rated the crisis by the impulse of his personal activity. After a tremendous fire from the batteries on the 20th, the breaches were declared practicable.

The danger to which Mons was reduced roused the French commander to make an attempt for its relief, or at least to interrupt the progress of the besiegers. Berwick, who was hastily recalled from Briançon, where he was stationed at the close of the campaign against the duke of Savoy, joined the main army under Boufflers on the 18th, near Quesnoy, and reconnoitred the allied camp; he found them posted with the left toward the Upper Trouille, and the right toward the Haine, their front covered by woods and marshes, and deemed the position too strong for him to risk the consequences of an attack.*

While, however, the French commanders were reconnoitring and performing manœuvres, as if they menaced an immediate attack, Mons was vigorously pushed, breaching batteries opened against the body of the place, and, to escape the effect of an immediate assault, the governor beat a parley, and surrendered with such marks of honour as the confederate generals allowed. Of the 3500 men, who originally composed the garrison, a great number were killed or wounded, and many of the Walloons joined the besiegers; only 1500 men took advantage of the capitulation, to be conducted to Namur and Maubeuge.

By the capture of Mons, and the other conquests on the Lys and the Dyle, the great towns in Brabant and Flanders, the protection of which had previously occasioned much trouble, were entirely covered. The frontiers of the Dutch and the adjacent provinces were also exempted from the burden of supplying encamping and foraging armies; and the French were at length circumscribed within their own limits, and reduced to the resources which they could draw from their own territories.

On the loss of Mons, the French troops were divided into two bodies. Berwick, with 50 battalions and 100 squadrons, took post to cover Maubeuge; and Boufflers, with the rest of the army, protected Valenciennes and Quesnoy, in order to prevent any new operation of the allies. Their precautions were, however, groundless. The heavy rains, the advanced season of the year, the losses of the campaign, and the sick* Mémoires de Berwick.

ness which was the consequence of the siege of Mons, prevented the allies from attacking Maubeuge, which Marlborough had much at heart. On the 26th the confederate generals moved from the camp before Mons, passed the Haine, and encamped at Thieusies, where they celebrated a solemn thanksgiving for the capture of Mons. They sepa rated on the 28th for winter quarters, the English marching to Ghent, the Danes to Bruges, the Prussians to the Meuse, and the remainder of the army to Brussels, Louvain, and the neighbouring towns of Brabant. Eugene and Marlborough repaired to Brussels, and from thence to the Hague, by different routes.*

During his continuance at the Hague, Marlborough, in concert with Eugene, made the necessary arrangements for the future campaign, and stimulated the Dutch to concur in the vigorous prosecution of the war. He likewise joined with the republic in representing to the states of the empire the necessity of furnishing their respective quotas, since they demanded, as the terms of peace, no less than the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, with Alsace and Franche Comté. He also obtained from Prince Eugene a solemn promise that his imperial master would join in pressing the states and princes of the empire punctually to fulfil their engagements. He arranged likewise the proper means for extinguishing the war in the north, or at least for preventing its extension into the empire, and affecting the interests of the grand alliance. Finally, he concerted with Eugene measures for despatching such a powerful reinforcement into Spain as would enable the confederates no longer to confine themselves to defensive warfare, but to undertake such operations as were likely to decide the fate of this protracted

contest.

CHAP. LXXXIV.-OPERATIONS ON THE RHINE.-1709. THE great effort of both powers being made in the Netherlands, the other parts of the theatre of war were of little importance.

*Correspondence.

Lediard. Vie de Marlborough.

History of Europe. Mémoires de Berwick. Brodrick, &c.

Complete

:

A grand project was indeed formed for a simultaneous invasion of France in two quarters where she was least provided with defence. We have already adverted to the plan concerted by the duke of Savoy, for penetrating into Dauphiné and the Lyonnois; and a co-operative invasion was projected in spring on the side of Germany, to enter Franche Comté, where the inhabitants, averse to the Bourbon government, were expected to rise in favour of their former masters, the Austrian sovereigns. The chiefs of the alliance likewise hoped to embarrass the French government, by fomenting an insurrection in the Cevennes, where the disaffected still maintained a clandestine correspondence with their refugee countrymen.

While the combined troops of the duke of Savoy and of the emperor were in motion towards Dauphiné, the elector of Hanover was to send a detachment from the army of the Upper Rhine, to make a rapid movement upon Alsace; and, before a sufficient body could be collected to oppose them, to push forward to Franche Comté, with the hope of establishing a communication with the army of Piedmont in the vicinity of Lyons.

