in court as in connection with other claims asserted by the United States against its citizens.

Aside from these considerations, it is not within the power of the head of a department to enforce such demands by administrative action save with the acquiescence of the employee; and the damage might be great, affecting both willingness and ability to repay.

What is now suggested was, in effect, tried out during the earlier years of our national existence, but with judicial determinations of the liability. I refer to the following statement of the Solicitor for the Government in Dennis v. United States, 2 Ct. Cls. 210, as indicating the view entertained at that time.

"It is undoubtedly true that the claimant could not have proceeded against the vessel, but he might have proceeded against the master. Here it is alleged that the collision resulted from the failure of the government ship to have the required signals. The failure to do this must be regarded as negligence on the part of the master. For such negligence the master, and not the United States, is responsible, and for this the claimant, by the statutes to which reference has been made, has a complete remedy in the district courts."

Numerous suits were filed by private parties against officers and employees of the Government and the judgments obtained were sometimes in amounts so large as to threaten financial ruin and bankruptcy. Notwithstanding the view stated by the Solicitor in Dennis v. United States, the Congress repeatedly came to the relief of the erring officers and employees. Thus, in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 124, the Supreme Court held Captain Murray, of the U. S. Frigate Constellation, personally liable for a tortious seizure, but the Congress made provision for his relief by the act of January 31, 1805, c. 12, 6 Stat. 56. Some of these suits were undoubtedly prosecuted in anticipation of such action by the Congress. In other cases private acts appropriated money for the direct relief of the injured. private persons.

Since that time the Congress has by general legislation progressively assumed liability to persons sustaining injuries through negligence of officers and employees of the Government and in doing so has not made provision for the asser

tion of claims by the United States against the officers and employees causing the damage. A comprehensive review of the course of such legislation (including private acts) in collision cases appears in the Government's brief on reargument in Boston Sand and Gravel Co. v. United States (No. 15, October Term, 1928), 278 U. S. 41.

For the foregoing reasons it is my opinion that there is no authority in the Secretary of Agriculture to require an employee to reimburse the Government for a payment made in settlement of a claim under the act of December 28, 1922. Of course, the employee may be subjected to suitable discipline, including dismissal, if warranted.

Respectfully,

ROBERT H. JACKSON.

AUTHORITY TO PROTECT OIL DEPOSITS AGAINST

DRAINAGE

Where oil is being drained from land not subject to the Mineral Leasing Act there is implied authority in the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction to take protective measures, including the making of necessary contracts.

If it is found advisable or more convenient for the protective action to be taken by another department or agency it is within the power of the President to transfer the necessary authority and jurisdiction.

The PRESIDENT.

APRIL 2, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to confirm the view expressed by me at a recent cabinet meeting that there is implied authority in the Executive branch to take protective measures in cases where lands acquired by the United States for a specific public purpose are found to contain oil which is being drained by adjoining owners-such lands not being subject to the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 (41 Stat. 437), as amended (U. S. C., title 30, sec. 181).

It is my opinion that the authority to take the protective action is vested in the department or agency charged with jurisdiction over the land involved, and includes the making of any necessary contracts.

If, however, it should be determined in particular cases that it is advisable or more convenient for the protective ac

tion to be taken by another department or agency it is within your power to transfer to the latter department or agency by Executive order the necessary authority, duty and jurisdiction with respect to the oil, to be exercised, however, upon the condition and to the extent that there is no interference with the primary use of the land.

Respectfully,

ROBERT H. JACKSON.

REGULATION OF EXPORTS FROM THE CANAL ZONE

Section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940, authorizing the President to prohibit or curtail the exportation of military equipment and other named material, was intended and should be interpreted to include the Canal Zone.

It is desirable that proclamations and regulations previously issued under this section and employing the term "United States" be amended to make clear the scope of their intended operation.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

APRIL 16, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to your letter of April 10, 1941, requesting my opinion whether section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940, c. 508, 54 Stat. 712, 714, may be applied to the Canal Zone, and whether for that purpose an amendment to the proclamations and regulations heretofore issued pursuant to said statute is necessary or desirable.

