storing what one has received from another,—or shall we say, that it is possible to do the very same things at one time justly and at another unjustly? My meaning is somewhat as follows: Every one would probably be of opinion, that if a man received arms from a friend in sound mind, and that person should demand them back when mad, it would not be proper to restore such articles, nor would the restorer be just; nor again, [would he] who, to a man so situated, should willingly tell the whole truth. Right, replied he. This, then, is not the definition of justice, [namely,] to speak the truth, and restore what one has received. Of course it is, Socrates, replied Polemarchus taking up the subject, if at least we are to believe Simonides. However that be, said Cephalus, I leave this conversation to you; for I must now go to attend to the sacred rites.† Well then, is not Polemarchus, said I, the heir of your [argument?] Certainly, replied he, smiling, and went off to the sacred rites. CHAP. VI.—Tell me, then, said I, you who are heir in the conversation, what is it, that you affirm Simonides to have correctly alleged about justice? That to restore to each his due, is just, replied he: in saying this, he seems, to me at least, to speak correctly. Aye, indeed, said I, we cannot easily discredit Simonides; for he is a wise and divine man-but as to his meaning in this passage, you, Polemarchus, are probably acquainted with it, but I am not; for it is plain he does not mean what we were saying just now,-that, when one has deposited any thing with us, we should return it to him, even if he demand it in his insanity: and yet the thing deposited is in some sense due, is it not? It is. At least, then, [you will grant] it must on no account whatever be restored, when a man asks for it in his insanity? True, replied he. Simonides then, it would seem, has some other meaning than this, in saying that to deliver up what is due, is just? Yes, one quite different, replied he: for he is of opinion, that friends ought to do their friends good-not ill. 1 understand, said I;-that man does not give back what is due, who restores money deposited with him, if the repayment and receipt be really hurtful, and the receiver and restorer be * Comp. Cicero de Off. iii. 25. + Cicero very elegantly refers to this passage in his Epistles to Atticus, iv. 16. friends-is not this what you allege Simonides to say ? Surely. What then?are we to give our enemies, also, what may chance to be their due? By all means, said he, what is really due to them; and from an enemy to an enemy, there is due, I imagine, what is fitting too,-namely some evil. CHAP. VII.-Simonides, then, it would seem, replied I, defined the nature of justice somewhat enigmatically, and after the manner of the poets; for it seems he had a notion, that justice consists in giving every one what was expedient for him; and this he called his due. But what is your opinion? said he. By Zeus, replied I, if any one then should ask him thus,-Simonides, what is the art, which, dispensing to certain persons something fitting and due, is called medicine, what, think you, would he answer us? That art, surely, replied he, which dispenses drugs to the body, and also meats and drinks. And what is the art, which, dispensing to certain things something fitting and due, is called cookery? The art which gives seasonings to victuals. Granted. What then, is that art, which may be called justice, as dispensing to certain persons something fitting and due? If we ought to be at all directed, Socrates, by what has been said above, [it is] the art which dispenses good offices to friends, and injuries to enemies. To do good, then, to friends, and ill to enemies, he calls justice? It seems so. Who then can best serve his friends, when they are sick, and most ill to his enemies, as either in sickness or health? A physician. And who to those at sea, as respects danger on the sea? A pilot. But what as to the just man? In what business, and with respect to what action, can he most serve his friends and harm his foes? In fighting in alliance with the one, and against the other, so far as I think. Just so; but at any rate, to those who are not sick, Polemarchus, the physician is useless? Aye. And the pilot, to those who do not sail? He is. And is the just man, in like manner, useless to those not engaged in war? This, at any rate, is not at all my opinion. Is justice, then, useful also in time of peace? Yes, useful, too. And so is agriculture, is it not? Yes. Towards the getting in of crops? Yes. And is not shoemaking useful too? Yes. Towards the possession of shoes, methinks you will say? Certainly. But what then? For the use or possession of what is it, that would you say justice were useful in time of peace? For contracts, Socrates! By these contracts do you mean copartnerships, or what else? Copartnerships, certainly. Well then; is the just man or the dice-player, a good and useful copartner for playing at dice? The dice-player. But, in the laying of tiles or stones, is the just man a more useful and a better partner than the builder? By no means. In what copartnership then, is the just man a better copartner than the harper, as the harper is better than the just man for touching the strings of a harp? In one about money, as I imagine. And yet perhaps, with regard to the use of money, Polemarchus, when it is necessary jointly to buy or sell a horse, then, I should think, the jockey is the better copartner, is he not? He would appear so. And with respect to a ship, the shipwright or pilot? It seems so. When is it, then, with respect to the joint application of money, that the just man is more useful than others? When it is to be deposited and be safe, Socrates! Do you not mean when there is no need to use it, but to leave it in deposit? Certainly. When money then, is useless, justice is still useful with regard to it? It seems likely. When, therefore, one