Designing Incentive Regulation for the Telecommunications Industry
The American Enterprise Institute's Studies in Telecommunications Deregulation present new research on telecommunications policy, with particular emphasis on reforms of federal and state regulatory policies that will advance rather than inhibit innovation and consumer welfare.
AEI has commissioned more than twenty-five distinguished experts in law, economics, and engineering to write monographs on regulatory issues in telephony, cable television, broadcasting, information services, and other communications technologies.
The monographs are written and edited to be immediately useful to legislators, jurists, and public officials at all levels of government - as well as to business executives and consumers, who must live with these policies. As such, the monographs will also find a place in courses on regulated industries and communications policy in economics and communications departments and in business, law, and public policy schools.
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Introduction and Overview I
Todays Telecommunications Industry
The Monolithic Industry Structure Before Divestiture
The Industry Structure at Divestiture
Pricing in the Telecommunications Industry
Incentive Regulation and Competition
The Present State of Competition
Summary and Conclusion
Fostering Regulatory Commitment Powers
Competition Regulation and Deregulation
RBOC Entry Into InterLATA LongDistance Markets
Pitfalls in Measuring the Effects
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