As pointed out by you, the answer to your first question depends upon whether the statute, since it does not expressly mention the Canal Zone or other outlying possessions, is limited in its application to the continental United States. Section 6 reads in pertinent part:

"Whenever the President determines that it is necessary in the interest of national defense to prohibit or curtail the exportation of any military equipment or munitions, or component parts thereof, or machinery, tools, or material, or supplies necessary for the manufacture, servicing, or operation thereof, he may by proclamation prohibit or curtail such exportation, except under such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe *

In the absence of express statutory provision covering the

point, the question whether an act of Congress is applicable to the various territories and possessions of the United States depends upon the nature and general purposes of the legislation. Thus, in Puerto Rico v. The Shell Company, 302 U. S. 253, the question was raised whether the Sherman Act, prohibiting combinations in restraint of trade "in any Territory of the United States," applied to Puerto Rico. The Supreme Court observed:

66* * * it is evident, from a consideration of the pertinent acts of Congress and the decisions of this court with respect to these acts, that whether Puerto Rico comes within a given congressional act applicable in terms to a 'territory,' depends upon the character and aim of the act. Words generally have different shades of meaning, and are to be construed if reasonably possible to effectuate the intent of the lawmakers; and this meaning in particular instances is to be arrived at not only by a consideration of the words themselves, but by considering, as well, the context, the purposes of the law, and the circumstances under which the words were employed" (pp. 257–258).

Pointing out that "it was apparent that Congress meant to deal comprehensively with the subject of contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade" and "to exert all the power it possessed in respect of the subject matter," the Court concluded that Puerto Rico was embraced within the terms of the act.

Similarly, a statute restricting to 8 hours the daily service. of laborers and mechanics employed upon public works of the United States has been held applicable to the Canal Zone, Attorney General Moody saying:

"Where, therefore, Congress in dealing with a subject matter over which it has full jurisdiction uses general words which do nothing more than Congress has the right to do, no exception from the generality of the words ought to be made unless for the most weighty reasons. There is nothing in the history of the legislation under consideration, nor of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, nor any absurdity in the result which would follow from giving a literal interpretation to its terms, which gives me leave, in my opinion, to declare that a departure from the plain words of the law would be warranted" (25 Op. 441, 447).

Likewise, in 30 Op. 271 Attorney General McReynolds held applicable to the Canal Zone an act prohibiting the admission of opium, for other than medicinal purposes, “into the United States, or into any territory under the control or jurisdiction thereof." See, also, Panama Agencies Company v. Franco, 111 F. (2d) 263, where the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that stevedores injured on ships in Canal Zone ports were covered by the Merchant Marine Act (U. S. C., title 46, sec. 688). For situations in which there was found no intention on the part of the Congress to include the Canal Zone within the terms of the statute in question, see 27 Op. 136; 27 Op. 594; 30 Op. 139; see, also, Luckenbach Steamship Company v. United States, 280 U. S. 173.

The provision here involved is designed to prohibit or curtail the exportation of equipment and supplies “necessary in the interest of national defense." Its purpose is to prevent loss of jurisdiction over materials vital to national defense. See H. Repts. Nos. 2261 and 2685, 76th Cong., 3rd sess; S. Rept. No. 1649, 76th Cong., 3rd sess; Cong Rec., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., pp. 10397, 11888-11889, 12047. The provision contains no express limitation, and no language implying any limitation, in its application to territory subject to the jurisdiction of the Congress. It seems apparent from the nature of the enactment and from its legislative history that the Congress meant to "deal comprehensively" with the problem and to "exert all the power it possessed in respect of the subject matter." I see no reason to confine the effect of the provision to the continental United States.

This conclusion is confirmed by reference to other provisions of the act. Thus, section 1 (a) authorizes the Secretary of War to provide the necessary construction "at military posts, depots, stations, or other localities" of plants, buildings, facilities, utilities, and appurtenances thereto, "for the development, manufacture, maintenance, and storage of military equipment munitions, and supplies, and for shelter." It can scarcely be open to question that this provision includes military posts at the Canal Zone. It is thus apparent that the statute as a whole was not designed to be limited to any geographical regions.

For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that sec