wants to put by a pruning-hook, justice is useful, both for a community and for a particular person: but when one wants to use it, then the art of vine-dressing [is useful.] It seems so. You will say, likewise, that when a shield or a lyre is to be kept and not used, then justice is useful; but when they are to be used, then the arts of warfare and music? Of course. And with reference to all other things, when they are to be used, justice is useless; but when they are not to be used, it is useful? It seems so. CHAP. VIII. Justice, then, my friend, can be no very important matter, if it is useful only in respect of things not to be used. But let us consider this matter :-is not he who is the cleverest at striking in a fight, whether with the fists or some other way, the cleverest likewise, in self-defence? Certainly. And as to the person who is clever in warding off and escaping from a distemper, is he not very clever also in bringing it on? So I suppose. And he too the best guardian of a camp, who can steal the counsels, and the other operations of the enemy? Certainly. Of whatever, then, any one is a good guardian, of that likewise he is a clever thief. It seems so. If, therefore, the just man be clever in guarding money, he is clever likewise in stealing. So it would seem, said he, from this reasoning. The just man, then, has been shewn to be a sort of thief; and it is likely you have learned this from Homer; for he not only admires Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Ulysses, but says, that he was distinguished beyond all men for thievishness and swearing.* Justice, then, seems in your opinion as well as in that of Homer and Simonides, to be a sort of thieving carried on for the benefit of our friends on the one hand, and for the injury of our enemies on the other :-did not you say so? No, by Zeus, I did not ; nor, indeed, do I any longer know what I was saying-yet it is still my opinion, that justice benefits friends, but injures foes. But [tell me,] whether you pronounce such to be friends, as seem to be honest; or such merely as are so, though not seeming so;—and in the same way as to enemies? It is reasonable, said he, to love those whom one deems honest, and to hate those [one deems] wicked. But do not men fall into error on this point, so that many appear to them honest who are not so, and many the contrary? Yes, they do. To such as these, then, the good are enemies, and the bad friends? Certainly. But still is it, in that case, just for them to benefit the wicked, and hurt the good? So it seems. The good, moreover, are just, and incapable of doing any ill. True. According to your argument, then, is it just to do those harm, who do no harm [themselves?] By no means [think that,] Socrates, replied he; for that opinion seems to be vicious. With respect to the unjust, then, said I, is it right to injure these, but to do good to the just? This opinion seems fairer than the other. To many, then, it will occur [to think,] Polemarchus, that is, to as many as have formed wrong opinions of men, that they may justly hurt their friends (for they are wicked to them), and, on the other hand, benefit their enemies, inasmuch as they are good :—and thus we shall state the very reverse of what we alleged Simonides to say. That is precisely the case, said he :-but, let us change our definition; * Μητρὸς ἑῆς πατέρ ̓ ἐσθλὸν, ὃς ἀνθρώπους ἐκέκαστο His mother's noble sire, who all mankind In furtive arts and fraudful oaths excelled.-Cowper. : for we seem not to have rightly defined a friend and a foe. How were they defined, Polemarchus? That he who seems honest, is a friend. How then are we now to alter our definition, said I? That the person, replied he, who seems, and also is honest, is a friend; but that he who is apparently honest, but not really so, seems to be, yet is not [really] a friend the definition, too, respecting an enemy, exactly corresponds. The good man, according to this reasoning, will, it seems, be a friend; and the wicked man a foe? Yes. Do you bid us then make an addition to our former definition of justice, by saying that it is just to serve a friend and harm a foe :—and are we now to say, in addition to this, that it is just to serve a friend who is good, but to hurt an enemy who is bad? This last, said he, seems to me perfectly well expressed. CHAP. IX. Is it the just man's part, then, said I, to hurt any one mortal whatever? By all means, said he; the wicked at least, and his enemies, he ought certainly to injure. And horses, when hurt, do they become better or worse? Worse. Do they so, as regards the virtue of dogs or horses? That of horses. And, do not dogs, when hurt, become worse as regards the virtue of dogs, but not of horses? Necessarily so. As to men, then, friend, may we not likewise say, that when hurt, they become worse with reference to man's virtue? Certainly. But is not justice a human virtue? This too we must [allow.] It follows, then, friend, that those men who are hurt become more unjust? It seems so. Can musicians, then, by music, make men unmusical? Impossible.—Or horsemen, by horsemanship, make men unskilled in horsemanship? They cannot. Is it possible, either, that by justice the just [can make men] unjust; or in general that by virtue, the good can make men wicked? It is impossible. [Yes,] for it is not, methinks, the effect of heat to make cold, but [the effect] of its contrary? Yes. Nor of drought to make moist, but that of its contrary? Certainly. Neither is it the part of a good man to hurt, but that of his contrary? It appears so. But, at any rate, the just is good? Certainly. Neither, then, is it the part of a just man, Polemarchus, to hurt either friend or any other, but [that] of his contrary, the unjust man. In all respects, Socrates, said he, you seem to reason truly. then, any one affirms it just to give every one his due, and consequently thinks this within himself, that injury is due If, |