FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-continued.
4. Where insolvent traders, to secure a debt due the wife of one of them,
give and record a chattel deed of trust on their store fixtures,
license, lease, and other stock in trade on their premises, and to
be placed thereon, reserving the right to retain possession until de-
fault, and the debt mentioned in the deed in trust is greater than
that actually owed, and the grantors thereafter sell part of the
stock in trade, but do not apply the proceeds of sale to the reduction
of the debt or to the payment of their other creditors, the deed of
trust is not fraudulent as matter of law, but the question as to
whether it is a fraud upon creditors is one of fact for the jury.
(Citing sec. 1120, D. C. Code [31 Stat. at L. 1368, chap. 854], pro-
viding that, in fraudulent conveyances, "the question of fraudulent
intent shall be deemed a question of fact, and not of law.") Marche
v. Johnson, 36.
5. Sec. 1120, D. C. Code, providing that the question of intent in fraudu
lent conveyances shall be deemed a question of fact, and not of law,
does not deprive the courts of the rights to declare an instrument to
be fraudulent in every case that may come before them. Id.
6. The statute of 13 Eliz. chap. 5, relating to fraudulent conveyances,
(superseded in this district by sec. 1120, D. C. Code, 31 Stat. at L.
1368, chap. 854), extends its protection not only to technical credit-
ors, but also to those whose claims and demands consist of actions
for tort. Hopewell v. Wright, 247.
7. When the grantee under an alleged fraudulent conveyance has shown
the payment of a valuable consideration, the burden is upon the
party attacking the conveyance to show that such grantee had
knowledge of the fraudulent intent of his grantor. (Following Mori-
mura v. Samaha, 25 App. D. C. 189.) Id.
8. It is not necessary to constitute bad faith on the part of a purchaser
from one who has sold his property to defraud creditors, and who
has paid a valuable consideration, that he either actually partici-
pated in the scheme to defraud, or had actual knowledge of the
fraudulent intent of his vendor. Bad faith may exist where the facts
and circumstances of the transaction are such as to put him on in-
quiry. (Following Morimura v. Samaha, 25 App. D. C. 189.) Id.
9. Where the defendant in an action at law, and in anticipation of a
judgment being recovered against him, and after a bill in equity by
the plaintiff in such action had been filed against him, to enjoin
him from disposing of his real estate to avoid payment of the an-
ticipated judgment, sold his real estate worth $5,400 for $4,500, and
a title company employed by the buyer examined the title and re-
ported the filing of the equity suit and advised him that the court
was without jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for therein, and
that the title was good in the seller; and the buyer prosecuted no
further inquiry, but, resting entirely upon the judgment of the title
company, accepted a deed of the property and paid the consideration,
it was held in suit by the plaintiff in the action at law after he had
recovered a judgment, to set aside the deed as fraudulent, that the
grantee had actual knowledge of the pending action at law, of the
reduction in price of the real estate, and of the charges made in the
bill, and that these facts and circumstances were such as to put a
man of ordinary caution upon inquiry, and that the deed was
therefore void as against the judgment creditor. Id.
GARNISHMENT. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 2.
A demand promissory note made in this District, and payable in New
York city to the order of a trust company there, becomes, by involun-
tary transfer, the property of the superintendent of banks of the
State of New York, in trust for the benefit of the creditors and stock-
holders of the trust company, upon the superintendent taking
charge of its assets under the banking laws of that State; and if
indorsed by the superintendent to another in trust for the trust
company, and sent by the indorsee for collection to a bank here,
and paid, the proceeds are not subject to attachment or garnishment
in the hands of the bank here, at the instance of local creditors.
(Following Jenkins v. Purcell, 29 App. D. C. 209, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.)
1074.) Union Savings Bank v. Carnegie Trust Co. 548.
"GOOD RECORD TITLE." See JUDICIAL SALES, 2.
GOOD WILL. See TRADEMARKS, 9.
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY, SALES OF. See SALES, 1.
Under the act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 716, chap.
1375); April 26, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 137, chap. 1876); and June 21,
1906 (34 Stat. at L. 325, chap. 3504), relating to the lands and
funds of the Cherokee tribe of Indians, the members of the tribe en-
rolled for allotment as of September 1, 1902, did not become the
owners as tenants in common of the undivided community or tribal
property to the exclusion of after-born members of the tribe; but
control was retained by the Federal government in the property
until such time as the enrolment of members should be complete,
and until final dissolution of the tribal government. Gritts v.
Fisher, 473.
INDICTMENT. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 6, 7; BRIBERY, 4; CRIMINAL
LAW, 2, 10, 29, 30, 33, 34; JUDGMENT, 1, 2.
INFANTS. See RAILROADS, 4.
The object of the general rule deferring the act of avoidance by an in-
fant of a contract made by him, until his coming of age, is his pro-
tection; and when it is apparent to the court that delay will work in-
jury to the infant, the power of repudiation may be exercised by the
court immediately. Adriaans v. Dill, 59.
IN FORMA PAUPERIS. See PATENTS, 6.
INJUNCTION. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 8; ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 3, 4;
REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS.
