight years of age, the life tenant under a will, and her grandchildren, the remaindermen, for services to be performed in defending a caveat to the will, held, at the suit of the remaindermen, who were illiterate, after the death of the widow, to have been fraudulently procured by the attorneys, where it appeared, inter alia, that the defendants obtained the signatures of the complainants, most of whom were minors, and who lived in another city, without reading or explaining the papers to them, and on the representation that the object was to obtain money for their grandmother; that when the instruments were procured, the executors of the will, who were lawyers, had taken all necessary steps, without the aid of the defendants, to defend the will; and that the caveat was abandoned without the defendants having rendered any substantial service in the matter.

2. The object of the general rule deferring the act of avoidance by an infant of a contract made by him, until his coming of age, is his protection; and when it is apparent to the court that delay will work injury to the infant, the power of repudiation may be exercised by the court immediately.

3. Where illiterate parties living in another city, on learning of the true meaning of a contract and a deed of trust securing it, on their interest in an estate in this District, executed by them about nine years before as the result of fraudulent representations made to them, immediately took steps towards bringing suit to set aside the instru ments as fraudulent, and commenced the suit within a year of their discovery of the fraud, it was held that they were not guilty of laches. (Following George v. Ford, 36 App. D. C. 315.)

4. One who practises bad faith will not be permitted to invoke the doctrine of constructive notice in aid of his wrongdoing, unless negligence on the part of the injured party has supervened.

5. In a suit in equity against an attorney, to vacate a fee contract fraudulently obtained by him, and in which the fraud alleged is established, he will not be allowed remuneration for the services he actually performed, especially where, in his answer, he relies upon the contract, and does not offer to accept the reasonable value of his services.

No. 2253. Submitted March 6, 1911. Decided April 3, 1911.

HEARING on an appeal by one of two defendants from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a court of equity, vacating a contract and a deed of trust securing it, as having been fraudulently procured. Affirmed.

The COURT in the opinion stated the facts as follows:

This is an appeal from a decree of the supreme court of the district, declaring null and void a deed of trust and the contract thereby secured, the purpose of said deed and contract being to insure the payment of a contingent fee to appellant, John H. Adriaans, and Samuel H. Lewis, for professional services in defeating the caveat to the will of Peter Dill, deceased, of the District of Columbia.

The material averments of the bill are these: Peter Dill died on the 18th day of December, 1897, in this District. At that time he owned certain land situated in Charles county, Maryland, and considerable real estate in the District of Columbia.

The deceased left a will, dated February 13th, 1896. Under this will all his real estate was left to his wife, Ann Dill, for life with remainder over in fee to the grandchildren of his wife, they being the children of the wife's son, who was the testator's stepson.

Joseph J. Waters and Oliver P. Johnson, members of the Bar of the District of Columbia, and residents of the District, were named as executors of the will, and both qualified as such. Thereafter a caveat was filed, and said executors, as in duty

bound, undertook to secure the probate of the will. Thereupon the defendant Adriaans and said Lewis (who was named as codefendant in the bill, but who died October 20, 1909, prior to the entering of the decree below, and whose representatives abandoned the case), both being members of the Bar, appeared in said probate proceeding, claiming to represent Mrs. Dill, the widow, and the remaindermen, who are the complainants herein. The bill expresses ignorance as to whether the widow ever employed the defendants to represent her, and avers, upon information and belief, that said defendants "deceived and defrauded the said Ann Dill, widow, as to her rights and duties in regard to the probate of the will of said Peter Dill, deceased, and deceived and defrauded the said Ann Dill into executing a contract in reference to compensating said John H. Adriaans and Samuel H. Lewis for alleged professional services rendered, and deceived and defrauded said Ann Dill, widow, into executing a deed of trust hereinafter referred to, to secure the payment of the fees of said John H. Adriaans and Samuel H. Lewis for said alleged professional services."

