the present case the reservation by West Virginia of concurrent jurisdiction did not operate to deprive the United States of the enjoyment of the property for the purposes for which it was acquired, and we are of the opinion that the reservation was applicable and effective."

It has been urged by the Attorney General of Virginia that prior to this decision it was thought there could be no consent under the Constitution other than an unqualified consent which carried with it exclusive jurisdiction and that this view influenced the interpretation placed upon section 355 R. S. However that may be, the view did not originate after the statute was enacted. As the Court pointed out, "the point was suggested by Justice Story in United States v. Cornell [1819], Fed. Cas. No. 14,867." The probable truth is that the Congress when choosing its language in 1841 thought consent would carry with it exclusive jurisdiction and that the interpretation thereafter placed upon the statute correctly reflected the legislative contemplation.

The provision has remained effective for nearly a hundred years, during which time the Congress has acquiesced in the interpretation placed upon it and, indeed, has reenacted it (act of June 28, 1930, c. 710, 46 Stat. 828) without change of language-which under ordinary circumstances, at least, is regarded as settling the question of interpretation. Swendig v. Washington Co., 265 U. S. 322, 331; United States v. Jackson, 280 U. S. 183, 193; 39 Op. A. G. 132 (Feb. 23, 1938). Furthermore, the matter may be affected by the principle noticed in Boston Sand Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 41, 48, that "if Congress has been accustomed to use a certain phase with a more limited meaning than might be attributed to it by common practice, it would be arbitrary to refuse to consider that fact when we come to interpret a statute."

There would appear to be little occasion to provide mandatorily for acquisition of jurisdiction as a condition of the expenditure of Federal funds if any cession of jurisdiction, howsoever qualified and conditioned, would suffice, although amounting perhaps to no more than an acquisition of the land without consent of the State and without express cession of jurisdiction.

For the foregoing reasons it is my opinion that the provisions of the Virginia statute do not meet the requirements of section 355 R. S.

Respectfully,

FRANK MURPHY.

MISSION POINT LIGHTHOUSE RESERVATION

The act of March 3, 1931, authorizing conveyance of the Mission Point Lighthouse Reservation to the State of Michigan is properly to be interpreted as authorizing conveyance only of land no longer required at that time; it does not authorize conveyance now of the portion then reserved.

The SECRETARY OF COMMERCE.

MAY 8, 1939.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letters of February 9 and May 1 in connection with the question of your authority under the act of March 3, 1931, c. 440, 46 Stat. 1510, to convey to the State of Michigan “the remaining portion of Mission Point Lighthouse Reservation, Mich., comprising 5.38 acres and dwelling reserved by the Government in the deed to the State dated February 15, 1932."

The statute is copied below:

"That the Secretary of Commerce is hereby authorized to dispose of to the State of Michigan the lighthouse reservations at Mission Point and Grand Traverse Point, in the State of Michigan, the same to be held by said State for public-park purposes, on such terms as he may determine and with such reservations and restrictions as may be necessary or proper for the maintenance and operation of lighthouses and Coast Guard station and for construction, maintenance, and use of such building or other property thereon as the needs of navigation may now or hereafter require; reserving also full and permanent right of ingress and egress to and from and travel upon lands which may thus be disposed of, for construction, maintenance, and operations of lighthouses, Coast Guard station, and of buildings and property in connection therewith: Provided, That should the State of Michigan fail to keep and hold said land for park

purposes title thereto shall revert to and be reinvested in the United States."

*

Your Solicitor states, in his opinion submitted by you, that in 1931 the Mission Point Lighthouse Reservation consisted of approximately 142 acres and that only a small part thereof was needed for lighthouse purposes. In reporting upon the bill which became the act of March 3, 1931, the House and Senate committees included a memorandum transmitted by the Acting Secretary of Commerce which stated that "portions of the reservations referred to are no longer required for lighthouse purposes" and that "the description of the properties it is proposed to transfer will be incorporated in the deeds of conveyance if the proposed legislation should become a law." (S. Rept. 1804, H. Rept. 2568, 71st Cong., 3d sess.) After enactment of the legislation all portions of the Mission Point Lighthouse Reservation except the 5.38 acres mentioned by you were conveyed to the State. The land reserved by the United States was used for lighthouse purposes until October 20, 1938, at which time the light was moved to a new site beyond the limits of the reservation.

