does not come within the last proviso of the fifth section. The appellants never could acquire such property right in the coat-of-arms of Maryland, or any simulation thereof, against the State of Maryland.

Reference is also made by the Examiner to the decisions of the Commissioner in the cases of ex parte Alart and McGuire, (C. D., 1907, 409; 131 O. G., 2145,) in which registration is refused of a mark containing "Guaranteed under the Food and Drugs Act, June 30, 1906," and ex parte United States Sanitary Manufacturing Company, (C. D., 1908, 230; 137 O. G., 227,) in which registration of the letters "U. S." was refused. The ground of rejection in such case was that the mark claimed would tend to make the public believe that the goods upon which the mark was used had received the official approval of the United States Government. In the case of ex parte Sieber & Trussell Manufacturing Company, (C. D., 1909, 145; 145 O. G., 1249,) in which the registration of the word "Government' is refused upon the same ground, the Commissioner said:

Section 28 of the Trade-Mark Act requires that notice be given to the public that a trade-mark is registered either by affixing thereon the words "Registered in U. S. Patent Office" or an abbreviation thereof. The association of the words constituting this notice, together with the word " Government," on the mark would be apt to mislead the public into the belief that not only is the mark registered in the United States Patent Office, but that the goods have received the approval of the Government.

In the brief filed on behalf of the appellant the reasons for the adoption of the word "Copyright " as a trade-mark by The Blish Milling Company are stated as follows:

Prior to 1883 the predecessors in business of the applicant manufactured flour under the old bur process. About this time the modern method of making flour by rolls came into use. Flour made by rolls was called "Patent Flour" to distinguish it from the flour made under the old bur process, and all rollermills began marking their flour with the word “Patent," for example-“ Doe's Patent," "Roe's Patent," "Blish's Patent," etc. About this time the predecessors in business of the applicant conceived the idea of using the word "Copyright" as something novel and uncommon, and being a change from the word "Patent," which was universally used by other manufacturers of flour.

The appellant has called attention to the fact that in the case of Taft v. Stevens Lithographing & Engraving Co., (38 Fed. Rep., 28,) in a suit for penalty for inserting a false notice of copyright, it is asserted that the penalty is not recoverable for placing the notice on an article that cannot be copyrighted. In that case the Court said: The law is designed to guard against deception and no one is deceived when the word " Copyright" is placed upon an article that cannot be copyrighted, such as a kitchen-stove, etc.

While the appellant denies any intention upon the part of his predecessors in the business to deceive or defraud the public in the selection and use of the word "Copyright" for a trade-mark for

flour, it is quite obvious that the term was adopted to obtain whatever mystical influence might be carried by a word used to designate articles protected by the United States Government.

The appellant apparently recognizing the force of the Examiner's objection, states in his brief:

While it may be possible that no one should be permitted to register the word Copyright" as a technical trade-mark, it is believed that if this word is used upon goods which are not the subject of copyright for a sufficient length of time to enable the applicant to make the affidavit under the ten-year proviso, that registration should be permitted as a matter of course.

The force of this argument is not at all conclusive, for it is manifest that if the term "Copyright" is not capable of being exclusively appropriated by the applicant, and especially if its use would have a tendency to deceive purchasers in the belief that the merchandise was subject to Government protection, the exclusive use of the term as a trade-mark for ten years could not confer the right of registration upon it. It must therefore be concluded that the word "Copyright is prohibited registration as a trade-mark under the ruling of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, in re Cahn, Belt & Company, supra.

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It is also held that registration of this trade-mark should not be allowed for the reason that the use of this word, together with 'Registered in the United States Patent Office" or "Reg. U. S. Pat. Off.," would be likely to convey to the mind of the purchasing public the fact that the merchandise upon which this mark is used had received the official approval of the United States Government.

Finally, it may be stated that the registration of the word "Copyright" as a trade-mark would place in the hands of the registrant means by which he could prevent, or at least harass, registrants of labels. Under the Copyright Acts of 1874 and of 1909 labels are registered in the United States Patent Office. In order to maintain suit under the Copyright Acts, it is required that notice of copyright of a label shall be given by the use of the word "Copyright," the date of the copyright, and the name of the owner printed upon such label. It it obvious, therefore, that if other parties have copyrighted fanciful labels used in connection with flour and have placed upon such labels the required copyright notice they might at least be charged with infringing the applicant's trade-mark and possibly put to the expense of a suit in defense of their legal rights.

For each of the reasons above given it is held that the action of the Examiner of Trade-Marks refusing to register the word "Copyright" as a trade-mark for flour was right.

This decision is accordingly affimed.

EX PARTE ACKER, MERRALL & CONDIT COMPANY.

Decided March 28, 1911.

165 O. G., 473.

TRADE-MARKS-" CELTIC "-NOT GEOGRAPHICAL.

The word "Celtic" used as a trade-mark for tea Held not geographical and to constitute a registrable trade-mark.

ON APPEAL.

TRADE-MARK FOR BLENDED TEA.

Messrs. Wise & Lichtenstein for the applicant.

MOORE, Commissioner:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Examiner of TradeMarks refusing registration of the word "Celtic" as a trade-mark for tea.

Registration was refused on the ground that the word is geographical in significance and descriptive as applied to tea. In support of his conclusion that the word is geographical he cites cases in which "Nubia," "Roman," "Santosa," "Grecian," and "Orient " have severally been held geographical and unregistrable under section 5 of the Trade-Mark Act.

