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This question was passed upon by Attorney General Stone in an exhaustive opinion to the Secretary of the Treasury dated October 21, 1924 (34 Op. 311), holding that "the Comptroller General has no authority, express or implied, to review the collectors' liquidations of entries of imported merchandise and drawback entries." The opinion states in part:

"Various statutes have imposed certain duties upon the Secretary of the Treasury and upon the collectors of customs, which duties must be performed. It cannot be assumed that the powers conferred on the Comptroller General by the Budget and Accounting Act to settle claims by or against the United States; to prescribe forms, systems, and procedure of accounting; to investigate receipts and disbursements of public funds and report thereon; to require from the several executive departments information regarding the powers, duties, activities, financial transactions, and business methods of such departments, and the right to examine the books, documents, and records of such departments, for the purpose of securing this information, confers upon the Comptroller General the authority to review the acts and decisions of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Collectors of Customs in the performance of their statutory duties."

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I am in accord with the conclusion reached by Attorney General Stone. The statutes authorize and direct the collectors of customs, under the control and supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury, to make the determinations referred to in your submission, and expressly provide that subject to review by the courts their "decisions" shall "be final and conclusive upon all persons (including the United States and any officer thereof)." U. S. C., title 19, secs. 1514-1515. In my opinion, the judicial review thus provided for is exclusive.

I do not understand that the Comptroller General takes a contrary view. A copy of your letter was furnished him with a request for his views upon the question submitted; and in his reply dated June 11, 1940, he states in part:

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this office disclaims any purpose to make determination of either the weights, rates, or classifications of

imported commodities, on the basis of which customs revenue is assessed and collected or refunded."

Accordingly, your question is answered in the negative. Respectfully,

ROBERT H. JACKSON.

COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FEES

The Register of Copyrights should collect a renewal fee of $6.00 in cases involving commercial prints and labels subject to registration. under the act of July 31, 1939.

The PRESIDENT.

JULY 5, 1940.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to comply with your request of June 28 for my opinion concerning the renewal fee to be charged under the act of July 31, 1939, c. 396, 53 Stat. 1142, which transferred "jurisdiction over commercial prints and labels, for the purpose of copyright registration," from the Patent Office to the Copyright Office, effective July 1, 1940.

Section 3 of the act of June 18, 1874, c. 301, 18 Stat. 79 (U. S. C., title 17, sec. 63), which is repealed and superseded by the act of July 31, 1939, prescribed a registration fee of $6.00, with no provision for a different renewal fee; and this is also true of the later act. The Patent Office by regulation under the prior law prescribed the same fee for a renewal as for an original registration.

Section 61 of the act of March 4, 1909, c. 320, 35 Stat. 1087, as amended by section 1 of the act of May 23, 1928, c. 704, 45 Stat. 714 (U. S. C., title 17, sec. 61), prescribing original registration fees of $1.00 and $2.00, respectively, and a renewal fee of $1.00 in the classes of cases specifically covered by the statute did not, and does not, apply to copyrights of commercial prints and labels.

It is therefore my opinion that the Register of Copyrights should collect a renewal fee of $6.00 in cases involving commercial prints and labels subject to registration under the act of July 31, 1939.

Respectfully,

ROBERT H. JACKSON.

TRANSFER OF JURISDICTION, SAND ISLAND MILITARY

RESERVATION

The President has authority without further legislation to transfer jurisdiction over land comprising a part of the Sand Island Military Reservation, Hawaii, from the War Department to the Treasury Department.

Dictum to the contrary in 33 Op. 409 is not controlling.

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

JULY 18, 1940.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: By letter of May 23, 1940, your predecessor requested my opinion whether a certain tract of land (4.08 acres) comprising a part of the Sand Island Military Reservation, Territory of Hawaii, now under the jurisdiction of the War Department, may be transferred to the Treasury Department by Executive order, or whether legislation for such transfer is necessary.

Sand Island lies in Honolulu Harbor and was created upon submerged lands by the deposit of spoil resulting from dredging operations by the United States for the improvement and enlargement of the harbor.