INSANITY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 4.
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 10-12; CRIMINAL
LAW, 35; STREET RAILROADS, 7, 8; TRIAL, 11.
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY, EXPRESSION OF COURT'S OPINION IN.
See TRIAL, 10.
1. A provision in a life insurance policy that the insurer will not be bound
unless at its date the insured is in sound health, and that it is void
if before that date the insured has had certain specified diseases, are
conditions precedent to the liability of the insurer on the policy,
notwithstanding a statement in the policy that the application upon
which it is written "omits the warranty usually contained in ap-
plications," and no other provision in the policy contains the word
"warranty." Healy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 240.
2. A provision in a life insurance policy that it shall be "incontestable
after two years, except for fraud or misstatement of age" is incon-
sistent with a provision in the policy that if the age of the insured
is not correctly given, the amount paid will be adjusted according to
the true age, and also with provisions in the policy that the insurer
shall not be bound if the insured is not in sound health at the date
of the policy, and that it will be void if before that time the insured
has had any of certain specified diseases; and if the insured is not
in good health at the date of the policy or has suffered from any of
such diseases, the policy is voidable on those grounds for two years,
but is incontestable thereafter, except for fraud. Id.
3. Under the guise, of requiring proofs of death, an insurance company
may not compel a claimant to procure and introduce in evidence in
an action on one of its policies, proofs of health. Id.
4. Where, in an action on a life insurance policy, the plaintiff agrees at
the trial that the proofs introduced shall be considered as part of
the proofs of death, he is bound by them to the extent of their dis-
closures, except as such disclosures may be modified by the oral testi-
mony. (Following Griffith v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. 36 App. D. C.
8.) Id.
5. Where a policy of life insurance provides that the company shall not
be bound unless the insured was in sound health at the date of the
policy, and that the policy shall be void if before its date the in-
sured had suffered from pulmonary disease, and the insured died of
tuberculosis about ten months after the date of the policy, it was
held, in an action on the policy, that the evidence was such as to re-
quire the case to be submitted to the jury upon the question whether
the insured was free from disease and in sound health at the date of
the policy. Id.
INTENT AS A QUESTION OF FACT. See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES,
4, 5.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE. See TERRITORIES, 1.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. See MANDAMUS, 1, 3; RAIL-
ROADS, 6, 7.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has no power to enter judgments
and decrees, such as belongs to courts of general jurisdiction. Its
acts are administrative, and not judicial. U. S. ex rel. Humboldt
S. S. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 266.
INTERVENTION. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 13.
JOINDER OF COUNTS. See CRIMINAL LAW, 2, 3.
JOINT TENANTS. See TENANTS IN COMMON.
JOINT TORT FEASORS, ACTION AGAINST. See PLEADING, 1.
JUDGMENT. See INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
1. On a motion in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the indictment
does not sufficiently describe the offense charged, defects or imper-
fections in matter of form only, not tending to the prejudice of the
accused, will not be considered.
U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 720.)
(Citing sec. 1025, U. S. Rev. Stat.,
Dufour v. United States, 497.
2. While the statement in an application by one under indictment, for a
speedy trial, that he did not intend to demur to the indictment or
to enter any other plea than that of not guilty, will not preclude
him from afterwards taking advantage of a defect in the indictment
on a motion in arrest of judgment, the court is at liberty to con-
sider such statement on the hearing of such a motion, in determin-
ing whether any alleged informality or ambiguity in the indictment
operated to his prejudice. Id.
JUDICIAL NOTICE. See EVIDENCE, 6; PLEADING, 2.
1. A party admittedly liable for costs for which a judgment has been ren-
dered against another person, and who permits a marshal's sale in
satisfaction of such judgment to be made of land belonging to him,
but the title to which was in such other person until two days before
the sale, when it was conveyed to him, cannot maintain a bill in
equity to set aside the sale and the marshal's deed thereunder to
the judgment creditor, merely because the latter knew that the
property belonged to him and he recorded his deed before the sale;
and it is immaterial, in the absence of any allegation of fraud, what
amount of money was realized from the sale. (Citing American
Sav. Bank v. Eisminger, 35 App. D. C. 51.) Bride v. Baker, 231.
2. While a purchaser of land at a judicial sale under ordinary conditions
will not be compelled to accept a title that is not good (citing Me-
Caffrey v. Little, 20 App. D. C. 116), he will be required to accept
the title if it is good by adverse possession, although such a title
is not what is called a good record title (citing Block v. Ryan, 4
App. D. C. 283). March v. Kenyon, 574.
JURY, QUESTIONS FOR. See QUESTIONS for Juby.
Where illiterate parties living in another city, on learning of the true
meaning of a contract and a deed of trust securing it, on their in-
terest in an estate in this District, executed by them about nine
years before as the result of fraudulent representations made to
them, immediately took steps towards bringing suit to set aside the
instruments as fraudulent, and commenced the suit within a year
of their discovery of the fraud, it was held that they were not guilty
of laches. (Following George v. Ford, 36 App. D. C. 315.) Adria-
ans v. Dill, 59.
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