missioner Flemming, United States Civil Service Commission, Hearings on S. 1762 and H. R. 4115, Senate Committee on Civil Service, 78th Cong., 2d sess., May 19, 1944, p. 30.)1 This mere advisory effect of an appeal under section 14 is to be contrasted with the binding nature of the decision in efficiency rating appeals available to the veteran preference employee under section 9 of the Classification Act, as amended. Section 18 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 specifically provides that the act "shall not be construed to take away from any preference eligible any rights heretofore granted to, or possessed by, him under any existing **" This would indicate a congressional intent that the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 should not be construed as repealing the right to appeal an efficiency rating to a board of review granted under 5 U. S. C. 669. law * Moreover, the Supreme Court has often held that repeals by implications are not favored and that statutes should not be construed so as to work such a repeal unless the intention of the legislation is "clear and manifest." E. g., United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198 (1939). In this respect, the issue in the instant situation is analogous to that involved in the case of United States v. Burroughs and James Cannon, Jr., 289 U. S. 159 (1933), in which the Court construed two statutes governing criminal appeals. The act of March 3, 1901 (31 Stat. 1189, 1341), applicable only to the District of Columbia, sanctioned appeals by the Government to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in criminal cases. The Criminal Appeals Act (act of March 2, 1907, 34 Stat. 1246), adopted six years later, sanctioned appeals by the Government direct to the Supreme Court "in all criminal cases." The Court held that the later general statute 1 The President's letter of August 23, 1945, to the heads of the executive departments and agencies, while apparently recognizing that the decisions of the Civil Service Commission in appeals under section 14 are not binding as a matter of law on the employing agencies, requested such agencies to give effect to the Commission's decisions. The President said: "It is my desire that the heads of all departments and agencies arrange to put into effect as promptly as possible the recommendations which the Civil Service Commission makes under section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944." did not work a repeal of the earlier statute and that the only appellate remedy was the one specifically granted in the earlier statute. The Court said at pages 163–164: * * * * "That section [the act of March 3, 1901] deals comprehensively with appeals in criminal cases from all of the courts of first instance of the District and confers on the Court of Appeals jurisdiction of appeals by the Government seeking review of the judgments of those courts. The Criminal Appeals Act, on the other hand, contains no repealing clause, and no reference to the courts of the District of Columbia *. We cannot construe it as impliedly repealing the complete appellate system created for the District of Columbia by [the act of March 3, 1901] in the absence of expression on the part of Congress indicating that purpose. Implied repeals are not favored; and if effect can reasonably be given to both statutes, the presumption is that the earlier is intended to remain in force.” [Italics supplied.] * * * * * * The reasoning applied by the Court in the Burroughs case may be applied here. 5 U. S. C. 669 deals specifically with efficiency rating appeals. Neither section 12 nor section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 mentions efficiency ratings or the review thereof on appeal. The earlier specific legislation should not be construed as having been repealed by the later general statute which makes no reference to the subject matter specifically covered in the earlier act without a clear "expression on the part of Congress indicating that purpose.". To hold that the appeal under section 14 was intended as a substitute for 5 U. S. C. 669, and repealed the latter statute pro tanto, would be contrary to the basic purpose and spirit of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944. Such a construction would mean not only that a right of appeal with the appellate decision being binding on the employing agency had been revoked and a right of appeal in which the decision was purely advisory had been substituted in place thereof, but also that veteran preference eligibles would have a less effective right to challenge efficiency ratings (under section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944) than non-veterans who would remain subject to 5 U. S. C. 669. It is evident that the main purpose of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, was to fortify and broaden the preferences and rights of veteran preference eligibles rather than to restrict them (S. Rept. 907, 78th Cong., 2d sess., Hearings on S. 1762 and H. R. 4115, supra, p. 8) and the statute should be construed so as to give effect to this purpose. Cf. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U. S. 178, 194 (1922). For these reasons I am of the opinion that the right to challenge an efficiency rating by appeal under 5 U. S. C. 669 was in no way affected by the enactment of sections 12 and 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 and remains in full force and effect. I have also considered a possible construction of these statutes whereby the merits of an efficiency rating might be challenged in both types of appeals, i. e., appeals under sections 12 and 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 and appeals under 5 U. S. C. 669. However, as the Supreme Court held in the Burroughs case, supra, where a specific appellate remedy is granted by an earlier statute, a later general statute should not be construed as providing a duplicate and additional remedy in the absence of a clear legislative intent. Moreover, such a construction would involve substantial administrative difficulties and would be, on the whole, an unreasonable construction. For example, under the Civil Service Commission regulations, the decisions of the Commission in appeals under section 12 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 are binding on the employing agency (5 C. F. R. (1945 Supp.) sec. 12.314). Decisions of a board of review under 5 U. S. C. 669 are likewise binding. If the merits of an efficiency rating could be challenged in both types of appeal, there would exist the possibility of conflicting decisions on the same issue by different appellate bodies with both decisions purporting to bind the employing agency. This construction would also involve duplication of effort and expense. Under it, an issue raised and adjudicated in one appeal could be raised again and readjudicated in a second appeal to a different agency. I am therefore of the opinion that the Civil Service Commission may not consider the merits of an efficiency rating made under the uniform system in connection with any appeal filed under sections 12 or 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944. In my opinion the appeal provided under 5 U. S. C. 669 is the only method which may be utilized for challenging the merits of such an efficiency rating. I note from the regulations governing appeals under 5 U. S. C. 669 that the Civil Service Commission may, on its own motion, obtain the review of an efficiency rating by a board of review, and that boards of review may grant appeals after the usual ninety-day limitation has expired (5 C. F. R. Cum. Supp., sec. 56.4). These provisions offer a safeguard against arbitrary action to both the Civil Service Commission and the employee concerned where discharge or reduction in compensation is proposed on the basis of an "unsatisfactory" or “fair” efficiency rating and there has been no review of such rating by a board of review. As to employees not subject to the uniform efficiency rating system, the Civil Service Commission is of the opinion that it may properly consider and adjudicate all matters at issue in appeals under section 12 or section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act. I see no reason to dissent from that conclusion. The answer I have given to the above question disposes of the case which prompted the Civil Service Commission's request for my opinion and it is therefore unnecessary to decide the other question asked by the Commission. Respectfully yours, J. HOWARD MCGRATH TRANSFER OF PROPERTY BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Sections 3732 and 3736 R. S., which impose certain restrictions on contracts and purchases on behalf of the United States, have no application to interagency transfers made under clear authority of law. Executive Order No. 9689 and the First War Powers Act, 1941 (55 Stat. 838), under which it was issued, supply the War Assets Administration with ample authority to acquire from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and to hold property and leases transferred to it pursuant to an order of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The PRESIDENT. SEPTEMBER 6, 1946. MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to comply with your request for my opinion upon the two questions set forth in the following paragraph of a letter addressed to you by the War Assets Administrator: "There is attached a letter addressed to the Attorney General requesting his opinion [1] as to whether or not title to real property acquired through the use of funds of Reconstruction Finance Corporation during the period it was acting as a disposal agency under the Surplus Property Act of 1944 may be transferred to the United States of America, represented by the War Assets Administrator, when such transfer is not expressly authorized by law. An opinion is also requested [2] with respect to the assignment by Reconstruction Finance Corporation of certain leases of real property which provide for a term in excess of one year." The first question is raised because of the provision in section 3736 R. S. (41 U. S. C. 14) that "no land shall be purchased on account of the United States, except under a law authorizing such purchase." The second question is said to arise by reason of the provision in section 3732 R. S. (41 U. S. C. 11) that "no contract or purchase on behalf of the United States shall be made, unless the same is authorized by law or is under an appropriation adequate to its fulfillment," with exceptions not here pertinent. The War Assets Administration was created by Executive Order No. 9689, issued January 31, 1946. This order was clearly authorized by section 1 of the First War Powers Act, 1941 (approved December 18, 1941, c. 593, 55 Stat. 838; 50 U. S. C. Appendix 601). Section 4 of the order provided as follows: "There shall be transferred to the agencies to which functions are transferred by this order so much as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine to relate primarily to such functions, respectively, of the records, administrative property, personnel, and funds of the Surplus Property Administration, the Office of War Mobilization and and Reconversion, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the War Assets Corporation. All authorizations, com |