Interior by the act of March 3, 1899, was subsequently limited by the Weeks Act with regard to forest lands acquired under the later statute. Since the Weeks Act does not mention the act of March 3, 1899, the legislative history of the two statutes must be consulted for an adequate understanding of the problem presented.

The act of March 3, 1899, augmented the power conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior by the act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 482 (43 U. S. C. 934-939), under which railroads are granted rights-of-way "through the public lands of the United States." Chicago, Mil. & St. P. Ry. v. United States, 244 U. S. 351, 357. When the act of 1899 was passed, all forest reservations of the Federal Government were being created out of public lands under authority of section 24 of the act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (16 U. S. C. 471), as amended in the appropriation act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. 11, 34, 36. By the act of February 1, 1905, 33 Stat. 628 (16) U. S. C. 472), the administration of national forest reservations was transferred from the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of Agriculture.

Weeks law forests, on the other hand, are not reserved out of public lands. They are located on lands purchased by the Secretary of Agriculture for the protection of watersheds (section 6). S. Doc. 91, 60th Cong., 1st sess., Cong. Doc. 5240; H. Rept. 1036, 61st Cong., 2d sess., Cong. Doc. 5592. Cf., amendment June 7, 1924, 43 Stat. 654. These lands are to be permanently reserved and to be administered by the Secretary of Agriculture as national forests under the provisions of section 24 of the act of March 3, 1891, as amended (section 11). See Proclamation 2187, July 10, 1936 (50 Stat. 1745). With the exception of the authority conferred on the Secretary of Agriculture to dispose of small agricultural tracts, no interest may "be initiated or perfected" in such lands (section 10). Cf., act of March 3, 1925, 43 Stat. 1215, amending section 7. This prohibition is specific. A special statute subsequent in time prevails over the general provisions of an earlier one, insofar as their terms are inconsistent. United States v. Griffin, 14 Fed. 2d, 326.

The history of the General Exchange Act (act of March 20, 1922, 42 Stat. 465; 16 U. S. C. 485) supports the view that the provision in the act of March 3, 1899, is not applicable

to Weeks law forests. The General Exchange Act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to exchange lands located within the exterior boundaries of national forests. The Attorney General ruled that the Exchange Act does not apply to Weeks law forests (34 Op. 132). When the Congress amended the Weeks Act to permit exchanges of lands within Weeks law reservations, it vested the authority in the Secretary of Agriculture (act of March 3, 1925, 43 Stat. 1215; 16 U. S. C. 516). The power of the Secretary of Agriculture over Weeks law forests is preserved in two other statutes. See Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 262, 277. The appropriation act of March 4, 1911, 36 Stat. 1235, 1253 (16 U. S. C. 523), empowers "the head of the department having jurisdiction over the lands" to grant easements for electrical, telephone, and telegraph purposes over public lands, national forests and reservations (29 Op. 303). The appropriation acts of August 11, 1916, and March 4, 1917, 39 Stat. 462, 1150 (16 U. S. C. 520), authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to permit the prospecting, development, and utilization of mineral resources in Weeks law reservations.

Because of the nature and wording of the Weeks Act and of its general history, it is my opinion that the act of March 3, 1899, does not authorize you to grant a right-of-way for railroad purposes within the Pisgah National Forest, which was acquired and set aside as a national forest under the provisions of the Weeks Act (act of March 1, 1911).

Sincerely yours,

FRANCIS BIDDLE.

VETERANS' PREFERENCE ACT, "UNMARRIED WIDOWS" The term "unmarried widows," as used in section 2 of the Veterans' Preference Act of June 27, 1944, must be interpreted as including only those widows who have not remarried.

The Congress is chargeable with knowledge that the word "widow," as used in the prior law, had been interpreted as including certain remarried widows (a construction that was, at least, doubtful), and also must be presumed to have intended that the added word, “unmarried," be given some effect.

The PRESIDENT.

JUNE 22, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to respond to your request for my opinion on a question submitted by the

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Civil Service Commission concerning the meaning of the term "unmarried widows" as used in section 2 of the Veterans' Preference Act of June 27, 1944, c. 287, 58 Stat. 387 (5 U. S. C. Supp. 851).

Section 2 provides in pertinent part:

"In certification for appointment, in appointment, in reinstatement, in reemployment, and in retention in civilian positions in all establishments, agencies, * * *, preference shall be given to ***; (3) the unmarried widows of deceased ex-servicemen who served on active duty in any branch of the armed forces of the United States during any war, or in any campaign or expedition (for which a campaign badge has been authorized), and who were separated therefrom under honorable conditions * * *"" [Italics supplied.]