Under the terms of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States, as contained in the joint resolution of the Congress approved July 7, 1898, 30 Stat. 750, all public lands and all other public property of the Hawaiian Government were ceded to the United States, and the cession expressly included harbors. It is understood that Honolulu Harbor passed to the United States by virtue of the cession and annexation. It appears that certain private persons claimed title to the submerged lands as well as lands forming Quarantine Island, and sought to establish their title thereto by an ejectment suit against the United States. This suit was settled by way of compromise under which the plaintiffs conveyed to the United States all their right, title, and interest in and to the lands involved in the suit. The conveyances made pursuant to the compromise agreement were in the nature of quit-claim deeds, and do not, of course, imply that the grantors had established any title in the property adverse to the United States. But whatever might have been the situation with respect to title prior to the suit and compromise, the

deeds executed by the plaintiffs gave the United States perfect title to the lands if it did not already have such title.

By section 91 of the act of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. 159, as amended by section 7 of the act of May 27, 1910, 36 Stat. 447, the Congress provided that the public property ceded and transferred to the United States under the joint resolution of annexation should remain in the possession and control of the Government of the Territory of Hawaii until otherwise provided by the Congress, "or taken for the uses and purposes of the United States by direction of the President or of the Governor of Hawaii."

By Executive Order No. 3358 of November 24, 1920, the President set aside certain lands on Sand Island (including the parcel here in question) and on Quarantine Island for military purposes. This order does not cite the authority for its issuance. However, in view of the circumstances above set out, it is probable that the order was issued under the theory that the lands set aside by it were a part of the public lands which belonged to the Hawaiian Government and which passed to the United States under the joint resolution of annexation, and that the President therefore had authority to reserve the lands for "purposes of the United States," including military purposes, under the above-quoted provisions of section 91 of the act of April 30, 1900, as amended. It was upon this theory, also, that the President issued Executive Order No. 6584 of February 6, 1934, which, in part, transferred certain lands within the Sand Island Military Reservation from the War Department to the Treasury Department and the Department of Commerce, respectively, for public purposes of the United States.

The authority of the President to set the land aside for military purposes by the Executive order of November 24, 1920, was recognized by the Congress in the act of January 31, 1922, c. 42, 42 Stat. 360. Your Judge Advocate General, in his opinion of May 22, 1940, states that "the purpose in setting aside these lands [by the Executive order of November 24, 1920] as a military reservation was in order that they would become available for exchange for other lands as soon as proposed enabling legislation to that end was

enacted," citing the opinions of the Judge Advocate General dated November 13, 1920, and September 13, 1921. This being true, the Congress must have had notice of the Executive order at the time the statute was enacted. (See also opinion of Acting Attorney General Seymour of January 16, 1923, 33 Op. 409.)

If the President had authority to set aside the land for military purposes-and that authority is not now questioned-it would seem that he is equally authorized to transfer it to the Treasury Department for a different public purpose (33 Op. 436; 37 Op. 417; id. 431). It is therefore my opinion that the proposed transfer may be effected by Executive order, and that legislation for such purpose is

unnecessary.

I am not unmindful of the fact that some language of the opinion of Acting Attorney General Seymour of January 16, 1923, would seem to suggest that the act of January 31, 1922, supra, was such a ratification of the Executive order of November 24, 1920, as to constitute a congressional dedication of the lands covered by it to military purposes. I am unable, however, to find any language in the act that supports such view. Furthermore, the statements made in this respect are mere dictum. The only question submitted for the decision of the Attorney General was whether the lands set aside by the Executive order of November 24, 1920, were included in the lands transferred to the Marine Hospital Service by section 97 of the act of April 30, 1900, supra. Obviously, the determination of that question did not require a determination of the question whether the Congress had dedicated the lands involved to military purposes, which latter question was not before the Attorney General for consideration.

Respectfully,

ROBERT H. JACKSON.

POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

The penalty for violation of section 9 of the Hatch Act is removal from office.

Whether there has been a violation is determinable by the head of the department or independent establishment concerned with making the removal.

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