Had this combined attack, which was planned with equal address and boldness, been successful, a fatal blow would have been given to the declining greatness of France. But many delays and obstacles occurred to delay the movements of the respective troops. Before the German army could assemble on the Rhine, a considerable force, under Marshal d'Harcourt, had been collected to defend the lines of Lauterburg, and to cover Alsace; and although he was prevented from undertaking offensive operations by the draughts which were detached to the Netherlands, he was in sufficient strength to impede the advance of the Germans under General Thungen, inferior in numbers, and unprovided with the requisites for opening the campaign.

During this suspense, the elector of Hanover made, as usual, numerous difficulties before he assumed the command; the want of money also delayed the necessary preparations, and it was not till the latter end of July that the expedition against Franche Comté marched from the army of the Rhine. Still, however, sanguine hopes of success were entertained; for while the elector amused Marshal d'Harcourt with a

feigned attack behind the lines of Lauterburg, Count Merci led 6000 chosen and gallant troops, by forced and secret marches, into the canton of Basle. Passing under the walls of the town, notwithstanding the neutrality of the Swiss, he burst into Alsace, which was destitute of troops, and intrenched himself at Rumersheim, near Neuburg on the Rhine, waiting for the junction of another body, which was advancing to his support. In this situation, being apprised of the approach of a corps, under the command of the Count de Bourg, which had been detached from the army of Marshal d'Harcourt, he formed the imprudent resolution of quitting his intrenchments to oppose them, deceived by the false intelligence that they were greatly inferior in numbers. In a desperate conflict he was totally defeated, and compelled to retrace his march behind the Rhine, with the loss of half his army. The clector, during the remainder of the season, continued inactive.

This defeat put an end to the projected invasion of Franche Comté; while the military operations on the side of Piedmont were rendered abortive by the increase of the fatal misunderstanding between the courts of Turin and Vienna.

In conformity with the project of invading France, Victor Amadeus made active preparations for opening the campaign, and the Austrian forces were assembled by Marshal Daun to serve under his command; but he refused to take the field until he had received the investiture of the Vigevenasco, which had been promised to him in the treaty of 1703, by the emperor Leopold. Unfortunately, he claimed the district of the Langhes, and nine villages, as dependencies of the Vigevenasco, which, being fiefs of the empire, afforded the court of Vienna a new pretext for withholding the investi

ture.

In the midst of these disputes, the king of France artfully endeavoured to increase the misunderstanding, by making overtures to the duke of Savoy, through his daughter, the queen of Spain, promising to him the most advantageous terms of accommodation. England and the States were naturally interested in preventing the schism in the alliance, which the defection of the duke of Savoy was likely to occasion. They therefore used the utmost exertions to induce the court of Vienna to comply with his demands;

but the only concession which they could obtain was a vague promise of fulfilling the treaty, and a consent that commissaries should be appointed, to repair to Milan for the arrangement of the investiture. But these commissaries, though hourly expected, never arriving, the duke ordered his minister to deliver a memorial on the 24th of June to the queen and the States, declaring his resolution not to assume the command until his claims were satisfied. He at the same time demanded the arrears due to him for the pay and maintenance of the Austrian troops in Piedmont, which the court of Vienna had not liquidated. To conciliate him, the queen and States guaranteed the payment of this debt; but their intercession at the court of Vienna failing of effect, the duke made private and stronger appeals to Marlborough, to use his influence over Prince Eugene and the imperial ministers. The powerful intercession of the British general was equally fruitless; and the referees delaying to make the award, Victor Amadeus sullenly remained at Turin, and gave the command of the army to Marshal Daun, notwithstanding the urgent entreaties of the maritime powers, that he would suppress his resentment for the advantage of the common

In consequence of these delays, the campaign was not opened till the middle of August, when, from the absence of the duke of Savoy, the movements were impeded by frequent altercations between the Piedmontese generals and Marshal Daun ; and even after he had burst into Savoy, and advanced towards Briançon, he found the enemy, under the duke of Berwick, so strongly posted, that he could not venture to force the passage into Dauphiné. At the same time receiving intelligence of Count Merci's defeat, he gained no farther advantage over the enemy than to drive them beyond the frontiers of Savoy, and to capture the small post of Annecy. After this trifling success, he repassed the Alps, marched into Piedmont, and closed the campaign at the latter end of September.

In the midst of these operations, Berwick sent a detach

* Letters from the duke of Savoy, Count Briançon, and General Palmes, to the Duke of Marlborough and Lord Sunderland; also from Mr. Chetwynd, the British agent at Turin, to the same, from January to August.