Prior statutes and Executive orders granted preference to "widows."* Prior to the act of June 27, 1944, the Commission construed the term "widow" in these prior statutes and Executive orders as including, in certain instances, remarried widows. This construction of the term is reflected in the following Minute adopted by the Commission on June 29, 1936:

"A widow of an honorably discharged soldier, sailor or marine, who remarries shall be entitled to the benefits of widow's preference, provided that it is shown that her subsequent marriage has been dissolved either by the death of her second husband or by divorce without fault on the part of the wife. The same rule shall apply to successive marriages."

Two memoranda which accompanied the Commission's letter show that there is a difference of opinion among the members of the legal staff of the Commission regarding the meaning that should be given the phrase "unmarried widows" in section 2 of the act of June 27, 1944. One memorandum states that the word "widow" as used in the pension laws had never been construed as including remarried widows, that it was error for the Commission to extend the term through resort to specific statutory provisions relating only to pen

*5 U. S. C. 35; id. 37; 13 U. S. C. 203. Executive Orders, No. 3801, Mar. 3, 1923; No. 5068, Mar. 2, 1929; No. 5610, Apr. 24, 1931; No. 5776, Jan. 18. 1932.

sions, and that the phrase "unmarried widows" should not be construed as including remarried widows in any circumstances. The other memorandum concedes that "it is not quite clear that Minute 2 of June 29, 1936, correctly reflected the general law on the subject," but concludes that the act of June 27, 1944, requires no change in the granting of veterans' preference to widows except elimination from the rule adopted on June 29, 1936, of the qualifying words, "without fault on the part of the wife."

The legislative history of the act of June 27, 1944, contains no statements directly indicating the meaning that the Congress intended to give the phrase "unmarried widows" in section 2 of the statute. The Minute of June 29, 1936, reflecting the Commission's construction of the law as it existed prior to the act of June 27, 1944, appears from the memoranda accompanying the Commission's letter to have been based on provisions in pension laws administered by the Veterans' Administration. It further appears that the probable purpose of the Commission in adopting the Minute of June 29, 1936, was to grant veterans' preference to widows eligible for pensions. Actually, however, the definition as worded in the Minute appears to include certain groups of remarried widows to whom the Congress had specifically denied pensions.

Resort to the pension laws for guidance in administering veterans' preference statutes is entirely proper. The Commission was justified in seeking such guidance when it framed its Minute of June 29, 1936, and in its consideration of the problem presently before it. Yet resort to the pension laws is not conclusive, and in the present circumstances appears to afford only limited help. The fact that when the Congress has granted pensions to remarried widows it has done so by express language tends to support the view that they are not included in the law under consideration.

Among the statutes which may be cited in this connection. are the acts of March 3, 1901, c. 865, 31 Stat. 1445 (38 U. S. C. 205); September 8, 1916, c. 470, 39 Stat. 845 (38 U. S. C. 285); May 1, 1926, c. 209, 44 Stat. 382 (38 U. S. C. 364a); June 9, 1930, c. 420, 46 Stat. 529 (38 U. S. C. 291b); March 3, 1927, c. 320, 44 Stat. 1362 (38 U. S. C. 381a); March 3, 1944, c. 78, 58 Stat. 109 (38 U. S. C. 381e). All of these pension laws

state with some degree of particularity the circumstances under which a pension may be obtained by a remarried widow of a veteran who served in the wars mentioned in the several statutes. For example, the act of May 1, 1926, as reenacted by the act of August 13, 1935, c. 521, 49 Stat. 614, provides that a remarried widow of a veteran who served in the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection or the Boxer Rebellion is entitled to a pension if subsequent marriages were dissolved by death or by divorce on any ground except adultery on the part of the wife. Remarried widows of Civil War veterans were made subject to the same provision by the act of June 9, 1930. On the other hand, there is no such provision for remarried widows of veterans of World War I; compensation payable to them terminates upon death or remarriage without exception. Act of June 27, 1924, c. 320, 43 Stat. 616, as amended (38 U. S. C. 472f (2)). And the act of March 3, 1944, supra, relating to pensions for widows of veterans of Indian Wars, provides that "pension and increase of pension under this section shall not be paid to the widow who has remarried either once or more than once since the death of the veteran, and upon remarriage of such a widow her pension shall be terminated."

Turning from the pension laws to the veterans' preference laws as they existed prior to the act of June 27, 1944, it will be recalled that those earlier preference statutes referred simply to "widows." It was this expression which was interpreted by the Commission in its Minute of June 29, 1936. In the act of June 27, 1944, the Congress added the qualifying word "unmarried." The Congress is chargeable with knowledge of the interpretation given to the word "widow" in the prior law, and also must be presumed to have intended that the added word, "unmarried," be given some effect. This can be done only by excluding those classes of remarried widows to whom the prior law had been extended through a construction that was, at least, doubtful.

It is therefore my opinion that the term "unmarried widows," as used in section 2 of the act of June 27, 1944, must be interpreted as including only those widows who have not remarried.

Respectfully yours,

FRANCIS BIDDLE.