seem to penalize a purchase by such an alien for the benefit of, or for resale to, another alien who might himself have. made the original purchase. In the present situation Filipino purchasers will no doubt wish to make resales to other Filipino citizens or to make purchases as known agents for Filipino citizen principals. It is wholly unintended that criminal sanctions be applied to such normal transactions. The criminal provisions should be construed together with the authorization in the first proviso to make sales to aliens. Where sales to a specified group of aliens are authorized in the public interest, the members of that group may purchase for and may resell to all other members of the same group. There remains the question whether the President has delegated to you his powers under section 5 (b), as amended, or under section 12, as amended. Such delegation is authorized both by the original statute (sec. 5a; 50 U. S. C. Appendix, 5; United States v. Chemical Foundation, supra, p. 13) and by the 1941 amendment (sec. 5b; 50 U. S. C. Appendix, 616). I find that the President's powers under both sections have been delegated to you by various Executive orders. See Markham v. Cabell, supra, concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Burton. "All power and authority conferred upon the President by sections of the said Trading with * 12 * * * "were delegated to the Enemy Act, as amended the Attorney General by Executive Order No. 8136 of May 15, 1939 (4 F. R. 2044), and subsequently were transferred to you by Executive Order No. 9142 of April 21, 1942 (7 F. R. 2985). Presidential powers under section 5 (b), as amended, were delegated to you and to the Secretary of the Treasury severally by paragraph 12 of Executive Order No. 9095 of March 11, 1942, as amended by Executive Order No. 9193 of July 6, 1942 (7 F. R. 5205). For the forgoing reasons it is my opinion that you are authorized, on making the determination required by the statute, to sell property in the Philippine Islands to Filipinos. Responding to your further inquiry, and aside from considerations of policy, I do not feel that as a matter of law an additional personal approval by the President is required. Sincerely yours, TOM C. CLARK. DISPOSITION OF VESSELS STRICKEN FROM NAVY REGISTER Under section 5 of the act of March 3, 1883, vessels stricken from the Navy Register may be sold to foreign governments. Such authority has not been rescinded by section 4 of the act of February 19, 1943, or other legislation. The disposal authority conferred by the Surplus Property Act of 1944 is in addition to, not instead of, other statutory disposal authority. Repeal of a statute or a part thereof by implication is not favored. The intention of the legislature to repeal "must be clear and manifest." The PRESIDENT. March 26, 1946. MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to comply with your request of February 11, 1946, for my opinion on the following two questions: 1. Whether section 5 of the act of March 3, 1883, c. 141, 22 Stat. 582, 599 (34 U. S. C. 492), "authorizes the sale to a foreign government of vessels stricken from the Navy Register"; and 2. "If so, whether the power to do so has been limited or qualified" by section 4 of the act of February 19, 1943, c. 1, 57 Stat. 4 (22 U. S. C., Sup. IV, following Sec. 412) or other legislation. Section 5 of the act of March 3, 1883, authorizes the Secretary of the Navy, subject to certain restrictions not pertinent here, to sell vessels of the Navy which have been stricken from the Navy Register, as "unfit for further service," pursuant to the provisions of the act of August 5, 1882, c. 391, 22 Stat. 284, 296 (34 U. S. C. 491). It provides also that no vessel of the Navy shall be sold except in accordance with this section, unless the President directs otherwise in writing. The Secretary of the Navy is not prohibited by the terms of the section from selling such Navy vessels to foreign governments. Moreover, the authority conferred upon the President by the section has been broadly construed. Levinson v. United States, 258 U. S. 198, 201. In my opinion the President and the Secretary of the Navy may, under authority of this section, sell such vessels of the Navy to foreign governments. See 39 Op. A. G. 484, 489. I turn, therefore, to the question whether the powers granted by this section have been limited or qualified by section 4 of the act of February 19, 1943, or by other legislation. Section 4 provides: "SEC. 4. Hereafter any ship, boat, barge, or floating drydock of the Navy may be leased in accordance with the act approved March 11, 1941 (55 Stat. 31), but not otherwise disposed of, for periods not beyond the termination of the present wars, but title thereto shall remain in the United States." (The act of March 11, 1941, c. 11, 55 Stat. 31 (22 U. S. C., Sup. IV, 411-419), is commonly known as the Lend-Lease Act.) Attorney General Biddle has already held that section 5 of the earlier act has not been repealed by this provision. 