The above paragraph clearly distinguishes between the act and the rule. Senator Hatch then inserted in the Record a brief summary of the rules of the Civil Service Commission as applied to political activities of employees in the classified service. This summary reads in part as follows: "The pertinent language in section 9 is practically a duplication of the civil service rule prohibiting political activity of employees under the classified civil service. "The section provides in substance, among other things, that no such officer or employee shall take any active part in political management or in political campaigns. "The same language of the civil service rule has been construed as follows; * * * "7. Employees may express their opinions on all subjects, but they may not make political speeches" (id. 4542). Reference to "private" expression of opinions is significantly omitted. Thereafter, Senator Hatch read the exact words of the civil service rule into the Record (id. 4547-4548): "No person in the executive civil service shall use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the results thereof. Persons who by the provisions of these rules are in the competitive classified service, while retaining the right to vote as they please and to express privately their opinions on all political subjects, shall take no active part in political management or in political campaigns." But the Senator then added: "As I have so frequently said over and over again, that is almost the exact language of the pending bill and the exact langauge of the law that was passed," the reference to "the law" necessarily being to the original act, which as he had carefully pointed out, supra, did not prohibit public expressions of opinion. Then occurred the following: "Mr. BROWN. Let me interrupt the Senator. I ask the Senator if his substitute for section 15 relates to the interpretation of the rule? "Mr. HATCH. Yes. "Mr. BROWN. Does it say so? "Mr. HATCH. Yes; it says that the provisions of the act shall be deemed to prohibit the same activities on the part of the persons affected by it as the United States Civil Service Commission has heretofore determined are at the time of the passage of the act prohibited on the part of employees in the classified civil service, limiting it to that particular time. "Mr. BROWN. Then, Mr. President, we not only are writing the rule into the statute "Mr. HATCH. But we are writing into the statute the interpretation of it. "Mr. BROWN. But we are writing into the statute the interpretation of the Civil Service Commission. "Mr. HATCH. Yes, exactly." Senator Hatch also stated (4548) that he was "endeavoring to have all employees put under exactly the same rule." After section 15 had been agreed to (4558) the Senator on March 18 stated (4588): "Under the amendments which were made to the act permitting expression of opinion on all subjects, and eliminating the word 'privately,' I think the field was fully covered, and every needful protection given." While this occurred after section 15 had been adopted, it was before the final passage of the bill. Thereafter, on the same day the bill was passed (4593). It is clear that Senator Hatch, the author of the bill, did not intend through adoption of section 15 to put back into the statute the word "privately," which had been intentionally omitted. His reference to the fact that the Senate was writing into the statute the civil service rule and the interpretations of it was patently to the interpretations inserted in the Record, supra, 4537-4539. In stating that he was endeavoring to have all employees put under the same rule, it appears that he was speaking generally of the rules and interpretations of the Commission and not specifically of the part of Rule I now in question. The pertinent discussion in the House also indicates that the House understood that the bill broadened the privilege of expression of opinions beyond the civil service rule, so that such expressions could be made publicly as well as pri vately, if not part of a political campaign (14154–14155; 14281). The legislative history hereinabove reviewed shows that although the Congress brought into the statute in a general manner the rules and interpretations of the Civil Service Commission relating to prohibited activities, the special problem of expression of opinions was specially treated by adherence to the well understood meaning of section 9 as originally enacted. Having adopted language which plainly permitted public expression of opinions and having brought forward this language into the amendatory act, the legislative history shows that in seeking to define the term "active part in political management or in political campaigns" the Congress did not intend to override the specific language of section 9. To resolve otherwise any doubt on the subject growing out of the conflict between section 9 and Rule I of the Commission would be contrary to the congressional intention. It is my opinion, therefore, in answer to the third question, that the Hatch Act does not restrict persons subject to its terms to a private expression of opinion on political subjects and candidates, but permits a public expression of such an opinion, provided it is not such as to constitute taking an active part in political management or in political campaigns. Respectfully, ROBERT H. JACKSON. APPEAL TO LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS FROM DECISION OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS The provision that the Register of Copyrights shall perform his duties under the direction and supervision of the Librarian of Congress does not warrant a demand by counsel that the Librarian personally examine upon its merits a claim for copyright registra tion denied by the Register. Even if the duties relating to the registration of copyrights were imposed directly upon the Librarian it would be unnecessary for him to act personally in the examination or reexamination of a particular claim. The PRESIDENT. JANUARY 28, 1941. MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to comply with your request of January 21 for my opinion upon a question submitted to you by the Librarian of Congress as arising under the following section of the Copyright Act, approved March 4, 1909, c. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1085 (U. S. C., title 17, sec. 47): "SEC. 47. That all records and other things relating to copyrights required by law to be preserved shall be kept and preserved in the copyright office, Library of Congress, District of Columbia, and shall be under the control of the register of copyrights, who shall, under the direction and supervision of the Librarian of Congress, perform all the duties relating to the registration of copyrights." It is stated that on December 26, 1939, there was submitted to the Copyright Office with an application for registration a claim of copyright supported by sheets of thick black paper or cardboard with musical symbols, arabic numerals, etc., "all obviously in the public domain," outlined thereon by indentation, "haphazard and at different angles without the slightest correlation as to form and substance, obviously for the purpose of being cut out and individually used in connection with some system or plan of facilitating the reading of music." Registration was refused on the ground that the material was not subject to copyright. Subsequently counsel for the applicant filed with the Librarian an "appeal" from this decision of the Copyright Office. No statute or regulation purports to authorize any such appeal. Since the Register of Copyrights by express provision of law performs his duties "under the direction and supervision of the Librarian of Congress" and must be presumed to have so acted when denying the application for registration, it might be thought that the so-called appeal more nearly approximated a request for reconsideration. In any event, the Librarian caused the application to be reexamined by the Register of Copyrights, and thereafter the applicant was informed that upon reconsideration it appeared that the application had been properly denied. It is stated that "it seemed apparent to the Examining Section, to the Revisory Board, to the Senior Attorney, to the Assist * ant Register * as well as to the Register of Copyrights himself, that this material was not copyrightable." Counsel now demands that the Librarian personally undertake a reexamination of the case upon its merits, relying on the provision that the Register shall perform his duties under the direction and supervision of the Librarian. The statute does not warrant any such demand. The provision is that the duties relating to the registration of copyrights shall be performed, not by the Librarian, but by the Register of Copyrights under the direction and supervision of the Librarian; and even if the duties were imposed directly upon the Librarian it would be unnecessary for him to act personally in the examination or reexamination of a particular claim. As pointed out in the Attorney General's opinion of October 14, 1933, 39 Op. 541, to the Secretary of Commerce: "The theory underlying the vesting in an executive officer of numerous duties, varying in importance, is not that he will personally perform all of them, but rather that he will see to it that they are performed, the responsibility being his and he being chargeable with the result. The accomplishment of this is one of the highest responsibilities of an executive and there is not, and in reason cannot be, any set formula by which it is to be done." It is my opinion that no further action by the Librarian is required. Respectfully, MATTHEW F. McGUIRE, NEUTRALITY ACT-SUBSCRIPTION TO NEW ZEALAND WAR LOAN BY FOREIGN AGENT OF AMERICAN COMPANY Section 7 of the Neutrality Act of 1939 prohibits the New Zealand agent of an American steamship company from subscribing to a New Zealand Government war loan for the account of the steamship company. THE SECRETARY OF STATE. JANUARY 28, 1941. MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to your letter of December 28, 1940, requesting my opinion whether it |