soul on the one hand, and on the other the perfectly good State, composed of many members in different classes, performing their respective functions. Justice, then, the principle, cause, and uniting bond of all the other virtues,-one, too, that is essentially of a political character—forms a very suitable discussion by way of introduction to this Dialogue. The refutation of incorrect or inadequate definitions of this virtue, occupies a large portion of the first Book ;-and Socrates (the hero of this, as of most other of the Platonic Dialogues), then proceeds, with the view of educing some abstract definition of justice, to explain his notion of a perfect State, as one in which all ranks of its members accurately fulfil their respective functions, dwelling together in harmony. Commencing with the consideration of Virtue, (which consists in the harmonious cultivation of the different intellectual and moral faculties,) he opens the inquiry with a kind of analysis of the human mind, which he divides into three parts,-first, the rational or reasoning principle, (rò λoyiσrikòv),—secondly, the spirit or will, (rò Ivμixòv or Ivμoɛdès),—and thirdly, the appetite or passion (rò ¿πiðvμntiкòv),*-which last, however, indicates nothing beyond that vital impulse which leads from one sensation to another. Of these faculties the most excellent is Reason, whose proper province is to direct and controul the other faculties; and of the operations of this faculty Plato forms several divisions (at the close of the sixth Book), according as the ideas are abstract, mixed, or material,-the vónous constituting the knowledge of pure ideas, the diavola that of mixed ideas, rioriS that of actually existing materials and their affections, and ɛikaσía the knowledge of the images or shadows of bodies,†-these divisions including-first, Torun (true science), and secondly, opinion true or false, (dóka). So much for Reason (rò λoyiotikòv). Ritter, ii. p. 363. + (Query-the science of forms?) Comp. Republ. vi. 509. e. Plato's system of Ideas (eïdn) consists, strictly speaking, of what we now term generalization and abstraction,-the main part of the definition real, and he seems to have constructed his theory as a mean between the Heraclitean doctrine of a perpetual flux, modified into the notion of Protagoras, пáνтшν μéтρоν avoρwπos, which set up yiyveolar instead of elva,) and the Eleatic doctrine that all is one, without multiplicity, change, augmentation, or decay He was convinced of the Now,-intermediate between Reason and Passion (rò ¿πivμηtikov) is the Will or Spirit, which should be an assistant to Reason (ἐπίκουρον ὄν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει) in the pursuit of virtue, and should oppose the indulgence of base desires,—all desires being legitimately under the controul of the Reason and the Will.* Furthermore, from the exercise and combination of these three faculties there are generated four principal or cardinal virtues :1. Prudence or Wisdom (ppovýois);-2. Courage or Fortitude (ávopɛía), by which Plato means the maintenance of right opinion as to what is and is not to be feared, (TEρi Tv dεivõv,) i. e. as to good and evil;t-3. Temperance or Self-controul (σwppoσúvn); ‡— and 4. Justice (dikaιoσúvn), which, with Plato, does not simply mean the virtue of rendering to all their due, but stands for that harmonious and proportional development of the inner man, by means of which each faculty of his soul performs its own functions without interfering with the others || (μὴ ἐάσαντα τἀλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῷ μήδε πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα). Just or virtuous actions, then, says he, consist in the performance of actions agreeable to the nature of the soul,§ whereas the contrary comprise such as are discordant to a right nature, and productive of mental disturbance and agitation. In the realization of this Justice, in short, consists Virtue itself, which Plato defines to be "a certain health and beauty and good habit of the soul," exercising the nobler parts of our nature in the contemplation of philosophy and more particularly the summum bonum (rò ȧyalóv), the practical realization of which should be the chief aim of the State constituted in the soul.¶ reality both of the permanent being or genus (ovoía) and of the mutable yéveσis of the phenomena :-the science that contemplates these general terms is called ή διαλεκτική-Dialectics. These ideas are recognized by the νόησις and διάνοιαnot by the senses; and as they belong to ovoía, they become the objects of true science or certain knowledge. Everything of this kind is an eldos, or general term, or quiddity. He thought, moreover, that there was a supreme standard IdeaGod-in which were comprised all other subordinate Ideas, and which contained nothing whatever capable of being apprehended by the senses. This is not exactly but nearly the view taken by Ritter, ii. 264-270. + Ib. iv. 429. b. c. Republ. iv. p. 441. a. § Ib. iv. 444. e. Ib. iii. 389. d. and iv. 430. d. e. Ib. ix. 591. e. The man, then, who studies to produce this harmony in the mental faculties, is truly consistent with himself,-truly entitled to the appellation—μουσικὸς and πολιτικός,—by which he means far more than is conveyed by the modern terms, musician and politician. So great, indeed, is the power and influence of virtue that, without it, there can be neither true happiness nor mental tranquillity,—all else of the nature of pleasure being mere shadow and inanity (okaypapnμévn tíç.)* Now, with respect to Pleasure, each mental faculty has its own peculiar species,-the highest as well as purest of all being exclusively enjoyed by the philosopher, through the exercise of wisdom;† and those who cultivate wisdom and virtue are to be deemed happy, even in the midst of misfortune, and when it has no probability of proper reward. It is to be cultivated, indeed, on its own intrinsic merits, without any regard for expediency-any hope of reward. At the same time, however, it is quite apparent that good men are praised, loved, and honoured, while the unjust are eventually exposed and punished; -nay, even by the Deity, good and just men are not neglected, for God loves and rewards those who practise virtue and seek to resemble Him. Independently of this, too, Plato derives another motive to virtue from the immortality of the soul,—viz., that, if we be not justly and adequately compensated in this life, we shall meet with perfect and unswerving justice, when arraigned before the judgment-seat of God. Having thus far explained Plato's notions respecting Man's character individually, and respecting the dignity and excellence of Virtue—and of Justice in particular-that union and consummation of all the other virtues,— -we now proceed to shew, how he applied these principles to the formation of his ideal and perfect Commonwealth (πoλerɛía), which he thought to be analogous to, *Republ. ix. 583. b. + The relation which, according to Plato, subsists between knowledge and pure pleasure, seems to be in general of the following nature.