Ivice instead of virtue? How could they? said he; for perhaps you mean blindness instead of sight. Whatever, said I, be their virtue, that I mean,-for I do not yet enter on this question; but, whether by their own proper virtue they will perform their own proper work well, whatever they undertake; and by vice, badly? In this, at least, said he, you speak the truth. And will not the ears also, when deprived of their virtue, perform their work ill? Certainly. And, are we to settle all other things by the same reasoning? So I suppose. Come then, after this, consider what follows: has the soul a certain work, which you can perform by no other living thing, such as this, to take care, to govern, to consult, and all such [acts?] Is there any other than the soul, to which we can justly ascribe them, and say they are its proper functions? No other. But what of this?-To live; shall we say it is the work of the soul? Most assuredly, said he. Do not we say, then, that there is some virtue, also, peculiar to the soul? We do. And can the soul, then, Thrasymachus, ever perform its own works cleverly, whilst deprived of its proper virtue ;-or, is this impossible? Impossible. Of necessity, then, a bad soul must govern and take care of things badly, and a good soul perform all these things well? Necessarily so. Did we not then agree, that justice was the virtue of the soul, and injustice its vice? We did so agree. The just soul, then, and the just man, will live well, and .the unjust ill? It appears so, said he, according to your reasoning. Surely, then, he who lives well is both blessed and happy; and he who does not, the opposite? How not? The just, then, is happy, and the unjust miserable? Granted, said he. But at any rate, it is not advantageous to be miserable, but happy? How not? In that case, excellent Thrasymachus, injustice is never more profitable than justice. Well, now, Socrates, said he, you have been capitally well feasted at these Bendideia. Aye, by you, Thrasymachus, I certainly have; for you are grown quite mild, and have ceased to be troublesome :-and if I have not feasted handsomely, it is owing to myself, not you. But just as greedy guests, ever gloating on what is fresh brought before them, taste thereof, without having properly enjoyed what went before,so I, methinks, without having first ascertained what we were before investigating,-namely the nature of justice, have omit

ted this, and rushed eagerly forward to inquire concerning it, whether it be vice and ignorance, or wisdom and virtue ;—and when an assertion was afterwards introduced, that injustice is more profitable than justice, I could not refrain from coming to this, from the other; so that now, from this conversation, I have learnt nothing at all;-for since I do not know what justice is, I can scarcely know whether it be a virtue or not, -and whether he who possesses it be unhappy or happy.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

A

BOOK II.

ARGUMENT.

In the second book he illustrates justice by a pretty long discourse about injustice, its contrary, and the social evils thence arising. From such a comprehensive view of society itself he is not unnaturally led into his main argument, the subject of civil government; carefully distinguishing between the head and the members-the governors and the governed;. but also bearing in mind that society is the stage on which alone the virtues of the just man can be seen in perfection. The governors, says he, should be spirited and shrewd, so as to be able both to repel the violence of the state's enemies, and severely to punish wicked citizens, as well as peaceably to maintain their own subjects or dependants under the law's protection, and to appoint proper rewards for virtuous and deserving actions. The principal study then should, as respects a state, be devoted jointly to music and gymnastics—the former referring to mental, the other to bodily training; but above all these he places religion, which though he does not statedly define it, yet he proves to be wholly distinct from the superstition of his own time.

CHAP. I. Having said these things, I thought to have been relieved from the debate; but this it seems was only the introduction; for Glaucon is on all occasions most courageous, and then especially did not approve of Thrasymachus's withdrawal from the debate, but said;-Socrates, have you any desire of seeming to have persuaded us, or to succeed in really persuading us that it is in every respect better to be just than unjust? I, for my part, said I, would prefer to do so in reality, if it depended on me. You are not doing then, said he, what you desire: for, tell me, does there appear to you any good of this kind, such as we would accept as a possession, without regard to its results, but embracing it [simply] for its own sake; such as joy and all kinds of harmless pleasures,* though for the future no other advantage springs from them

