on the faith of such representations, but as between themselves their
relations as partners depend upon contract express, or reasonably
to be implied from all of the circumstances; and when one of the
parties alleges the existence of a general partnership, the burden of
proof is upon him to so show. Smith v. Lancaster, 25.
2. On an appeal by the plaintiff from a decree based upon a finding of
fact that a general partnership did not exist between the plaintiff
and the defendant, this court affirmed the decree, although in doubt
as to whether the evidence showed that the plaintiff had been fairly
treated by the defendant, the court not being satisfied that the
plaintiff had discharged the burden upon him of showing that a
general partnership existed. Id.
3. In a suit for the dissolution of an alleged partnership, in which the
plaintiff alleged, and the defendant denied, the existence of a gen-
eral partnership; the evidence was reviewed, and the decree dis-
missing the bill affirmed. Id.
II. ABANDONMENT AND CONCEALMENT.
III. PATENTABILITY.
IV. REISSUE.
V. IN GENERAL.
VI. INTERFERENCE.
(a) In general.
(b) Conception, Disclosure and Reduction to Practice.
(d) Specifications and claims.
1. Where each of the parties to an interference has been granted a patent
and an interference is declared on a reissue application of the first
patentee, embodying the claims of the other's patent, and not chan-
ging the description of the applicant's original application, this court
on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner, awarding priority
to the applicant for the reissue, has no power or jurisdiction to de-
termine whether a statutory bar of intervening rights exists against
the granting of a reissue patent to such applicant. (Reconsidering
Skinner v. Carpenter, 36 App. D. C. 178, and construing sec. 4904,
Rev. Stat. U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3389, and citing Allen v.
United States, 26 App. D. C. 8, s. c. 203 U. S. 476, 51 L. ed. 281,
27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; Kreag v. Geen, 28 App. D. C. 437; Burson
v. Vogel, 29 App. D. C. 388; Gueniffet v. Wictorsohn, 30 App. D. C.
432; Re Fullagar, 32 App. D. C. 222; Lecroix v. Tyberg, 33 App. D.
C. 586; and distinguishing Podlesak v. McInnerney, 26 App. D. C.
405.) Norling v. Hayes, 169.
2. Where the Commissioner of Patents has held in an interference that
the application of one of the parties does not constitute a construc-
tive reduction to practice because the applicant has made material
changes in it after execution, and awards priority of invention to
the other party, this court has no power, on appeal, to permit the
applicant to strike out such new matter, and restore the application
to the condition in which it was when the applicant executed it.
Lindstrom v. Ames, 365.
3. Where all of the tribunals of the Patent Office concur on questions of
fact in an interference case, this court is not disposed to disturb their
conclusions on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of
Patents, unless error is clearly apparent. McIntire v. Perry, 372.
4. Although on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Pat-
ents, rejecting some of an applicant's claims, this court may be of
opinion that the invention of the appellant is not patentable, the
court can do no more than affirm the decision, having no right to
disturb the allowed claims. To reverse the decision would be to
enlarge the error of the Patent Office. (Distinguishing Re Luten, 32
App. D. C. 599.) In re Luten, 379.
5. In the exercise of his functions, the decisions of the Commissioner of
Patents in the matter of applications for patents and interferences
between applicants affect private as well as public interests. In such
decisions, he exercises a function judicial in its nature, and for that
reason statutes authorizing appeal therefrom to the courts are with-
in the power of Congress. (Citing United States ex rel. Bernardin
v. Seymour, 10 App. D. C. 294.) In re Mattuluth, 410.
6. The act of Congress of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 866, chap. 435),
amending sec. 1 of the act of Congress of July 20, 1892 (27 Stat.
at L. 252, chap. 209, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 706), and allowing
appeals and writs of error from United States courts to circuit
courts of appeal to be prosecuted in forma pauperis upon certain
conditions therein prescribed, does not apply to an appeal to this
court from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an inter-
ference proceeding; and a motion to so prosecute such an appeal
will be denied. (Citing McGrane v. McCann, 2 App. D. C. 221.)
Id.
7. The action of the appellant in a patent appeal, condemned as an abuse
of the privilege accorded him, where, after obtaining leave to file a
supplemental brief for the purpose of further elucidating the one
question involved on the appeal, he devoted a considerable portion
of the brief to a criticism of the Patent Office. In re Tallmadge,
590.
8. Concurrent, adverse decisions of the Patent Office impose a serious bur-
den upon the losing party on an appeal by him to this court.
Ruping v. Lowry, 311.
II. ABANDONMENT AND CONCEALMENT.
9. An inventor who designedly, and with a view to applying his invention
indefinitely and exclusively to his own use and profit, withholds it
from the public, does not come within the protection and policy of
the patent laws. Dieckmann v. Brune, 399.
10. The object of the patent laws is to secure to the inventor the full rewards
of his invention; and he is not limited to the use of one specific
substance, but his patent covers all known equivalents. In re Ellis,
203.
11. In compositions of matter, substances which, at the granting of the
patent, were known as capable of serving the same purpose in the
composition as the ingredients actually employed, become thereby
their chemical equivalents; but the specifications and claims must be
broad enough to cover them. Id.