40 Op. A. G. 321, June 14, 1944. The opinion reserved the question whether the power "to sell any vessel of the Navy to any foreign government under section 5 of the act of March 3, 1883, * * * has been limited or qualified by the enactment of section 4 of the act of February 19, 1943." For the reasons stated in that opinion, I agree that section 5 of the 1883 act has not been repealed by the 1943 provision. I am of the opinion, furthermore, that no distinction has been drawn therein, with respect to vessels stricken from the Navy Register, between domestic sales and sales to foreign govern ments. Attorney General Biddle's opinion demonstrates, by a consideration of the language of section 4 of the act of February 19, 1943, the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act, and the legislative history of the 1943 statute, that section 4 thereof was designed to limit the power conferred by the Lend-Lease Act to dispose of vessels to foreign governments, rather than to limit disposal powers granted by other statutes. Section 3 (a) (2) of the Lend-Lease Act empowered the President, in the interest of national defense, to sell or otherwise dispose of "defense articles," including Navy vessels, to foreign governments. The section provided further, however, that defense articles "procured from funds hereafter appropriated to any department or agency of the Government," other than from funds expressly appropriated for lend-lease purposes, "shall not be disposed of in any way under authority of [section 3 (a) (2)] except to the extent hereafter authorized by the Congress in the acts appropriating such funds or otherwise." Accordingly, the acts of February 7 and October 26, 1942, c. 46, Title III, * * * Sec. 301, 56 Stat. 82, c. 629, Title I, sec. 103, 56 Stat. 994, (22 U. S. C., Sup. IV, following sec. 412) authorized Navy ships procured from later appropriations to be disposed of under the Lend-Lease Act provided they were only leased for a period not exceeding the duration. (See 88 Cong. Rec. 902, 904, 7962.) These provisions refer only to "ships." It appears that the primary purpose of section 4 of the 1943 measure was to amplify the term "ships," used in these statutes, by adding boats, barges, and floating drydocks (89 Cong. Rec. 517). The close connection between the 1943 measure and such predecessor legislation supplementing the Lend-Lease Act confirms the conclusion that section 4 was intended to prescribe the kind of disposition of Navy vessels permitted under the Lend-Lease Act and not to preclude sales under other statutory authority. The reason for limiting the power to dispose of Navy vessels to foreign governments under the Lend-Lease Act, while not so limiting it under the act of March 3, 1883, with respect to vessels stricken from the Navy Register, is plain. The LendLease Act, as supplemented, is concerned, among other things, with vessels of the Navy that are fit for further duty. The legislative history of the act of February 19, 1943, shows that the Congress wished to render aid to our allies through the Lend-Lease program, but did not wish such aid to impair the postwar fighting strength of our own Navy. The dual purpose could be served best by permitting the Government, under the Lend-Lease Act, to lease serviceable vessels of the Navy to the United Nations for the duration (H. Rept. 65, 78th Cong., 1st sess., p. 4; S. Rept. 51, 78th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 3-4; 89 Cong. Rec. 517, 518, 519, 935). Since the LendLease Act, as supplemented, was broad enough to cover Navy vessels fit for further service, section 5 of the act of February 19, 1943, understandably confined the disposal authority, under the Lend-Lease Act, in the case of vessels of the Navy, to duration leases. These considerations do not apply to the disposal, under the act of March 3, 1883, of vessels stricken from the Navy Register because they are not fit for Navy duty. Moreover, it necessarily follows from Attorney General Biddle's opinion, cited above, that section 4 of the act of February 19, 1943, does not prohibit domestic sales of stricken Navy vessels and there is nothing in the language or legislative history of the section to suggest any distinction between domestic and foreign sales of such vessels. Your letter refers to the fact that the vessels in question include "vessels of the categories mentioned in section 3 (d) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944," c. 479, 58 Stat. 765, 767 (50 U. S. C., App. 1612). The Surplus Property Act authorizes the sale or other disposition of "property" as defined in section 3 (d). Section 3 (d) defines "property" broadly to include "any interest" of the United States but expressly excepts certain kinds of property, including "naval vessels of the following categories: Battleships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers, and submarines." With respect to other naval vessels, it thus appears that the Surplus Property Act confers authority to sell to foreign governments (cf. sec. 32 (b), c. 479, 58 Stat. 782, 50 U. S. C., App. 1641 (b)). This is in addition to, not instead of, other statutory disposal authority (sec. 34 (a), c. 479, 58 Stat. 783, 50 U. S. C., App. 1643 (a)). With respect to naval vessels of the categories named in section 3 (d), the Surplus Property Act does not expand or contract disposal powers conferred by other laws (ibid.). The possibility that such vessels might be disposed of "under provisions of [other] existing law[s]" was expressly recognized in the Conference Report on the Surplus Property Act (H. Rept. 1890, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 25). No opinion has been requested, and none is expressed, as to the scope of regulations that may be issued under section 34 (a) thereof. Since your letter assumes that the vessels in question have been or will be certified under section 14 (a) of the act of June 28, 1940, c. 440, 54 Stat. 681 (34 U. S. C. 546e), not to be essential to the defense of the United States, I express no views as to its application. My attention has not been called to any other provision which might be deemed to limit or qualify section 5 of the act of March 3, 1883. * "It is a cardinal principle of construction that repeals by implication are not favored. *The intention of the legislature to repeal 'must be clear and manifest."" United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198-199. I find no "clear and manifest" purpose on the part of the Congress, in the act of February 19, 1943, or in other statutes, to abrogate the authority contained in section 5 of the act of March 3, 1883, 798037-49- -30 |