Law and TruthOxford University Press, 1996 - 189 pages Taking up a single question--"What does it mean to say a proposition of law is true?"--this book advances a major new account of truth in law. Drawing upon the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, as well as more recent postmodern theory of the relationship between language, meaning, and the world, Patterson examines leading contemporary jurisprudential approaches to this question and finds them flawed in similar and previously unnoticed ways. He offers a powerful alternative account of legal justification, one in which linguistic practice--the use of forms of legal argument--holds the key to legal meaning. |
Contents
Realism AntiRealism and Legal Theory | 3 |
On the Immanent Rationality of Law | 22 |
Moral Realism and Truth in Law | 43 |
Legal Positivism | 59 |
The Case of Stanley Fish | 99 |
A Modal Account | 128 |
Postmodern Jurisprudence | 151 |
Afterword | 181 |
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Common terms and phrases
answer anti-realism anti-realist argues assertion assumptions beliefs Bobbitt Bork Brink claim coherence conception constitutional law conventions criticism debate decision distinction epistemology example fact Fish's formalist forms of argument G. E. M. Anscombe H. L. A. Hart Hart idea immanent intelligibility interpretive community judges judicial review juridical jurisprudence knowledge language law as integrity law is true lawyers legal argument Legal Formality legal positivism legal practice legal propositions legislative legitimacy linguistic Ludwig Wittgenstein matter meaning ment metaphysical modal conflict Moore Moore's moral moral realism natural kind normative notion object P. M. S. Hacker perspective philosophy position positivism positivist Posner postmodern principles problem propositions of law question reader reader-response realist reference relationship Richard Rorty Ronald Dworkin Rorty rule of recognition semantic sense sentence social Stanley Fish statute statutory interpretation supra note 43 things tion truth conditions truth of propositions understanding Weinrib Wittgenstein words