12. The claims of a patent must be construed in the light of its specifica-
tions and drawings, and may be limited, but not enlarged, by them.
Id.
13. The range of equivalents depends upon the nature and extent of the
invention. If it be broad and primary, the range of equivalents will
be likewise broad; if it be but an improvement over the prior art,
the range of equivalents will be correspondingly restricted. Id.
14. Where there is a serious doubt left in the mind of this court, such
doubt should be resolved in favor of the applicant for a patent; be-
cause, if his application be denied, he is not in a position to go into
court and attempt to enforce a lawful monopoly. (Following Re
Schraubstadter, 26 App. D. C. 331.) Id.
15. A patentee is not obliged in his specifications to state all the known
equivalents of the materials used by him. Id.
16. On an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents rejecting
certain claims in an application for a patent for finish removers, it
was held, reversing such decision, that the expression "a liquid finish
solvent, ketonic derivative of a cyclic CH, hydrocarbon," used in the
appealed claims, meant only such ingredients as were the known
equivalents of those specified in appellant's application, or which
could be ascertained to be such by those skilled in the art without
the exercise of invention; and that, in view of the fact that no other
phraseology could be employed to accord to appellant the protection
to which he was entitled; that the substances embraced in the class
claimed were generally capable of accomplishing the purpose of the
invention; and that the claims must be construed in the light of the
specification, and, if necessary, be limited by it, the claims should
be allowed. Id.
17. Where an application for a patent for a finish remover covered a compo-
sition having acetone as one of its ingredients, without referring to
any equivalent for it, and five years after the filing of the appli-
cation, during which time the finish-removing art had been extensive-
ly developed, the applicants presented claims substituting ketones
generally for acetone, it was held that such claims were properly
rejected by the Commissioner, beyond the original disclosures
of the applicants. (Distinguishing Re Ellis, ante, 203.)
In re
Dosselman, 211.
18. There is nothing patentably novel in locating a series of shelves above
a linotype machine in order that the position of the magazines of
the machine may be interchanged, where no mechanical means for
so doing are suggested. In re Scharf, 339.
19. A claim for the combination of means in a linotype machine to sustain
"a magazine in operative position upon the machine, and storage
means for an idle magazine directly above the machine, whereby
the positions of the operative magazine and the idle magazine may
be interchanged by the operator without necessitating his leaving
the machine," is anticipated by a patent in which the same elements
are disclosed, but the storage device is located at one side of, in-
stead of above, the main frame of the machine. Id.
20. The claims of an application for a patent for an improvement in window
sashes held to be anticipated by patents theretofore issued. In re
Worst, 341.
21. A decision of the Commissioner of Patents rejecting certain general and
comprehensive claims in an application for a patent for improve-
ments in cutting and folding machines for printing presses, affirmed.
In re Cottrell, 370.
22. That the entire process for which a patent is sought is not anticipated
in any single reference is unimportant. It is sufficient to justify a
rejection of the application if the successive steps of the process be
found in different patents. (Following Re Mond, 16 App. D. C.
351; Re Droop, 30 App. D. C. 334; and Re Faber, 31 App. D. C.
531.) In re Harris, 374.
23. If, in an application for a patent for a process for preparing, storing,
and dispensing beverages (for the apparatus for carrying out which
process the applicant has been granted a patent), each step of the
process covered by its own claims is complete in itself and inde-
pendent of the other, the claims covering the successive steps are
in the nature of an aggregation of unrelated functions performed by
the applicant's apparatus, even though the beverage produced by
the process may be a beverage superior to others; and such claims
are not allowable if the several steps of the process are found in
different patents, although the entire process is not anticipated in
any single reference. Id.
24. To adjust a connected rod to re-enforce the points of greatest tension
in an arched concrete structure is not patentable novelty, but
amounts merely to putting together, by the exercise of the simplest
mechanical skill, things old in the art, to perform functions long
known, in a manner anticipated by other patents. In re Luten,
379.
25. To constitute a new and useful art, a process must be capable of produc-
ing a beneficial result without the aid of any particular mechanism,
for, where a process is simply the function or operative effect of a
machine, it is not an invention, but at most is the result of one.
(Following Re White, 31 App. D. C. 607.) In re Tallmadge, 590.
26. The placing of a debit and credit sheet in such a position that the debit
and credit entry can be made at the same time by a single operating
device does not constitute an inventive idea so as to entitle a person
conceiving the idea to a process patent, as distinct from a patent for
a machine for achieving such a result. Id.
27. A patentee cannot, in a reissue application, so broaden his claims as to
include an invention made subsequent to the grant of his patent.
Manly v. Williams, 194.
28. The representation of the conception of an idea by means of drawings
is not such an embodiment into practical and useful form as will
negative novelty. DeKando v. Armstrong, 314.
29. Mandamus on the relation an applicant for patent who had three
times unsuccessfully attempted to amend his claims, against the
Commissioner of Patents, to compel the latter to re-examine the
application after a final rejection, on the ground that the last claim
rejected differed in substance from the last preceding one so as to
constitute a new claim upon which the applicant was entitled to a
re-examination after rejection,-will not lie where the claims in
question are so nearly alike in their phraseology as to call for the
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