Of these the words "Nubia " and " Orient " seem to bear the closest analogy to the mark which applicant seeks to register in that they do not signify any definite political division. These words, however, are believed to be clearly distinguishable in character from the word "Celtic." "Nubia " is well understood to refer to a region south of Egypt and bordering on the Red Sea. The word "Orient" is commonly understood to refer to that region including Turkey, Persia, Egypt, India, etc. Both of these words therefore clearly refer to particular sections of the globe. This is not true of the word "Celtic." The Examiner of Trade-Marks has stated that the word "Celtic" refers particularly to Ireland; but there seems to be no authority to sustain this view. The word "Celtic" is defined in the dictionaries "as pertaining to the Celts or their language," and the word "Celt" is defined in the Century Dictionary as follows:

A member of one of the peoples speaking languages akin to those of Wales, Ireland, the Highlands of Scotland, and Brittany, and constituting a branch or principal division of the Indo-European family. Formerly these people occupied, partly or wholly, France, Spain, northern Italy, the western parts of Germany, and the British Islands. Of the remaining Celtic languages and peoples there are two chief divisions, viz., the Gadhelic, comprising the Highlanders of Scotland, the Irish, and the Manx, and the Cymric, comprising the Welsh and Bretons.

The word therefore appears to relate to a race or tribe of people of migratory habits or to the language of such people. So far as appears it has never been applied to a geographical division of the earth, political or otherwise.

The objection that the word is descriptive as applied to tea is based upon the holding that the word is geographical in significance, as appears from the following statement in the Examiner's answer to this appeal:

It is further pointed out on the label that applicant's tea is blended according to an original Irish formula by Irish experts. This word, therefore, is also used descriptively; it indicates a tea blended in Ireland or by an Irish expert. This objection therefore falls with that above discussed.

I am unable to conclude that the word is either geographical or descriptive of the goods within the meaning of the Trade-Mark Act. The decision of the Examiner of Trade-Marks is reversed.

EX PARTE FORTUNA AND MAGRO.

Decided February 10, 1911.

165 O. G., 473.

1. TRADE-MARKS-SIMILARITY.

A mark consisting of an ornamental panel having in the center thereof the representation of a lion surrounded by a smaller ornamented panel and having the words "Lion Brand" and "Illeone," respectively, above and below it Held properly refused registration in view of the prior registration of a mark consisting of the representation of a lion rampant upon a shield surrounded by a circle and the words "Puritas et Cura S. S. P. & Co."

2. SAME GOODS OF THE SAME DESCRIPTIVE PROPERTIES.

Olive-oil and cotton-seed oil for culinary purposes Held to be goods of the same descriptive properties.

ON APPEAL.

TRADE-MARK FOR OLIVE-OIL.

Messrs. Alexander & Dowell for the applicants.

TENNANT, Assistant Commissioner:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Examiner of TradeMarks refusing to register applicants' mark on the ground that it so nearly resembles certain registered marks as to cause confusion in trade and tend to deceive the purchasing public.

A question as to the form of the statement has also been raised on this appeal, and to it reference will first be made. In response to a requirement of the Examiner that a description of the mark be

inserted in the statement a description thereof has been submitted and ordered to be entered after line 10. It appears from applicants' brief that he meant line 10 exclusive of the preamble "To all whom it may concern," thus bring the insertion at the end of the first paragraph. The Examiner has required that the description be inserted after the words "accompanying drawing" in the preceding line, and in order that the paragraph may then read grammatically when there inserted he has further recommended certain changes in the introductory clause of the description.

The Examiner's requirement relates to a formal matter which is properly reviewable upon petition rather than upon appeal, and then only after the requirement has been made final by the Examiner. It appears that in this instance applicants have not furnished the Examiner with the reasons for objecting to the requirement. Inasmuch, however, as the case is necessarily before me on another question and in view of the fact that this point has been discussed both in the Examiner's statement and the brief on behalf of applicants it will be disposed of in order to prevent unnecessary delay.

The only reason given by the Examiner for insisting upon the requirement is that it is customary to have the description follow the words "accompanying drawing" and that persons examining trademark certificates would not know where to look for the description of the mark if not invariably inserted at the same place. The place at which applicants request the insertion to be made is only one line from the point at which the Examiner desires it to be entered, and it is not apparent that any difficulty should be experienced in finding a description so inserted. Since the description is somewhat long, in this instance it appears that it is rather in the interests of clearness that it should occupy a separate sentence. The requirement of the Examiner on this point is therefore overruled.

The mark for which registration is sought consists of an ornamental panel with the representation of a lion in the center thereof, surrounded by a smaller ornamental panel with medallions at the corners, and the words "Lion Brand" and "Illeone," respectively, above and below the figure of the lion. The mark is applied to olive-oil.

The registered marks upon which the registration has been refused are those to Whitman Brothers, June 3, 1890, No. 17,988; Chaffard & Couderc, December 6, 1898, No. 32,201.

The mark of Chaffard & Couderc consists of the representation of a lion rampant upon a shield surrounded by a circle and the words. "Puritas et Cura S. S. P. & Co." This mark, like applicants', is applied to olive-oil. While applicants' mark, as shown on the drawing, presents a much more elaborate appearance, it cannot be doubted that the predominating feature is the figure of the lion. Further