I concur in the conclusion of your Solicitor that the act of March 3, 1931, is properly to be interpreted as authorizing conveyance only of land "no longer required" at the time it was enacted, and that the statute does not authorize conveyance now of the portion then reserved.

Respectfully,

FRANK MURPHY.

CITIZENSHIP OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

During many years foreign-born illegitimate children of American mothers have been permitted to enter the United States and in some classes of cases, at least, exclusion of such children is not only harsh but largely impracticable. It is not clear, however, that these children have acquired American citizenship and additional legislation is desirable.

The SECRETARY OF STATE.

MAY 10, 1939.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of April 19 requesting my opinion whether foreign-born illegitimate

children of American mothers may be regarded as American citizens.

You point out that during many years such children have been permitted to enter the United States, and I perceive the harshness that would follow any other course. Nevertheless, it has been held that the applicable statutory provisions apply only to legitimate children, and two Circuit Courts of Appeals have questioned the conclusion of Acting Attorney General Ames (32 Op. 162, 164) that such children acquire citizenship through their fathers if subsequently legitimated. Ng Suey Hi v. Weedin, 21 F. (2d) 801; Mason ex rel. Chin Suey v. Tillinghast, 26 F. (2d) 588. Also it appears to have been considered that prior to recent amendments women were incapable of transmitting citizenship to their children (38 Op. A. G. 10, 14).

For the foregoing reasons, and after careful consideration, I am constrained to concur in the conclusion of the Secretary of Labor, stated in her letter to you of March 15, that resort to the Congress for additional legislation is desirable-having in mind that in some classes of cases, at least, exclusion of the children is not only harsh, but largely impracticable. Respectfully,

FRANK MURPHY.

JURISDICTION REQUIRED FOR FEDERAL BUILDING SITES The West Virginia statute (W. Va. Code Ann., 1932, secs. 3 and 4) concerning the acquisition of land by the United States fails to meet the requirements of sec. 355 R. S.

The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

MAY 11, 1939.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of May 1 requesting my opinion whether the statute of West Virginia (W. Va. Code Ann., 1932, secs. 3 and 4) consenting to acquisitions of land by the United States complies with the requirements of section 355 R. S.

For the reasons set forth in my opinion to you of May 5, 1939, concerning the sufficiency of a statute of the State of

Virginia (39 Op. 285), it must be concluded that the West Virginia statute also fails to meet the requirements of section 355 R. S.

Respectfully,

FRANK MURPHY.

OHIO RIVER BASIN FLOOD CONTROL PROJECTS

The proviso in sec. 1, act of Aug. 28, 1937, authorizing a waiver of certain local cooperation requirements, applies only to the Ohio River Basin flood control projects authorized by that section. A proviso is usually intended to except something from the enacting clause, although sometimes used to introduce independent legislation.

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

MAY 20, 1939.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to your letter of April 6, 1939, requesting my opinion whether the provision in section 1 of the act of August 28, 1937, c. 877, 50 Stat. 876, 877, authorizing the President to waive, to the extent of 50 percent, the provisions of section 3 of the act of June 22, 1936, c. 688, 49 Stat. 1570, 1571, requiring local contributions of land for individual projects is applicable to all levee and flood-wall projects authorized in the Ohio River Basin or whether it is to be limited to the projects authorized by the act of August 28, 1937. I have also received your letter of May 3, 1939, enclosing a copy of the opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army upon the question.

Section 3 of the Flood Control Act of June 22, 1936, provides that thereafter no money appropriated under the authority of the act shall be expended on the construction of any project until States, political subdivisions thereof, or other responsible local agencies have given assurances satisfactory to the Secretary of War that they will (a) provide without cost to the United States all lands, easements, and rights-of-way necessary for the construction of the project, except as otherwise provided in the act; (b) hold and save the United States free from damages to the construction works; and (c) maintain and operate all the works after