-In the gradual growth of the human consciousness, pleasure is necessarily combined with cognition,-so however, as that, at one time pleasure, at another cognition, is the dominant and determining element. In the former case, the pleasure is impure and immoderate while in the latter a pure pleasure arises, measured by the truth of Ideas. To avoid the former and pursue the latter, ought, therefore, to be the object of a truly intellectual life.-Ritter, ii. p. 398. and a sort of exhibition (rapadutyμa) of, a good and virtuous man. Some few incidental remarks occur on the formation of society for mutual aid and support; and he then proceeds to classify the members or parts of his ideal Republics. These he classes under three heads or divisions, corresponding with the faculties of the soul,-viz., 1. the ẞovλεurikov, (counsellors) those who employ reason in the contemplation of what best suits the State,—2. the ¿πiкovρiкòv,—those who aid the Bovλɛvrai with a ready will,-3. the xpnμariotikov, who are bent on gain and selfish gratification.* Reason alone is, according to Plato, entitled to and capacitated for the supreme government (just as reason is the monarch of the properly energising mind), to the total exclusion of the commonalty (xonμarioraí), who are totally unacquainted with wisdom or philosophy. The military class or executive, however, (Tò πikovρikóv), who are to be the active guardians (púλakes) of the State, he requires to be properly taught and disciplined, so that, while obeying the counsellors, they may protect the State from both internal and external danger. As these guardians, therefore, are necessarily to be chosen from the better class of the citizens, they should be of a philosophic turn, of an active will, and of a stern determination (piλóoopoɩ kai Ovμoridɛłg καὶ ταχεῖς καὶ ἰσχυροὶ τὴν φύσιν). As respects the training of the military class, that must be effected by a thorough discipline,-first, in Gymnastics, which includes every exercise and training of the body, whether patience under hardships, or endurance of hunger and thirst-cold or heat; and likewise dancing, all being practised not only to invigorate the body, but to strengthen the spirit and maintain the entire * In other words,-"There should be one part to correspond with the reason, to whom the sovereignty is to be entrusted,-a second, answering to spirit, is to assist the sovereign,-and lastly, a third part is made parallel to the appetite, and intended to supply the bodily wants of the community. These are the three social classes-the ruler, the warrior, and the craftsman. Each contributes a peculiar virtue to the general body: by its ruling class it becomes sagacious, bold by its warriors, and temperate by the obedience of the artizan to the orders of his ruler. From the due combination of these virtues in the whole community, results civil justice." This explanation, so happily expressed by Ritter, is fully authorised by the passages, lib. ii. 427. c.; 433. d. † Republ. ii. 376. c. man-the passions, in particular-in subjection to reason ;-and secondly, in Music,* which Plato held to comprise all imaginative art, the ordinary instruction in grammar, and also science itself, all of which contribute to elevate and enlarge the mind, protecting it, at the same time, from all that militates against virtue. More particularly, the púλakes must be kept free from all ambition and avarice, which are unquestionable obstacles to the proper performance of their civic functions. From these púλakes the chief rulers and counsellors of the State (Bovλevraí) are to be chosen; to be chosen, too, for their general fitness and estimation:-and those only should be placed in charge, who are endowed with high talent, and have all along maintained a life of virtue, superior to that of the other citizens. Furthermore, in the same way as human life can only attain to its highest happiness, under the guidance of reason conducting it to the highest good,— so also, a State can only attain to consummate virtue and prosperity, when its rulers apply themselves to the investigation of eternal truth and the contemplation of the highest good. Hence it is, that Plato says (v. 473. c.), the rulers must be philosophers, -not, indeed, necessarily occupied in subtle disputations on general subjects of investigation, but rather engaged in contemplating the eternal ideas of things-truth itself; and they must not only admire the beauty of virtue, but earnestly seek the individual cultivation of it, and teach it to others also + by the exhibition of its development in their own persons. Virtue, again, whether exercised by individuals or in com These accomplishments, however, he wished to restrain within due bounds, lest their simplicity should become luxurious, and lest they should become incentives to passion and vice. Poetry, in particular, he desires to restrain, dreading its evil influence on the moral habits;-and he almost wishes the expulsion of poets from his ideal State. He looks upon poetry, indeed, as a mere art of imitation, little better than mere illusion and childishness (x. 602. b. c.);-useful, perhaps, for education, but to be placed, for fear of abuse, under the strictest surveillance. † Virtue, according to Plato, in the Meno and Protagoras, may be learnt, so far as it rests on science, in the same sense as science itself is teachable,―i. e., originally and naturally it dwells potentially in the soul; and for the right attainment of virtue, nothing more is requisite than a fitting direction of the mind, leading man to contemplate the good through the medium of reflection and memory. |