The Veil of Isis: A Series of Essays on IdealismHodges, Figgis, & Company, 1885 - 365 pages |
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Common terms and phrases
Absolute Idea Absolute Idealism admits anticipation argument atheism Bacon belief Berkeley Berkeley's causation ception cognition common sense conceived conception conclusion conscious Democritus demonstration deny Descartes Dieu doctrine dogmatic effect ence existence experience external objects external world fact faculty Fichte forms of sense Hamilton Hegel human Hume's hypothesis ibid idealist imagination immediate impression induction inference intuition Kant Kant's Kantian knowledge Kritik Leibnitz Locke Locke's Malebranche mental merely metaphysical mind natural instinct Natural Realism necessary connexion never notion organism origin Pantheism Parmenides perceived perception phenomena philo philosophy Plato possible Pre-established Harmony present principles produced Proleg propositions qualities question Rational Psychology reality reason regarded Reid Reid's rejected relation rience sceptic self-actualising sensation sensible ideas simple ideas soul space speculation spirit substance suppose synthetic a priori theory thought tion transcend transcendental ideality transcendental object true truth understanding universe words world of matter
Popular passages
Page 349 - For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult)! for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once.
Page 76 - We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body ? but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not ? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.
Page 74 - Here, then, is the only expedient from which we can hope for success in our philosophical researches : to leave the tedious, lingering method, which we have hitherto followed ; and, instead of taking, now and then, a castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or centre of these sciences, to human nature itself, which being once masters of, we may everywhere else hope for an easy victory.
Page 78 - Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows, that it is impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different. from ideas and impressions.
Page 363 - A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.
Page 106 - But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception...
Page 364 - That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish...
Page 5 - Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind...
Page 242 - ... philosophers. Common Sense is like Common Law. Each may be laid down as the general rule of decision ; but in the one case, it must be left to the jurist, in the other, to the philosopher, to ascertain what are the contents of the rule...
Page 48 - But with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?