The bill then avers that the complainants were all made parties to said contract and deed of trust to secure the payment of fees under said contract. The ages of the complainants, six in number, at the time of the execution of said contract and deed of trust, are then given, and they range from twenty-one year to seven. It is then averred that the complainants did not read the contents of said contract, did not have the same read, nor the contents thereof made known to them, and have no further knowledge or information in reference to said contract except the recitals of said deed of trust, referring to said contract; that complainants knew nothing of said deed of trust at the time of the execution thereof, nor were the contents nor the effect thereof known to complainants until during the year preceding the filing of the bill, when "they immediately employed counsel to take the proper steps to protect and restore to them their rights in the premises." Said deed of trust was recorded in this District on the 28th of September, 1900, and a copy thereof is annexed to the bill.

Statement of the Case.

[37 App..

It is then stated that the complainants "never employed, either directly or indirectly, said John H. Adriaans and said Samuel H. Lewis, or either of them, to represent them, or any of them, in said proceedings. That the said John H. Adriaans and said Samuel H. Lewis, with intention to deceive and defraud your complainants, knowingly and wilfully induced your complainants, and each of them, to sign said contract and said deed of trust by representing to your complainants, and each of them, that the said papers being signed, to wit, the contract and deed of trust, were for the purpose of obtaining an allowance for their grandmother, Ann Dill, the widow of said Peter Dill, deceased. That your complainants and each of them, as far as they were able to comprehend what they were doing, owing to the tender years of several of your complainants, signed said contract and deed of trust under the misrepresentation aforesaid; to wit, that the object of the same was to obtain an allowance for the grandmother of complainants, Ann Dill, the widow of Peter Dill, deceased. That your complainants, and each of them, learned for the first time of the misrepresentation and fraud that had been practised upon them by the said John H. Adriaans and Samuel H. Lewis, during the past year, and employed counsel as aforesaid." The bill then avers that the defendants "never rendered any legal services that were necessary to protect the interest of complainants, or that were beneficial to, or aided the interest or rights of, complainants; that, on the contrary, the said John H. Adriaans and Samuel H. Lewis instigated and continued much needless litigation in reference to the probate of the will of said Peter Dill, deceased, and in the settlement of his estate, thereby incurring great expense to said estate;" that the trustees named in said deed of trust, to wit, Charles C. Cole and Clarence F. Norment, did not qualify as said trustees, but renounced said trust.

The bill further avers that the widow, Ann Dill, died on May 3d, 1906, being at the time about eighty-six years of age; that said deed of trust and contract, while in fact null and void, nevertheless constitute a cloud upon the title of the real estate devised to complainants, which cloud, complainants aver,

they are entitled to have removed by the cancelation of said instruments; that complainants have not, since becoming of age, sanctioned and consented to said contract and deed of trust, but, on the contrary, have repudiated them. The bill ends with appropriate prayers.

The defendants filed separate answers, Mr. Adriaans stating "that he was employed by complainants and said Ann Dill to defend said will against said caveat, in co-operation with the executors named therein; and that, as security for the services thus contemplated, a lien was given upon the subject-matter of the will, that a contemporaneous contract of compensation would be carried out by complainants and said Ann Dill." He then denies that any misrepresentations were employed or fraud practised in procuring the execution of said instruments, "and says that the statements in said paragraph (of the bill) that said papers were not read to or by complainants are absolutely false. This defendant distinctly denies that it was represented to complainants that the object of said papers was to secure an allowance for Ann Dill;" that he rendered valuable services to complainants; "that complainant William P. Dill was of full age, and intelligently signed said trust in 1898;" that complainants Marian A., John H., and J. Edward Dill "have waited beyond the statutory period, after arriving at age, to repudiate their action;" that complainants Leo A. J. and Maurice E., not being of age, can neither affirm nor deny said contract, nor can this be done for them by a guardian and next friend."

The defendant Lewis, in his answer, states "that he was retained by one Ann Dill, together with the complainants herein, to defend the will of Peter Dill, in connection with the executors therein named," and that said contract and lien were executed to secure his fees; "that he entered the said employment at the special instance and request of the said Ann Dill.” Misrepresentation and fraud are denied, and it is averred that said instruments were read by the complainants "and were apparently thoroughly understood by them, as well as by the said Ann Dill." Mr. Lewis in his answer "says that he is willing