* åßλaßeis means not only harmless pleasures, but those which are pure and unalloyed with pain. We may remark here, that he divides goods (rà ayala) into three classes,-one, to be pursued for its own sake only, without reference to advantage.-another, which is to be loved both

than the delight arising from their possession. To me, indeed, said I, there does seem to be something of this kind. But what ;—is there not some species of good which we both love for its own sake, and also for what springs from it,-as wisdom, sight, and health ?—for such goods we surely embrace on both accounts. Yes, said I. But do you see, said he, a third species of good,-among which are bodily exercise, being healed when sick, the practice of medicine, or any other lucrative employment ?-for these things, we should say, are laborious, yet beneficial to us, and we should not choose them for their own sake, but on account of the rewards and other advantages that spring from them. There is, indeed, said I, this third species also: but what then? In which of these species, said he, do you place justice? I think, indeed, said I, in the most beautiful,—as being a good, which, both on its own account and for what springs from it, is desired by a man bent on being happy. It does not seem so, however, said he, to the multitude, but rather to be of that laborious kind which is pursued on account of rewards and honours [gained] through high repute, but on its own account to be shunned, as fraught with trouble.

CHAP. II.—I am aware, said I, that it seems so; and it was in this view, that it was some time since condemned by Thrasymachus, but injustice praised :-it seems, however, that I am one of those who are dull in learning. Come now, said he, listen to me too, if you please; for Thrasymachus seems to me to have been charmed by you just like a snake,* more quickly than he ought; while, with respect to myself, the proof has not yet been made to my satisfaction in either case, for I desire to hear what each is, and what intrinsic power it has by itself, when residing in the soul,— letting alone the rewards and what springs from them.

for its own sake, and for the advantages thence accruing,-and a third, which of itself perhaps is not worthy to be pursued, but only on account of the advantages thence accruing. In the second or mixed class Socrates places justice.

* Thrasymachus is here, on account of his passionate violence and uncouth manners, aptly compared to a snake, which, as the ancients believed, could be softened and subdued by music:-and we note particularly the elegant use of the verb кŋλɛïv, which primarily signifies to charm, sooth, subdue, and then generally, to soften by persuasion or argument.

I will proceed, in this manner, therefore, if it be your pleasure. I will take up Thrasymachus's argument in another shape; and, first of all, I will tell you what they say justice is, and whence it arises, and, secondly, that all who cultivate it, cultivate it unwillingly, as necessary, but not as good, and thirdly, that they do this with reason, inasmuch as, according to their notion, the life of an unjust man is much better than that of one that is just. Though, for my own part, Socrates, it by no means appears so to me, still I am thrown into a state of doubt, from having my ears stunned by hearing Thrasymachus and innumerable others.-But as for the statement respecting justice, that it is better than injustice, I have never yet heard it explained as I wish. I wish, therefore, to hear it eulogized on its own account, and am quite of opinion that I shall hear it from you: wherefore, by way of opposition,* I shall speak in praise of an unjust life, and in so speaking will show you in what manner I want to hear you in turn condemn injustice and commend justice. But see if my proposal be agreeable to you. Quite so, said I; for about what would any man of intellect delight more frequently to speak and hear? You speak excellently well, said he:—and now, as to what I said I would first speak about, listen, both what justice is and whence it springs.

They say, forsooth, that to do injustice is naturally good, and to suffer injustice bad, but that suffering injustice is attended with greater evil than doing injustice with good; so that, when men do each other injustice, and likewise suffer it, and have a taste of both, it seems advantageous for those, who are not able to avoid the one and choose the other, to agree among themselves neither to act unjustly nor yet to be treated so; and also, that hence they began to form for themselves laws and compacts, and to call what is enjoined by law lawful and just.—This, then, is the origin and essence of justice,—a medium between what is best, namely, when a man acts unjustly with impunity, and what is worst, that is, when one injured is unable to obtain redress ;—and this justice being half-way between both these, is desired, not as

* Respecting this use of the verb xararɛívεiv, comp. ch. ix. p. 367 b. p. 47 of this translation :-wç duvaμaι μáλioтa KaTaTεivas Xέyw. See also, Xen. Anab. ii. 5, s. 30, and Eurip. Hec. v. 132.